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Preface 
Migration, asylum and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice continue to be some of the 
most discussed and topical policy areas of the European Union. 
The Erasmus+ Strategic Partnership entitled Innovative Solutions for Practicality and Impact 
in Refugee and Migration Oriented Education (INSPIRED) has aimed inter alia at improving 
the quality and relevance of legal education in the field of refugee and migration oriented 
education at the partner universities. It has undertaken to introduce innovative learning methods 
in legal education such as virtual mobility and the strategic use of information and 
communication technology, as well as to strengthen the quality of specialized education through 
international mobility and cross-border cooperation. 
In this spirit, the INSPIRED project has organized two Intensive Programmes (one in Opatija, 
Croatia and one in Vilnius, Lithuania) for students of the partner universities. The research 
papers contained in this volume have been prepared by the students taking part in these 
Intensive Programmes – they have been reviewed and selected for publication by the 
participating lecturers of the project.  
The editors hope that these research papers will also encourage other students to look deeper 
into the complex legal issues surrounding migration and asylum in the European Union. 
 
 
The editors 
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Current Trends in the Application of the principle of non-
refoulement in the Practice of the ECtHR 
RIČARDAS DOBROVOLSKIS, GABRIELĖ VIDUOLYTĖ  
Law students, Mykolas Romeris University 
Non-refoulement is one of the cornerstones of asylum law, its proper application is one of the 
most crucial prerequisites to achieving the goals of international law on asylum. This paper 
looks at the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as regards the non-
refoulement principle and aims to highlight some of its characteristic elements. 
Keywords: refugee status; principle of non-refoulement; principle of non-refoulement on the 
high seas; fundamental human rights. 
1. Introduction 
The free movement of persons is one of the greatest achievements of the project of European 
integration. The implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 starts a new part of the 
history of the EU.1 With this benefit came lots of obligations concerning asylum and 
immigration. Basically, such situations took huge proportions when the conflicts in the Middle 
East began and left Europe with thousands of refugees.2 The term 'refugee' is often interpreted 
more broadly than its legal definition, including all people who flee their homes and seek 
asylum for damage. In this context, one can name those who can force someone to flee to 
security, including war or civil conflict, domestic violence, poverty and natural or man-made 
disasters, and that is not an exhaustive list. If a state does not satisfy a person's request for 
refugee status and such a decision is not based on general principles and legislation governing 
such procedures, the expulsion of the alien back from the country from which he or she arrived 
may adversely affect that person's life on the grounds that he or she is at risk in the country of 
origin a real life threat that violates Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits “torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment."3 The Refugee Convention also regulates the principle 
of non-refoulement in Article 33, but recognizes people as refugees only if they move from 
their country to persecution for their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
 
1 The Schengen area and cooperation.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33020&from=EN  
2 K. C. Do Monte Vilar: The closing borders and refugees violations of human rights. IED Research Project: 
“Migration, borders control and solidarity: Schengen at stake?” 
https://www.iedonline.eu/download/2016/schengen/DO-MONTE-
VILAR.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3_byRfFHF5VNEMR382SBXzoAzQrj_ukW8dUzLcJQ-szzkFBDAeoQLZ7xg  
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Rome, 4.XI.1950.  Article 3 – 
Prohibition of torture. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
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social group or political opinion.4 This article will focus on the above-mentioned international 
documents and their application in court practice and evaluation.  
2. Practical aspects of the principle of non-refoulement 
From the beginning of the application of the legislation to the case-law, it appears that the 
Refugee Convention contains clear exceptions to the prohibition of expulsion and non-return 
of recognized refugees and asylum seekers, although they apply only in exceptional 
circumstances. “This interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHR can serve as a useful “safety net” 
for refugees or asylum-seekers considered by UNHCR to be wrongly denied or deprived of 
international protection. It must also be noted that by adopting this position the Court 
consequently provides protection from expulsion or extradition in situations where the 
exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention would apply to deny refugee status. The 
ECHR has no such limitations and the Contracting parties must then always secure the rights 
guaranteed under Article 3 “however heinous the crime allegedly committed”.18 By extension, 
Article 3 ECHR is also potentially relevant in cases raising issues under Articles 1C or 1D of 
the 1951 Convention.”5 
Also, like it was stated in the case Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden “an issue may arise under 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if a Contracting State deports an alien who has suffered or 
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the receiving State, the outcome of which was 
or is likely to be the death penalty.6 The Court noted that the Swedish Government had obtained 
no guarantee from the Syrian authorities that Mr. Bader’s case would be re-opened and that the 
public prosecutor would not request the death penalty at any retrial. In those circumstances, the 
Swedish authorities would be putting Mr. Bader at serious risk by sending him back to Syria. 
The Court considered that Mr. Bader had a justified and well-founded fear that the death 
sentence against him would be executed if he was forced to return to his home country. 
Moreover, since executions are carried out without any public scrutiny or accountability, the 
circumstances surrounding his execution would inevitably cause Mr. Bader considerable fear 
and anguish while he and the other applicants would all face intolerable uncertainty about when, 
where and how the execution would be carried out.7 It should be up to the country in which the 
applicant is seeking for an asylum to check if the evidence are concrete or not. Basically the 
applicant has to show his concern that his life or health is in danger due to an unfair trail. In this 
case Sweden did not check all necessary circumstances and if the applicant were deported back 
to his country of origin a violation of article 3 of ECHR might occur. In this case, the main 
factor was the threat of the death penalty, which is a denial of basic human rights; it violates 
one of the fundamental principles of universally recognized human rights law that states must 
 
4 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.  
5 European Court of Human Rights. Chahal v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 
22414/93, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V. 
6 European Court of Human Rights. Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, No 13284/04, Judgment of 8 November 2005. 
7 Ibid. 
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recognize the right to life. The UN General Assembly8, a representative institution of 
recognized states, called for an end to the death penalty, and human rights organizations agree 
that its imposition violates fundamental human rights standards. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the countries to which foreigners are subjected to the death penalty in their country of origin 
should be particularly careful and as detailed as possible with the information provided by the 
applicant for refugee status, so as not only to violate fundamental human rights, but also to 
respect the principle of non-refoulement the alien is in real danger in his country of origin. 
The principle of non-refoulement fully applies on the high seas, where EU Member States’ 
authorities remain liable for their conduct. Therefore, they have an obligation to assess the 
situation in the state of envisaged disembarkation and refrain from disembarking people if the 
third country lacks an asylum system or if the returned people would be at risk of ill-treatment 
or refoulement. Otherwise, EU Member States become accountable for refoulement. Regulation 
(EU) reminds EU Member States of their non-refoulement obligation.9 This obligation is 
triggered whenever they “are aware or ought to be aware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that third country amount 
to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a serious risk of being 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or where they are aware or ought to be aware that 
that third country engages in practices in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement”.10  
States not uncommonly seek to intercept unauthorised arrivals on the high seas. Ordinarily some 
opportunity is given for people to make asylum claims, and some examination is made of the 
claims. The issue was raised in stark terms in the US in 1993 when the US Supreme Court 
decided 8 to 1 that Article 33(1) does not have extraterritorial effect.11 The Court relied on 
textual arguments including that “return” in Article 33(1) referred to the defensive act of 
resistance or expulsion at the border rather than to transporting a person to a particular 
destination. The Court concluded: The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol 
… may not have contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them 
to the one country they had desperately sought to escape; such actions may even violate the 
spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on 
those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian intent.12 Because the text of 
Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens 
outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions. 
 
8 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2014 [on the report of the Third Committee 
(A/69/488/Add.2 and Corr.1)] 69/186. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty. 
9 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 
et al, 509 US 155, United States Supreme Court, 21 June 1993  
12 Ibid. 
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In the case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy13, Somali and Erirean migrants travelling from Libya 
who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya. Returning 
them to Libya without examining their case exposed them to risk of ill-treatment and amount 
to collective expulsion. There had been two violations of Article 3 of the Convention because 
the Applicants had been exposed to the risk of ill-treatment in Libya and of repatriation14 to 
Somalia or Eritrea.  In its judgment, the Court took into account the fact that the situation in 
Libya was known and there were no difficulties in its examination at the time of the facts, the 
Italian authorities had to or should have known that they would violate the provisions of the 
Convention when adopting such decisions. In addition, the fact that the Applicants have been 
unable to apply for asylum explicitly does not justify dismissing Italy from its obligations under 
the Convention and bilateral agreements. The Court drew attention to the obligations of States 
arising from international refugee law, including the principle of 'non-refoulement’.  
The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee 
protection. It is enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which is also binding on States 
Party to the 1967 Protocol.5 Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention provides: “No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.15  According 
to this case, it can be argued that the principle of non-refoulement for any State action taken 
outside the state should lead to the conclusion that an individual prohibition on the assessment 
of asylum applications and the related expulsion of the ban is not limited to land and state, but 
also to the open sea.  Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, non-refoulement not only refers to 
returns or expulsions of people who are already within a host state’s territory, but also 
encompasses rejection at the borders.16  
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has indeed stressed that the principle of 
non-refoulement applies equally on a state’s territory, at a state’s borders, and on the high seas. 
17 It is clear from the case-law that the principle of non-refoulement in the high seas is still 
being developed on the basis of the above cases. And for an alien who is detained on the high 
seas, his request to be granted refugee status will depend more on the state of regulation in this 
matter. However, states that apply for refugee status still need to assess that the applicant does 
not violate the general principles, along with the principle of non-refoulement, which is a real 
threat in his country of origin. 
 
13 European Court of Human Rights. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (GC), Application No. 27765/09. 
14 The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention does establish explicitly that the “voluntary character of repatriation shall 
be respected in all cases” and that no refugee shall be repatriated against his or her will (Art. 5 of the OAU 
Convention).  
15 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
16 Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.  
17 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. General Assembly. Supplement No. 12 
(A/53/12).  
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3. Applicability and inapplicability of article 3 of ECHR 
In the case M.A and Others v. Lithuania18, M.A that has a Russian nationality and lived in 
Chechen Republic, was tortured by the Russian Security services. After refusing to become an 
informer, he and his family in April 2019 left their home in the Chechen Republic and travelled 
to Belarus with the intention of seeking asylum in Poland.  M.A. made three attempts in 
crossing the border between countries and ware denied on the basis that they do not have valid 
visas or residence permit although all three time they wrote the word “azul’” that is often used 
by Chechen asylum seekers to mean “asylum” on the refusal decisions. Every time they 
received a denial in Lithuanian or English and when there legal stay expired in 10 July 2017 
and they returned to Russia, the applicant was detained and reported to be beaten. In January 
2018 the applicants managed to submit the asylum applications in Poland were they also stated 
that by failing to initiate asylum proceedings and returning them to Belarus, the Lithuanian 
authorities exposed them to a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment in Russia, in violation 
of Article 3. 
The court stated that in the circumstances of this case, the central question to be answered is 
not whether the applicants faced a real risk of ill-treatment in Chechnya, but whether the 
Lithuanian authorities carried out an adequate assessment of the applicants’ claim that they 
would be at such a risk before returning them to Belarus on the three occasions. The 
Government stated that the applicant did not submitted any asylum applications at the border, 
but during the first attempt to enter Lithuania the applicants had written the word “azul” 
meaning asylum, on all seven decision forms which they had been given to sign, also the court 
reiterated that neither Lithuanian nor international law required asylum applications to be 
lodged in a specific form and emphasized the importance of ensuring adequate interpretation 
for asylum-seekers at the border. Furthermore, the Court found that there was not any 
assessment at all whether it was safe to return the applicants (a family with five very young 
children) to Belarus. Therefore, the Court held that the failure to allow the applicants to submit 
asylum applications and their removal to Belarus on 16 April, 11 May and 22 May 2017, in the 
absence of any examination of their claim that they would face a real risk of return to Chechnya 
and ill-treatment there, amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 
The main problem in the Lithuanian case was that, basically the authorities did absolutely 
nothing to prevent the violations of M.A. and his family’s rights, nor they did try to see if the 
person met the required conditions. In the case Saadi v. The United Kingdom “The Court 
therefore sees no reason to modify the relevant standard of proof, as suggested by the third-
party intervener, by requiring in cases like the present that it be proved that subjection to ill-
treatment is “more likely than not”. One the contrary, it reaffirms that for a planned forcible 
expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial 
grounds to have been shown for that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be 
 
18 European Court of Human Rights. Case of M.A. and Others v. Lithuania. Application no. 59793/17 
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subjected in the receiving country to the treatment prohibited by Article 3)”19 The Lithuanian 
authorities did nothing to investigate M.A. and his family’s case and did not examine if there 
were any risk for M.A. and his family to return to his home country. From the moment 
Lithuanian authorities denied M.A and his family’s request, they were condemned to return to 
Russia were there human rights (that are laid down in article 3 of ECHR) were violated. 
In the case of X v. The Netherlands20 on 6 July 2012 the applicant left his home in Salouin 
(Morocco), where he had been living with his parents, in the Netherlands. He went to the 
Netherlands to visit his family but overstayed his tourist visa, which was valid until 24 August 
2012. During his stay in the Netherlands he lived with his brother and the latter’s family in 
Amsterdam. On 15 October 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed 
acts in preparation of terrorist offences and placed in police custody. When the applicant’s was 
placed in immigration detention, he maintained that he had sufficiently established that he 
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if 
he were expelled to Morocco, given that the Moroccan authorities must be considered to be 
aware of his conviction for terrorism related crimes in the Netherlands, his association with a 
dismantled Moroccan militant cell loyal to the Islamic State and his asylum application in the 
Netherlands. The ECtHR relied upon available country of origin information on Morocco, such 
as the findings of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the observations of the 
UN Human Rights Committee, and affirmed that ill-treatment and torture by the police and the 
security forces still occur, particularly in the case of persons suspected of terrorism or of 
endangering State security.  
Nevertheless, the Court does not find there to be a general and systematic practice of torture 
and ill-treatment, which is to be determined based on the specific situation of the person 
concerned. In the applicant’s case, while it must be assumed that the Moroccan authorities are 
aware of the nature of the applicant’s conviction in the Netherlands, nothing in the case 
materials indicate that the Moroccan authorities have ever taken any steps demonstrating an 
interest in the applicant, or that the Moroccan judicial authorities would fail to respect the 
principle of ne bis in idem by prosecuting the applicant in Morocco as a terrorist because of his 
conviction in the Netherlands.21 Therefore, the Court found that the assessment by the domestic 
authorities was adequate and sufficiently supported by reliable and objective material and that 
the applicant’s removal to Morocco would not result in a violation of Article 3 ECHR. As it is 
written in Article 33 of 1951 Refugee convention “No Contracting State shall expel or return 
('refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.“22 If Morocco would have shown any interest in the 
 
19 European Court of Human Rights. Case of Saddi v. Italy. (Application no. 37201/06) 
20 European Court of Human Rights. Case of X v. The Netherlands. Application no. 14319/17. 
21 Ibid. 
22 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.  
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applicants case, and there would be statements that his life maybe in danger, the we could 
assume the violation of above mentioned article and the violation of article 3 of ECHR. 
4. Conclusion 
The State and the applicant for refugee status must cooperate throughout the asylum process in 
order to assess every circumstance that may give rise to refugee status due to the real danger in 
the country of origin and to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement is not violated. 
In order to avoid violation of the fundamental human rights and the principle of non-
refoulement of aliens, States must also share responsibility and co-operate in exchanging or 
sharing supplementary information with regard to an applicant for refugee status until his / her 
application is examined and the decision taken. 
The principle of non-refoulement on the high seas, based on case-law which is not 
comparatively large, suggests that each state must rely on its own rules on granting refugee 
status, if that country has such a possibility, but above all that protection must be given to 
fundamental human rights, that is to protect the third country national or stateless person from 
a real threat. 
The state must take all measures to ensure that a person applying for refugee status has every 
opportunity to present the circumstances of the request and information supporting them, who 
also needs personal cooperation. In addition, the State must use all means to verify the 
information and to avoid violation of the principle of non-refoulement or other rules of 
international custom. 
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Challenges of the European Blue Card System 
MIRABELLA KITTI NEZDEI, KRISZTINA HOSSZÚ 
Law students, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law 
The migration is a common topic in the public nowadays. There are illegal and legal migrants 
too, in this paper we would like to show our views in connection with one type of the legal 
migration: the European Blue Card System. The so-called Blue Card Directive is a combination 
of residence and work permits for people with high qualifications and can be classified as third-
country nationals. We would like to show the Directive itself, the problems related to that and 
the questions in connection with the reform, which is undeniably timely – as you will see in the 
paper. 
Keywords: European Union law, blue card system, blue card directive, legal migration, third 
country nationals, labour market, highly qualified workers, intra-EU movement 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, migration is a common topic in the public. When people hear the word "migrant", 
their first thought is that, a migrant is a person who is trying to cross borders without papers, 
who is considered to be an illegal immigrant according to the law. It is important to note, 
however, that not only this type of migration – the illegal – exists, we can also talk about legal 
migration. The migration is legal, if it happens through recognizable, authorized channels, so if 
all legal conditions are fulfilled.1 There are a number of such channels and options, which the 
European Union dealing with. Migration has a significant effect on society, and it has brought 
many troubles with itself, for example terrorist attacks. The European Union also has ambitions 
in this regard, because the EU also wants to strengthen their external borders as well. However, 
it is not the only one problem that it is currently dealing with, because there is a growing lack 
of labour force in the European Union every year, especially the lack of highly qualified 
workers. This is why making a flexible and well-functioning system is very important. The 
European Union’s aspiration for this struggle is called the Blue Card System, which is made 
for highly qualified third-country nationals. We would like to present the problems and 
shortcomings of the system in this study and also, we want to present about the proposed 
revisions to the system.  
 
 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/legal-migration_en (20 March 2019). 
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2. Background 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reads as follows:  
The European Union is developing a common immigration policy aimed at for example 
the effective management of migratory flows at all stages of their treatment, to ensure 
fair treatment for third-country nationals who are legally resident in a Member State.2 
In view of the above, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning entry, stay visas, rules on the 
issuance of long-stay visas and long-term residence permits by Member States, including family 
reunification purposes. 
 It also lays down the rights of third-country nationals legally residing in one of the Member 
States, including the conditions governing the free movement and residence in other Member 
States.3 
According to the Hague Programme (2004)4, legal migration has an important role in the 
strengthening of the knowledge-based European Economy; this also needs a so-called “guided 
migration”5.6 As stated by Roberto Mangabeira Unger: “…with the knowledge economy 
suggests a new criterion of what makes the most advanced practice of production most 
advanced. In one sense, it is the practice of production that is closest to the mind, and especially 
to the part of our mental life that we call the imagination. In another sense, this most mindful 
practice is the one that, among all available forms of economic activity, most intimately and 
continuously connects our experiments in using and transforming nature and our experiments 
in cooperating.”7 
The Council invited the Commission to present a policy plan on legal migration, including 
admission procedures that are able to adapt quickly to fluctuations in demand for migrant labour 
on the labour market.8 
 
2 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, Art. 79 (1) 
3 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, Art. 79 (2). 
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF  
5 Guided migration allows people to travel to Europe in an organized way. This is an opportunity for them to not 
to turn to human smugglers or traffickers. 
6 See Á. Mohay, A nemzetközi migráció jogi aspektusai, különös tekintettel a legális migráció szabályozására az 
Európai Unióban. In: I. Tarrósy & V. Glied & Z. Vörös (eds.): Migráció a 21. században, Publikon Kiadó, Pécs 
2016, 56. p. 
7 R. Mangabera Unger, The Knowledge Economy https://www.oecd.org/naec/THE-KNOWLEDGE-
ECONOMY.pdf (20 March 2019). 
8 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
of highly qualified employment. OJ 2009 L 155/17/4. 
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3. The Blue Card Directive 
The so-called Blue Card Directive aims at facilitating the admission and movement of third-
country nationals for a period of more than three months for high-skilled employment and 
contributing, for example, to addressing labour shortages9 in order to make the Union more 
attractive to such workers from all over the world and to maintain the EU’s competitiveness10 
and economic growth.11 It is also important to mention that there is not one EU Blue Card but 
rather 25 different ones (the scheme applies to all EU member states except the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark).12 
Before we turn to the specific provisions of the directive, we find it important to clarify three 
concepts. The first – which is the simplest – is to define that who is the third country national. 
Well, a third-country national is a non-EU citizen.13 
The second is what is meant by high-qualified employment. The concept consists of three main 
parts. The first part is that the employee carries out real and actual work under the direction of 
another person or for someone else and for that purpose, he is protected in the Member State 
concerned under national labour law and / or national practice irrespective of the legal 
relationship. The second is to get paid for his work, and then to have adequate and specific 
competence, as proven by higher professional qualifications.14 
The third main part is what is the blue card, which is the subject of the Directive. In fact, this is 
a combination of residence and work permits for people with high qualifications and can be 
classified as third-country nationals that I explained above.15 
Of course, the Directive does not apply to all third-country nationals. For example, it doesn’t 
apply to those who hold a temporary protection permit in a Member State or have applied for 
permission to reside on such grounds and haven’t taken a decision from their status yet. It 
doesn’t apply to those who have been admitted to a Member State as seasonal workers.16 
 
 
9 S. Bellini, EU Blue Card: A promising tool among labour migration policies? A comparative analysis of selected 
countries, Institute for International Political Economy, Berlin, No. 76, 2016, p. 2. (23 April 2019). 
10 S. Kalantaryan, Revisions in the Blue Card Directive: Reforms, Constraints and Gaps, EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2017/59 (23 April 2019). 
11 Directive 2009/50/EC. 
12 C. Sullivan, The Blue Card for skilled migrants: Why isn’t it more popular in the Netherlands? 
https://www.iamexpat.nl/career/employment-news/blue-card-skilled-migrants-why-isnt-it-more-popular-
netherlands (21 March 2019). 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/third-country-national_en (20 March 2019). 
14 Directive 2009/50/EC Art. 2. (b). 
15 Directive 2009/50/EC Art. 2. (c). 
16 Directive 2009/50/EC Art. 3. (2). 
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3.1 Criteria of the Application 
There are several conditions for a person to apply for a card: he must present a valid 
employment contract with a duration of at least one year in the concerned Member State or a 
job offer in accordance with national law on highly qualified jobs; it shall also provide a 
document certifying that it fulfills the conditions laid down in national law for the exercise by 
Union citizens of a regulated profession as defined in the aforementioned contract of 
employment / job offer. In the case of a non-regulated profession, he must provide evidence of 
higher professional qualifications for the profession or sector specified in the employment 
contract / job offer. Each Member State determine the professions differently, so there’s a 
unified database according to which one is regulated, and which one is non-regulated. For 
example, being a real estate agent in the Netherlands is a regulated profession, while in Austria 
it is not.17 
There is also a need for a valid travel document under national law, if it is necessary, a visa or 
a visa application or a valid residence permit or a national long-stay visa certificate. For that 
purpose, that Member State shall provide all assistance to the applicant.  
In addition, he must present a certificate that he has sickness insurance against all the risks 
which the nationals of the concerned Member State are normally insured or – if the national 
law prescribe it – he has requested it for each period, when related to the employment contract 
doesn’t provide such insurance coverage or equivalent benefits. 
As a last criterion, of course, he can’t be a person who threatening public order, public security 
or public health.18 
It is important to note that the Directive doesn’t affect the right of Member States to allow for 
the admission of third-country nationals to their territory for this purpose.19 The vast majority, 
of course, have serious restrictions on this.20 
With regard to validity, Member States shall establish a “unified period” of validity for one to 
four years. If the employment contract is for a shorter period, the EU Blue Card must be issued 
or renewed for a period exceeding three months.21 In case of that the person apply for renewal 
 
17 https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/professional-qualifications/regulated-professions/index_hu.htm 
(20 March 2019)  
18 Directive 2009/50/EC Art. 5. (1). 
19 Directive 2009/50/EC Art. 6. 
20 S. Peers, The Blue Card Directive on highly-skilled workers: why isn’t it working, and how can it be fixed? EU 
Law Analysis, 4 June 2014 (http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-blue-card-directive-on- highly.html) 
(20 March 2019). 
21 Directive 2009/50/EC Article 7. (2). 
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of an existing card (which may take up to 90 days to complete), he/she can legally stay and 
work at the place of their residence, while the application being processed.22 
In the implementation of the Directive, Member States have provided very high levels of 
flexibility.  
3.2. Problems  
Based on the Commission's reports on the directive, it can be said that the Blue Card did not 
live up to the hopes which it inspired, because unfortunately the Blue Card is underused in 
almost all EU member states except Germany.23 If we only examine the number of Blue Cards 
granted, according to a 2012 data, only 3,664 cards were issued, far below the number of 
immigrants attracted by similar national systems, which in 2012 was 20,000. Most have been 
issued by Germany and Luxembourg, and the main countries of origin are India, China, Russia, 
the USA and Ukraine.24 It is important to note that – according to the Communication of the 
Commission on the Implementation of Directive - only 2,1% of the beneficiaries of the EU Blue 
Card during the first phase of the implementation in 2012 came from Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
may indicate implicit racial bias applied preventing certain types of workers to access to some 
more favourable statuses and therefore enjoying equal treatment with other workers or other 
family members. The lack of diversity among the EU Blue Card holders may reflect national 
policies and practices which can perpetuate forms of direct, indirect or institutional 
discrimination towards new candidates.25 
In the Netherlands – according to Jo Antoons - the Blue Card has had absolutely no success, 
because the salary threshold is too high, the procedure is lengthy and all diplomas must be 
recognized.26 Neither national systems - in spite of the relatively high figures - nor the Blue 
Card system aren’t able to attract enough highly skilled workers to the European Union.27 This 
fact definitely indicates the need for revision.28 
The most important problems are: the poor performance of the number of admissions - this can 
be seen from numbers previously referred to; extensive discretionary power during the 
implementation period due to the high level of flexibility that the Member States have in 
transposing the directive into national law. For example, the Directive makes it possible for the 
Member States to maintain or to introduce new national residence permits for any purpose of 
employment and it should not affect the possibility for an EU Blue Card holder to enjoy 
additional rights and benefits which may be provided by national law, and which are compatible 
 
22 https://www.eu-bluecard.com/validity/0 (20 March 2019). 
23 Sullivan, ibid. 
24 Peers, ibid. 
25 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0240_EN.html  
26 Sullivan, ibid. 
27 Kalantaryan, ibid, p. 11. 
28 Peers, ibid. 
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with this Directive.29  It is also a matter of discretion, but in this case, it showing a relative unity 
as a result of the Member States intending to set a higher payment threshold than the Directive 
requires. According to a data from 2014, only two Member States have set a higher payment 
threshold than required by the Directive, while the rest of the countries have established wages 
by the Directive as a condition of immigration for blue card holders.30 
The existence of parallel national systems, thus potentially competing with the blue card, and 
it’s cause greater disruption to stakeholders. For instance, in the Netherlands the national system 
offers far more favourable conditions for the highly qualified third-country nationals. The 
minimum payment that an employee must earn is lower, the procedure can be as quick as two 
weeks for recognized employers, and document requirements are simpler.31 A long bureaucratic 
procedure - the discretion of the Member States should also be taken into account here, as the 
application procedure and the examination of the application may take up to 90 days. Less than 
half of the Member States have set a shorter deadline for consideration of applications and grant 
of Blue Cards.32 The access to the system is limited for small and medium-sized enterprises: 
the sponsorship system favours large companies not only because the cost of becoming a 
sponsor is relatively small for them, but also because they have the necessary legal expertise to 
ensure compliance with all regulations. For smaller firms without this expertise, the costs of 
acquiring such expertise and the risk of incurring fines is too large, so they do not use the 
system. To facilitate the use of the system by small and medium-sized companies, public 
authorities could offer legal assistance in these cases or consider a waiver of the fee for small 
and medium-sized enterprises with certain characteristics.33 The lack of opportunities for 
mobility within the EU is also a huge problem too. The card does not provide authorization to 
work in all the countries of the EU. Only after an initial eighteen months’ freeze, the blue card 
holder will be able to move to another EU state if they find a job there.34 A lack of a framework 
that allows for the recognition of foreign qualifications simply - and because the frame is 
missing, therefore a large number of beneficiaries decreased significantly: the EU system for 
the recognition of foreign qualifications is too complex. The problem is specific to all countries 
and traced back to the same reasons that we mentioned above. There is – currently - no 
automatic recognition of academic or professional qualifications, even within the EU, and each 
Member State applies its own rules.35 As we can read in the summary which wrote by the 
Migration Policy Institute “In each EU Member State the various rules and procedures applying 
to the recognition of foreign professional qualifications make up a complex and disparate web 
of practices rather than a homogeneous corpus. Procedures differ depending on the occupational 
field, the scope of practice, and the regulated or un-regulated status of the profession for which 
 
29 Directive 2009/50/EC (7). 
30 Peers, ibid. 
31 Sullivan, ibid. 
32 Peers, ibid. 
33 OECD, Recruiting Immigrant Workers: The Netherlands 2016. p. 24. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-
issues-migration-health/recruiting-immigrant-workers-the-netherlands-2016_9789264259249-en#page1 (21 
March 2019). 
34 http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/eu-just-approved-the-blue-card (21 March 2019). 
35 Kalantaryan, ibid, p. 25. 
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recognition is sought. Moreover, authority over recognition is generally highly fragmented— 
with numerous public and private stakeholders involved in the process. These are not 
characteristics singular to EU Member States.”36 
The aptitude standards are too high, as we already mentioned above. Finally defining moderate 
rights for the beneficiary and his family. For example, the right to a family reunion is considered 
to be narrow because the Blue Card holder can only bring his or her family if they have a valid 
employment contract for a year or longer.37 Obviously, the restrictions are on rational grounds, 
but they limit the possibilities to narrow limits. The Blue Card holder is the “sponsor” of the 
family member’s license, because he or she must provide the appropriate financial support, the 
right accommodation (to be a suitable place for all family members), health insurance, and he 
or she has to prove the relationship between him/her and his/her family member. If the family 
receives the license, then - at least theoretically - they can enjoy the same rights as other citizens 
of the Member State, whether in education or employment.38 The Directive does not preclude 
Member States from maintaining or introducing integration conditions and measures, including 
language learning, for the members of the family of an EU Blue Card holder.39  
4. Revision  
The Commission's proposal in 2016 (the necessity of which was already referred to in the 2015 
Migration Strategy) is to transform the Blue Card into a more inclusive, flexible and transparent 
system. The aim is to improve the Union's ability to respond effectively and rapidly to the 
existing and emerging needs of highly qualified third-country nationals, and to offset skill 
shortages for economic migration, necessary to be able to enhance the economic 
competitiveness of the Union and deal with the consequences of demographic aging.40 
Demographic aging is a huge problem nowadays: as we can see in the joint EU-OECD Policy 
Brief, the working-age population in the Union is projected to decline by 7,5 million by 2020.41 
On 7 December the Commission presented a roadmap to a deal by June 2018 on the 
comprehensive migration package in which it aims for an agreement on the Blue Card file 
between the Council and the Parliament by June 2018. In his State of the Union Address 2018, 
Commission president Juncker called on the Member States to work on the legal migration 
proposals because the EU needs skilled migrants. In September, the Commission also published 
 
36 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=19241&no=3 (21 
March 2019). 
37 G. Wisskirchen, The EU Blue Card, Defense Counsel Journal, Vol 83, October 2016, pp. 505-506. 
38 http://eu-bluecard.com/family-reunification/ (20 March 2019). 
39 Directive 2009/50/EC (23). 
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committe of the Regions: European Agenda on Migration, 2015. COM/2015/0614 final 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en (20 March 2019) 
41 OECD, Matching economic migration with labour market needs in Europe, September 2014, p. 7. 
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a Communication on enhancing legal pathways to Europe, where it calls on the Parliament and 
the Council to adopt the Blue Card Directive before the next European Parliament elections.42 
The impact assessment showed two basic problems: failure to attract and retain highly qualified 
third-country nationals and failure to accommodate other highly qualified third-country 
nationals.43 The word „other” does not apply to those who do their work as subordinates, but to 
those who are, for example, some entrepreneurs or other providers.44 
The following changes have been made in the proposal. Only some of them are listed here by 
way of example:  
The first and most important suggestion is that the Blue Card System becomes a mandatory 
system for the Member States and replaces the national systems that concern identical or similar 
groups of third-country nationals. By doing so, they would "force" Member States to start 
issuing Blue Cards and, at the same time, deprive them of the opportunity to maintain national 
systems that are more favourable to them. This concept was already part of the original 
proposal, but it was gradually abandoned during the negotiations, as they wanted to leave the 
opportunity to develop their competitive national systems based on the express requests of their 
employers.45 
Important changes are contained in the proposal as it is for the Commission would like to extend 
the scope of Blue Card holders. The extension is helped by changing the definition: the concept 
of “highly qualified employment” is now replaced by “highly skilled employment”.46 It would 
be mandatory for Member States on the basis of change that to recognise professional 
experiences as an alternative to education qualifications.47 
At least until the establishment of such arrangements for the validation of non-formal and 
informal learning, every applicant should be required to present evidence of professional 
experience of at least three years such as recommendations of former employees, former 
working contracts, job references or certificates of employment. 
When transposing this Directive and in order to better respond to the needs of the Union labour 
market, Members States and the Commission should gather data and list the sectors of 
 
42 Legislative Train Schedule: Revision of the Blue Card Directive https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-jd-revision-of-the-blue-card-directive?fbclid=IwAR1-
fpeb_W5yccqgPkBsn9I_1enWkZ0y1XPLh209u6J69xyWyu_13VQaWGw (23 April 2019). 
43 European Agenda on Migration, ibid. 
44 Kalantaryan, ibid, p. 13. 
45 E. Guild, A New Blue Card Scheme? The Commission’s proposal for highly skilled migration into the EU, EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 12 July 2016 http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-new-blue-card- scheme-
the-commissions-proposal-for-highly-skilled-migration-into-the-eu/  (20 March 2019). 
46 Kalantaryan, ibid, p. 18. 
47 Ibid. 
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employment or geographical areas where there are employment shortages or where vacancies 
are hard to fill and communicate this information publicly.48 
According to the proposal, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection could also 
receive a Blue Card. This is especially interesting because a person in refugee status could 
receive the Blue Card with no loss of asylum49,50, his/her application will be processed through 
the relevant regulation with no labour-market test.51 In respect of the higher education 
qualifications and higher professional skills of applicants for, or beneficiaries of, international 
protection residing in the territory of the Union who do not have the necessary documents to 
prove their qualifications and or professional skills, Member States should be encouraged to 
establish appropriate skills and knowledge-based assessments that would allow for a 
determination of their level of qualification and/or professional skills.52 Long-term residents, 
seasonal workers and posted workers are still excluded from the beneficiaries.53 
The new proposal sets the standard validity period of the Blue Card to at least 24 months, or 
length of the contract plus three months, but a renewal should last at least 24 months. Applicants 
should be notified of the decision within 60 days, and this period is even shorter for ‘recognised 
employers’, a new optional system for Member States according to which certain employers 
recognised by the Member State may obtain access to the fast-track recognition procedure of 
30 days maximum. Blue Card holders would also be able to exercise a self-employed activity 
in parallel to their main work, to which the Blue Card pertains. Access to highly skilled 
employment in the EU is also simplified, and Member States may only ask the holder to 
communicate changes of employer or other changes which may affect the holder’s status as 
Blue Card beneficiary. 54 
It also includes plans to facilitate family reunification - family members could get a residence 
permit in parallel with the issuing of a Blue Card. In addition, Member States would not be able 
to restrict labour market access for family members, although they may carry out labour market 
tests.55 In accordance with Directive 2003/86/EC, Member States should be encouraged to 
ensure that family members of the EU Blue Card holders be granted an autonomous residence 
 
48 Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment (PE 595.499v05-00), 
amend. 12-13. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0240_EN.html (20 March 2019) 
49 Asylum, in international law, the protection granted by a state to a foreign citizen against his own state. See 
more: https://www.britannica.com/topic/asylum  
50 Guild, ibid. 
51 Kalantaryan, ibid, p. 19. 
52 Report on the proposal for a directive, ibid, amend. 14. 
53 European Parliament, Briefing, EU Legislation in progress: Revision of the Blue Card Directive p. 6. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603942/EPRS_BRI%282017%29603942_EN.pdf 
(20 March 2019). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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permit, independent of that of the EU Blue Card holder, in the event of widowhood, divorce, 
separation or death of first-degree relatives in the direct ascending or descending line.56 
They would also extend the rights of blue card holders, ensure the right to self-employment in 
parallel with blue card work and at the same time access to highly qualified workers would be 
simplified.57 Therefore they ease the conditions for obtaining long-term residence rights - 
instead of five years, it would be enough to stay for three years in the same country.58 This part 
of the proposal is somewhat twofold, as in this case - until the remaining two years for the five 
years are over - all the requirements for blue card holders must also be fit, and it is not enough 
to maintain a permanent residence.59  
Blue Card holders would also be able to enter and stay in other Member States for the purpose 
of carrying out a business activity without having to procure a work permit from the other 
Member State60 – short-term business trips will be less complicated too. 
5. Conclusion  
Overall, the Commission proposal is undeniably timely. As can be seen in relation to the current 
asylum crisis, there is a growing political resistance to the development of common European 
rules on migration, especially where such rules mean a large reduction of sovereignty and 
control of entry rules. Consequently, the legislative process can be long and difficult, even 
though it is increasingly acknowledged that skilled labour migration is beneficial to economic 
competitiveness.  
Several features of the 2009 directive, which are still relevant for its revision, have been 
discussed and criticised. Steve Peers4 warned that the features of the 2009 Blue Card which 
would have been attractive to third-country nationals, such as short decision-making deadlines, 
job mobility, lower thresholds for younger applicants, and validity of permits, were either 
dropped or watered down in the legislative procedure. He also identified the exclusion of certain 
categories of people, such as beneficiaries of international protection, as a problem. The new 
proposal has also already drawn some criticism. The abolition of parallel national schemes is 
expected to be a source of reluctance from the Member States, and as such would not make the 
EU more attractive according to Jean-Baptiste Farcy. He also predicts a long and difficult 
legislative process for the directive under the current political climate. Maria Vincenza 
Desiderio agrees with this prediction, and discusses the abolition of national schemes and 
facilitated intra-EU mobility as some of the main points of contention. Sona Kalantaryan and 
Ivan Martin also question the necessity of abolishing national schemes, which may be more 
 
56 Report on the proposal for a directive, ibid, amend. 38. 
57 European Parliament, Briefing, ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Guild, ibid. 
60 European Parliament, Briefing, ibid. 
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flexible and dynamic in meeting the needs of national labour markets. They express concern 
over the adequacy of taking the national average salary as a threshold instead of a threshold 
related to sector/ region/occupation-specific salary or one agreed through collective bargaining. 
In addition, the current proposal may not offer a mechanism enabling a pool of eligible potential 
candidates, but is merely a way for candidates who already have a job offer to get a permit.61 
In addition to these criticisms, there are still many shortcomings in the current blue card system, 
such as family reunification, which is a very important part of the system. 
Overall, we believe that the Commission should find a "golden middle" between national 
systems and the European Union Blue Card system. This is expected to take many years to 
come, and there is also a need for closer cooperation between the Member States and the Union, 
which will allow the single system to operate. However, unification should not jeopardize the 
attractiveness of the Union, as the objective is still to attract as many highly qualified third-
country nationals to the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 Ibid. 
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Some Effects of the Migration and Asylum Crisis on 
Hungarian and EU Legislation 
GÁBOR MÁRKY 
PhD student, University of Pécs 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the Dublin Regulation’s effectiveness in terms of the 
management of the migration crisis, to crawl up the most important changes in legislation 
which were introduced in Hungary as a reaction to mass migration, and also to reflect the effect 
of the migration crisis on Hungary in numbers. This study emphasizes Hungary’s role in the 
management of the migration crisis started in 2015 and aims to give a more nuanced picture 
of Hungary’s role in it.  
Keywords: migration and asylum crisis, Dublin Regulation, European Union, Hungary 
1. Introduction 
Inbound illegal migration is not considered to be a new phenomenon when it comes to Europe. 
Even before 2015, when the volume of illegal migration increased to a level which have caused 
difficulties for the European Union member states to handle, the number of illegal migrants 
showed a continuously increasing tendency. The different historical circumstances were 
reflected in different standing points migration-wise, and consequent to the different historical 
developments, there are unequivocal differences between the countries of Western Europe and 
the countries of Eastern Europe when it comes to the general point of view on the management 
of mass migration.  
Such different approaches served and serve continuously as the ground of unavoidable and 
interesting debates among member states in the European Union, and show more and more that 
it is a pure illusion that this platform of twenty-eight states integrating even more nations and 
several different cultural circles, will be able to show a unified attitude towards the subject 
issue.  
Uncontrolled migration, and therefore co-existing of significantly different cultures 
consequently leads not only to economic challenges, but also to cultural tensions and, as we 
experience it more and more, from the day-to-day news of countries following open border 
policies, parallel societies and the increasing level of exposure to security threat as well. The 
management of the issue one way or the other will be determinative regarding the whole future 
of Europe in historical perspective. The migration crisis, which the societies of Europe had to 
face in the recent past and the consequences of which they have to face nowadays has a 
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significant impact on the general interpretation of the issue and without a doubt are reflected 
on the highest level of domestic and EU level decision making procedures as well.  
The main goal of this study is to crawl up the general framework regulating migration policies 
in the European Union, and to reflect a better understanding on the domestic legislative 
regulation of the most migration-exposed member states. The emphasis of this study is to 
specify those legislative changes which were introduced explicitly in order to manage the 
increased volume of migration or offer preventive measures against the process. The new 
legislative materials on domestic level are appearing in the form of new legislative acts, 
government decrees and lower level materials, and in the form of amendments of the foregoing 
materials as well.  
After providing a general overview on the Dublin regulations and the presently relevant EU 
regulation, this study focuses primarily on Hungary in the foregoing respect, which, due to its 
geographical situation and due to fact that it is a Schengen border country, was highly exposed 
to mass migration in 2015 and needed to introduce radical and fast measures in order to cope 
with this never-before-experienced new phenomenon, which also emerged as a key issue in 
other countries, such as, including but not limited to, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
and Sweden. It is essential to give a true picture highlighting that Hungary is an EU member 
state that in fact performs its obligations in terms of border protection, unlike several EU 
member states that does not do the same way, or not to the fullest extent.  
2. The Dublin Regulation 
The Dublin Regulation (currently Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged 
in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person or also known as 
the Dublin III regulation) is a collection of rules which lay down the applicable mechanism to 
determine which member state is responsible for the examination of a request for international 
protection lodged in one of the member states by a citizen of a third country or by a stateless 
person. The currently valid and applicable Dublin III regulation is applicable to the twenty-
eight member states of the European Union, moreover to Iceland, Norway, Lichtenstein and 
Switzerland.1  
If an asylum seeker submits its application for international protection in one of the Dublin-
member countries, the application is also examined on the basis of the Dublin regulation, in 
order to determine whether the target country is indeed the one that is entitled to and obliged to 
record the application and decide it.2 Under the Dublin III Regulation it may be appointed that 
 
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32013R0604 (27 March 2019) 
2http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/moving_country/asylum_seekers_and_refugees/the_asylum_process_in_ir
eland/dublin_convention.html (27 March 2019) 
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the application shall be decided in another country and therefore, to this end the applicant may 
be transported to this country in order to the evaluation of its application. The Dublin Regulation 
had been adjusted several times in the past decades and the most recent version, the Dublin III 
Agreement has been effective as of 2013. The corner stone of Dublin III is that an asylum 
applicant can only be considered in one member state, in order to the most expedient allocation 
and distribution of economic resources and in order to the avoidance of unnecessary 
administrative burden. The basic principle of Dublin III is that an asylum applicant shall make 
its asylum claim in the first member state where it arrives at and enters the European Union. 
The application of same standards is problematic with view to the different geographic locations 
and therefore the significantly unequal exposure of member states to migration. Naturally, 
Greece, Italy or Spain are the target entries to the European Union via sea-route migration, and 
in the mass migration crisis of 2015, Hungary as a land border of the Schengen Area had to face 
many more times bigger migration pressure than other European countries. As a direct result of 
the aforementioned differences, member countries have different approaches on the 
management of migration and domestic legislative measures vary from country to country. In 
this very distinct environment, the uniform application of Dublin rules seems to be problematic 
in several cases, not to mention that the enforcement mechanisms in central EU-level are proven 
to be ineffective. The applicants’ chance on receiving refugee status is much higher in certain 
countries compared to several others. Welfare policies, labour market opportunities and pure 
political approaches are different. Another problematic issue with Dublin III is burden sharing. 
The whole set of regulations were developed in order to create the fair sharing of burden 
between member states, and in this respect, Dublin III proven to be ineffective.3  
The question comes, whether it can be a goal to distribute migrants between member states? 
Can the foregoing be interpreted as a measure taken in the spirit of fairness and in the spirit of 
respecting European values, or to the contrary, it is rather a premeditated attempt to change 
Europe’s ethnic and cultural features irreversibly?  
The first public criticism of the Dublin Regulation came from no one other than the Chancellor 
of Germany, Angela Merkel in August 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis. On 27 August 
2015, after her participation at the Western Balkans Summit, organized in order to the 
development of a common management mechanism with view to the handling of mass 
migration at that time, Merkel directly stated at a press conference that the Dublin Regulation 
does not work and ‘Europe as a whole’ shall give a unified response to the new phenomenon. 
Chancellor Merkel indicated that the Constitutional Court of Germany and the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) are both contributing to migrants not being returned to Greece, where most of 
migrants who arrived via sea routes entered the European Union. She expressed her doubts by 
pointing out that “Where are we going to return them to? To Hungary, Austria, Serbia, who all 
have as many or more refugees than we do?”4 The German foreign minister, Frank-
 
3 G. E. Tryggvadóttir, The Dublin III Regulation, A System Under Strain, Reykjavik University, School of Law, 
2017  
4https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_135_por_que_dublin_no_fun
ciona/why_dublin_doesn_t_work (27 March 2019) 
27 
 
Walter Steinmeier, expressed the need to reform the Dublin Regulation for ‘fair distribution’ of 
refugees in Europe.5  
It could be experienced in the recent couple of years that in member states with higher exposure 
to migration, election campaigns and the whole policy agenda was strongly dominated by the 
issue of migration and state security. This consequently led to the passing of state-level 
legislations which reflected such different approaches.  Without the need for full completeness, 
the following chapter will try to give a general overview on the Hungarian legislation pertaining 
to illegal migration.  
3. Legislative Effect of Migration in Hungary  
Due to its geographic and economic situation, Hungary serves as a destination country for 
regular migration from the neighbouring countries. The relative economic prosperity, the 
geographic location and the European Union membership are all together the key elements 
which play a significant role when Hungary is approached by regular migration, mostly by 
ethnic Hungarians. When it comes to the examination of migration policies and legislation in 
Hungary pertaining to migration, it has to be strongly emphasized that the Hungarian legislation 
relevant to regular migration is not different in merits at all from other European Union member 
states’ legislation which are considered to be liberal. To the contrary, the approach of Hungary 
towards legal migration can be considered as welcoming. The different approach is reflected in 
the laws applicable to situations when people are crossing the Hungarian borders and therefore 
entering the European Union illegally.  
At the appearance of mass migration at Hungary’s Eastern borders with Serbia in 2015, the 
Hungarian government made radical measures which proved to be highly effective. A border 
fence was constructed as a physical obstacle to hold up illegal migrants approaching the 
European Union on both the Eastern and the South-Eastern migration routes, among which the 
Western Balkan route (via Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia or Croatia to Hungary, then other 
EU Member States) was the most active at the peak of the crisis. In addition to the border fence, 
several legislative changes had been enacted in Hungary as of 2015.  
4. Changes in Legislation6 
Fundamental legislative developments have commenced in 2015, when major modifications 
and several minor changes were adopted to Hungarian asylum law, including amendments to 
Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum and other laws as well.7 
 
5https://www.dw.com/en/german-fm-steinmeier-demands-fair-distribution-of-refugees/a-18677140 (27 March 
2019) 
6 B. Nagy, Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation, German 
Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 06., 2016, pp. 1034-1082. 
7 Nagy, ibid, p. 1045. 
28 
 
The most important measure was the declaration of the list of safe third countries. Government 
Decree 191/2015 (VII. 21) on the designation of countries declared to be safe on a national level 
and on the designation safe third countries, declared the following two lists: 
One list designated third countries qualified as safe ones and another list designated safe 
countries of origin. According to the lists, safe countries of origin and safe third countries are 
“Member States and candidate states of the European Union - except for Turkey, Member States 
of the European Economic Area, and those States of the United States of America that do not 
apply the death penalty, furthermore: 1. Switzerland 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina 3. Kosovo 4. 
Canada 5. Australia 6. New-Zealand.” After the EU-Turkey agreement on asylum, Turkey was 
added to both lists.8 
At the same time, the first review of the refugee status determination procedure had been carried 
out, in order to facilitating and the asylum proceedings with view to the establishment of the 
border fence at the Serbian-Hungarian border.9 
The focal point of the adopted changes had been the following:  
- Shortening deadlines for the authorities to decide on asylum requests and shortening the 
deadline given for the applicant to legally challenge a negative decision. Accelerated 
procedures are to be finished within fifteen calendar days and an appeal must be 
submitted within three days10.  Courts have an eight-day decision deadline and courts 
become entitled to refrain from personal hearings. The separation of preliminary 
procedure on admissibility and procedure on the merits have ceased to exist and has 
been transformed into a unified procedure.   
- Termination of suspensive effect of appeals in the majority of asylum procedures, which 
means that in several cases applicants can be removed from the territory of Hungary 
before the judicial review of their request has commenced.   
- Supplementing the list of premises suitable to serve for the purpose of detention.11 
The scope of the next round of modifications was to lay down a special set of rules pertinent to 
migrants trying to come across the border fence. The new regulation is pertaining to and 
applicable in the event of exceptional situations, and grants powers to the Hungarian 
government, within the possession of which it becomes entitled to declare a crisis situation of 
mass migration. Moreover, legislation have been modified in several other points as well: the 
 
8 Nagy, ibid p. 1045. 
9 Nagy, ibid p 1046. 
10 Act CXXVII of 2015 on the establishment of a temporary security border-closure and on the amendment of laws 
relating to migration. Published in the Official Journal (Magyar Közlöny) on 13 July 2015, in force since 1 August 
2015. 
11 The whole listing was prepared on the basis of Nagy, ibid, p. 1046. 
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border fence and the adjacent transit zone became exempt from environmental impact 
assessment and other administrative procedures.12 
In 2016, several important amendments have been introduced, among others, assistance 
provided to recognized refugees have been terminated and a new rule has been established, 
according to which the status of a person who was granted refugee status have to be reviewed 
in every three years automatically, with the proviso that the foregoing rule shall also be 
applicable to holders of subsidiary protection. In addition, new rules have also been introduced 
in terms of designating a zone adjacent to the border, in which law-enforcement rights are 
allowed to be applied. The foregoing results that migrants held back in the subject zone are 
being inspected and if police forces determine that they are not entitled to stay in Hungary, they 
are prevented from going further and escorted back to the other side of the border.13 
5. Volume of Migration in Numbers 14 
These measures together contributed to the fact that number of illegal border crossings have 
decreased in a volume never seen before. In 2015, there were days when thousands of illegal 
migrants crossed the Serbia-Hungary border. With the building of the fence, this number have 
dramatically reduced, with nowadays this number is being close to zero. This naturally does not 
mean that by building the fence migration towards the European Union had been reduced or 
had been partly prevented. This only means that the land migration routes started to avoid 
Hungary and enter the European Union in other border countries15. 
It is important to note that from the early days of migration crisis, as of 2014 until nowadays 
the demographic background of asylum seekers have changed in a significant manner. In 2014, 
the vast majority of asylum applicants in Hungary was of Kosovo, Syrian and Afghan origin. 
In 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis, recently before the building of the border fence, the 
number of Syrian and Afghan migrants increased dramatically to approximately 65,000 and 
46,000 from circa 21,000 and 9,000, the number of applicants from Kosovo remained on the 
constant level of circa 25,000. In addition, the number of Pakistani asylum applications 
increased in a volume never seen before, from the circa 400 in 2014 to almost 15,000 in 2015, 
and as well, Iraqi applications increased from circa 500 in 2014 to circa 9,000 in 2015. All in 
all, after the building of the Hungarian border fence, the aforementioned numbers started to 
drastically decrease. The drastic decrease, besides the border fence, was thankful to the EU-
Turkey statement as well. The EU-Turkey statement was issued in early 2016 and serves as a 
sort of an action plan and workload sharing mechanism between the European Union and 
Turkey. The most essential part of the statement was that with the conditions mutually agreed 
by the parties, Turkey undertook to take back irregular migrants who entered the EU throughout 
crossing Turkey. The number of total applications fell dramatically, from circa 177,000 in 2015 
 
12 Nagy, ibid, p. 1047. 
13 Nagy, ibid, 1050-1051. o. 
14 http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary (27 March 2019) 
15 Ibid.  
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to circa 29,000 in 2016, and further decreased in 2017: the aggregate number of asylum 
applications were approximately between 3,000 and 4,000. Moreover, the number of 
applications were even lower in the first quarter of 2018, closing at 280.16 
It is of high importance that as of 2015, Hungary was the second European Union member state 
to intercept illegal migrants at its borders, while Hungary had more than 411,000 recorded 
border crossings at the respective year. However, with the construction of the border fences 
with Hungary’s southern borders with Serbia and partly Croatia, Hungary was put outside the 
Western Balkan migratory route.17 
6. Findings 
Doubts may be expressed concerning the fair nature of the ‘fair distribution’ of migrants, which 
has been already referred to above. The European Union is a significant, beneficial and effective 
organization which first and foremost contributed to the avoidance of wars between European 
countries after the Second World War, however, it also has to be taken into consideration that 
the European Union is a collection of sovereign states with individual historical backgrounds. 
This consequently leads to different cultural values and different interpretations when it comes 
to the issue of migration. Some societies are more closed in this sense and some are more open. 
The foregoing is subject to in-depth sociological analysis and should not be judged by outside 
of the respective state, and it shall be within a sovereign state’s and its people’s discretion 
whether or not they are open to welcoming economic migrants. Each state is unique not only in 
its culture, but as well in its socio-economic conditions, and there are states which are able to 
carry the economic burden which comes with migration, and there are states which cannot. But 
even the aforesaid neither means that a richer country shall be open to migration. A state, or a 
government of a state shall bring its decision for the satisfaction and for the welfare of its 
citizens first and foremost. Therefore, the respective approaches and policy-making shall be 
established in accordance with the people’s will, because this reflects the true nature of 
democracy. It means that it shall not be judged from outside if a state is open to migration, and 
it shall neither be judged if another state, like Hungary, finds that it is in the best interest of its 
citizens that it does not keep its borders wide open to economic migration. With a view to the 
foregoing, it may be grounded that contrary to Mrs. Merkel’s statement, ‘Europe as a whole’ 
proved to be insufficient to give proper answers to the migration crisis, and national solutions 
may become necessary. 
 
 
16 http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary (27 March 2019) 
17 Ibid. 
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Treatment of Refugees at the Borders 
BEATA BOŠNAKOVSKI, MATEA JAKŠIĆ, LUCA KUTNYÁNSZKY, 
MARTINA REŠETAR, DÁVID SZKLADÁN 
Law students of University of Pécs and University of Osijek 
During the ´modern day migration crisis´ that caught the European Union obviously 
unprepared, Hungary and Croatia experienced almost identical problems. However, the 
response of the countries in question was somewhat different which the authors believe is best 
demonstrated through comparison of real situations witnessed as citizens of those two 
countries. Thus, we will attempt to provide an overview of the relevant legal documents, both 
on international, European and national level and analyze how that legal framework is (or is 
not) being applied in real life situations. 
Keywords: refugees, migration, Croatia, Hungary, borders, asylum, crisis 
1. International and European legal framework 
International law provides a legal framework for the treatment and concretization of national 
legal rules in many areas, including refugee law. This topic, by itself, is something that concerns 
the wider society and not just the national interests of a particular country, so harmonization at 
the international level is necessary and inevitable at least as far as the basic concepts are 
concerned, although it would be very useful if international community defined it more 
specifically and strictly and if necessary, sanctioned some other areas of contemporary refugee 
law. International law should be able to respond to the demands of migration in the modern 
world, referring to issues of protection of security and national interests on one hand, and 
humanitarian issues on the other, all to avoid inequality and illegality in the treatment of all 
involved, and to fill in all the more obvious and increasingly detrimental legal gaps. 
Nevertheless, international law elaborated refugee protection mechanisms only in the 20th 
century. Thus, the Agreement on the Legal Position of Russian and Armenian Refugees, which 
guarantees some of the rights that refugees still enjoy today - such as protection from expulsion 
and return to the country they have fled, rights to work, access to justice, etc - was passed in 
1928. Under the influence of this Agreement and under the auspices of the League of Nations 
the Convention on the International Status of Refugees was adopted in 1933, which further 
expanded the already established rights and thus added the right to health care and the right to 
access to education. Under the auspices of the same organization, in 1936 the Interim 
Agreement on the Status of German Refugees was created, followed by the adoption of the 
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Convention on the Position of German Refugees in 1938. 18 However, the "cornerstone" of the 
international protection of refugees as we know today is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
It was adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and it was the first comprehensive instrument of 
human rights protection, including refugees. Among other things, the Declaration recognizes 
the right of persons to seek asylum (refuge) from persecution in other states.19 1951 Convention 
on the Legal Status of Refugees is based on this document.  
It was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations on July 28th, 1951, and came into force 
on April 22nd, 1954 and according to its preamble, its purpose is to revise and consolidate 
(codify) previous international agreements on  legal status of refugees.20 It is a document that 
came into existence after the Second World War, and was limited to people escaping the events 
that took place in Europe before January 1st, 1951. Namely, the Convention allowed the States 
Parties to limit the application of its provisions not only temporarily but geographically. Thus, 
apart from referring only to refugees who have become victims of events occurring before 
January 1st, 1951, the Convention also offered the States the option of restricting the application 
of its provisions solely to refugees from Europe by giving a statement upon signing, ratifying 
or acceding to the Convention. States, naturally still have the possibility of subsequently 
removing such restrictions and accepting the application of the Convention for all refugees by 
means of a notification sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. For example, 
Turkey, while party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, maintains the geographical limitation 
only to people originating from Europe which has been one of the big talking points in regards 
to their accession to the EU. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, Turkey provides non-
European refugees with protection and temporary asylum, pending UNHCR’s search for 
durable solutions elsewhere.21 
The Convention has experienced an amendment in the form of the 1967 Protocol, which 
abolished the above mentioned limitations in the application. However, for countries that have 
already decided on a geographic limitation, it continues to apply even after the Protocol enters 
into force, while for other states, as well as for new parties of the Protocol, such a limitation is 
no longer allowed.22 The former SFRY was a party to both documents, therefore the Republic 
of Croatia, as state succession also became a party of said documents.  
The Convention and the Protocol remain the core international documents in the field of 
migration and as such they define the main concepts and provide answers to the main issues 
 
18 D. Lapaš, , The Protection of Refugees in International Law, Croatian Legal Center, Zagreb 2008, p.1. 
19 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted and proclaimed at the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, Resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948), Art. 14. 
20 J. Andrassy & B. Bakotić & M. Seršić & B. Vukas, Međunarodno pravo, Part 1, 2nd edn, Školska Knjiga, 
Zagreb 2010, p. 367 
21 https://www.unhcr.org/474ac8e60.pdf (8 May 2019) 
22 Lapaš, ibid, p.4. 
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that the international community still faces today. Thus, according to the Convention, a refugee 
is a person who is outside the country of his or hers nationality because of well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion and cannot, or because of said fear does not want to accept the protection 
of the country concerned. Also, a refugee is considered to be a stateless person who, because 
of the above circumstances, is outside the country of his former habitual residence, who cannot 
or, out of fear, will not return to said country. In the case of a person who has more than one 
nationality, the term “country of nationality” shall apply to any country whose nationality the 
person has and if such person, without justified grounds based on established fear, sought 
protection from one of the countries whose nationality said person has, it will be considered 
that the protection of one of the countries of nationalities is not denied. That is, if such a person 
loses the protection of one of the countries whose nationality he or she has, he or she shall not 
be considered a refugee as long as there is a possibility of protection from another state whose 
nationality that person has.23 It is important here to emphasize the difference between refugees 
and the so-called "economic migrants." The difference is visible from the refugee definition 
itself, because the reasons why refugees leave the country of their origin are not the same as 
those of economic migrants. Although the definition of refugees mentioned above is the one 
that is most often used, it does not mean that it cannot be supplemented or changed as it was in 
some other international documents (e.i. the 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of the 
Refugee Problem in Africa, Cartagena Declaration of 1984), but the changes cannot provide 
more restrictive parameters for defining the concept of a refugee, because this term is the 
minimum refugee protection standard. In the light of contemporary so-called "refugee crisis", 
the generalization, trivialization and promotion of refugees as the main cause of the rise of 
crime in some host countries, it is important to point out that the Convention itself excludes its 
application to persons who are seriously suspected of committing a crime against peace, war 
crime or crime against humanity, those suspected to have committed another serious crime 
under international law outside the state of acceptance before they have received them as 
refugees or to have committed other offenses contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.24 
The status of a refugee is a complicated one in every scenario, but the one that causes the biggest 
problems and the one that is here the most relevant is when refugees are stopped at the border 
of the country since the space between two countries, before crossing the border is not really 
territory of that country, but it is also not terra nullius. Refugees in such relation of the mere 
jurisdiction to the state of acceptance, i.e. ones without the physical presence in its territory will 
enjoy fundamental human rights and freedoms such as the right to life, legal personality, 
freedom from racial discrimination, genocide, slavery, arbitrary punishment and seizure of 
liberty, etc. They also have the right to non-refoulement which for refugees is probably the most 
significant of their very limited rights. It is the Convention's obligation of the State to accept 
that refugees are not returned to their country of origin, or at all, to the frontiers of areas where 
their life or freedom would be endangered by their race, religion, nationality, belonging to a 
 
23 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art.1.  
24 Ibid. 
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particular social group or their political beliefs.25 The biggest role in such cases is played by the 
two instruments of the EU: Directive 2013/32/EU26 which establishes common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection and Directive 2013/33/EU27 which lays 
down the standards for the reception of applicants for international protection in Member States. 
Furthermore, there is a special procedure foreseen in cases of arrival of larger number of 
refugees, as such situations demand faster and more effective procedures and treatment. In such 
cases, the above mentioned Directive on the conditions of receiving international protection is 
derogated by the Council Directive 2001/55/EC which regulates the conditions under which 
international protection will be granted and the allocation of duties between countries in 
situations of mass influx.28 
2. Croatian national legislation 
The Law on International and Temporary Protection and the Aliens Act regulates the issue of 
refugees, asylum seekers and aliens, conditions, rights and obligations when entering and 
staying in the Republic of Croatia. Also, both law acts regulate the principle of forbiddance of 
forcible, known as non – refoulement. Croatian legislation provides that it is forbidden to return 
a third – country national or a stateless person to the country in which their life or freedom 
would be endangered because of their race, religion or national affiliation, affiliation to certain 
social group or because of their political opinion, in which it may be subjected to torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment and which could extradite her to other country.29 Among them 
are the principle of family integrity and the principle of the best interests of the child, but also 
cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).30  
The rights that international protection seekers enjoy in the territory of the Republic of Croatia 
are also highlighted; right to stay, freedom of movement in the Republic of Croatia, health care, 
primary and secondary education, legal counselling and free legal aid, freedom of religion, 
work, etc., are provided by the Law on International and Temporary Protection. However, it 
also emphasizes obligations to respect the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, laws and 
other regulations, cooperation with state bodies and acting in accordance with their instructions 
 
25 Lapaš, ibid, pp. 9-18. 
26 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection.  
27 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2013 laying down standards 
for the reception of applicants for international protection. 
28 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of July 20, 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states 
in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. 
29 Immigration Law, Official Gazette 130/11, 74/13, 69/17, 46/18, Art. 126. 
  Law on International and Temporary Protection, Official Gazette 70/15, 127/17, Art. 6.  
30 Ibid, Art. 11. 
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and measures, undergoing verification and identification of their identity, cooperating during 
the procedure of international protection etc.31  
International protection seekers are located in the Reception Office, which is the organizational 
unit of the Ministry of the Interior, where UNHCR, the Croatian Red Cross, as well as other 
organizations dealing with the protection of refugee rights or humanitarian work, can 
implement educational and similar programs while also providing other forms of assistance, 
with the consent of the Ministry.32 
It is important to point out temporary protection in cases of massive inflows or massive inflows 
of third-country individuals who cannot return to their own country because of armed conflict, 
local violence or serious dangers such as human rights violations in duration from one to 
maximum of three years which is provided by the Law on International and Temporary 
Protection. 
Same as international protection seekers, they enjoy certain rights, which binds themselves with 
the obligations of temporary protection seekers. Thus the Act emphasizes the right to stay, 
identity card, basic living and accommodation, health care, elementary and secondary 
education, work, family reunion and freedom of religion.33 The difference that can immediately 
be noticed between international and temporary protection is accommodation at the Reception 
Center, because the Law on International and Temporary Protection in article 90 provides that 
accommodation only if they do not own personal financials to insure their own. 
The Aliens Act regulates the issue of entry of third-country nationals into the territory of the 
Republic of Croatia and states that if it does not meet the entry requirements of the Schengen 
Borders Code, said person may be granted entry into the Republic of Croatia at a certain border 
crossing if that is required due to serious humanitarian reasons.34 
European Union and Croatian law which regulate status, rights and obligation of refugees and 
migrants, are harmonized. However, even though European Union directives have been 
implemented in Croatian legislation, real situation and law are in contradiction.  
3. Croatia in contemporary refugee crisis 
The term "Arab Spring" is considered the most famous political spring in the last few years 35 
and marks the first chain of social movements for the political and economic reforms in the 
 
31 Ibid, Art. 52. 
32 Ibid, Art. 56. 
33 Ibid, Art. 78. 
34 Immigration Law, Official Gazette 130/11, 74/13, 69/17, 46/18, Art. 36.  
35 B. Zgurić, Political Concept: Political Spring, Phenomenology of Protests, Political Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 17, 
2014, pp. 73-76. 
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Arab world that began in Tunisia and Egypt and then spread to a third of Arab countries.36 A 
series of political protests and demonstrations against the authorities that later turned into civil 
wars led to the emergence of a refugee crisis that was intensified during the conflict in Syria.37 
In search of asylum and a better life, thousands of migrants and refugees flee from war, hunger, 
poverty and mass destruction and move from Iraq and Syria and other Arab countries to 
Germany, Austria and Great Britain, or towards the European Union as the ultimate 
destination.38 To get to the European Union, they have to go through Turkey to get to Greece 
and cross over Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Croatia.39 By the summer of 2015, the 
refugee route went through Hungary, but faced with a large number of refugees and migrants 
without sufficient shelter options, Hungarian authorities made the decision and closed the state 
borders and border crossings and lifted the wire fence.40 At that point, Croatia becomes the 
main gateway to the so-called "Balkan route" to Austria and Germany.  
Over the period from September to December 2015 more than 550,000 refugees went through 
Croatia.41 In the Opatovac area near Ilok, a temporary refugee camp was established where 
migrants were registered. Food and water, warm clothing and other hygienic items were 
distributed.42 Several hundred volunteers helped border and refugee camps. The migrants came 
from Tovarnik or Bapska border crossing where a bus service with a police escort was organized 
for them. Every day, a large number of migrants entered the Republic of Croatia and it became 
common to see migrants all over nearby Croatian cities such as Osijek and Beli Manastir. It is 
understandable that smaller towns could not receive several thousand refugees especially those 
such as Beli Manastir, where about 11,000 refugees arrived in September 2015 and Beli 
Manastir itself counts less than 11,000 residents.43  It soon became clear that the number of 
migrants arriving far exceeds Croatia's accommodation potential, and the Croatian authorities 
encountered a new problem.44 As the Article 10 of Directive 2013/32/EU says, detention of 
applicants shall take place, as a rule, in specialized detention facilities. However, if a Member 
State cannot provide accommodation in a specialized detention facility and is therefore obliged 
to resort to prison accommodation, the detained applicant shall be kept separately from ordinary 
prisoners and the detention conditions provided for in this Directive shall apply.  
This led to an increasing number of illegal crossings across the Croatian border and entry into 
the country. The number of people that have entered Croatia and the way they have done it, is 
 
36 A. Osrečki, New Media and "Arab Spring", Political Thought, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2014, pp. 101-122. 
37 J. Simić, Rights of migrants - respect for universal human rights or the right to development, The Security 
Studies Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016, pp. 75-96. 
38 Ibid, 75. 
39 J. Čapo,: The Security-scape and the (In)Visibility of Refugees: Managing Refugee Flow through Croatia, 
Migration and ethnic issues, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2015., pp. 308-406. 
40 Ibid, p. 392- 
41 M. Grba-Bujević and associates: Response of the Croatian Health System to the Migrant Crisis, Medical Journal, 
Vol. 138, No. 3-4, 2016, pp. 99-103. 
42 Ibid, p. 101. 
43https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/vise-od-10000-izbjeglica-preplavilo-grad-spavaju-uz-cestu-ili-lutaju-trazeci-
prijevoz-1025476  (8 May 2019) 
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completely in accordance with the definition of mass influx as given in the Directive 
2001/55/EC. Thus, the said directive should have been activated and because that was not the 
case, neither the Croatian authorities nor the Croatian police were prepared to deal with the new 
problems nor they knew how to behave in a given situation. Consequence of that was a major 
violation of human rights of migrants and refugees.  
Croatian border police as a body responsible for dealing with incoming refugees should have 
provided them with information about the possibility of applying for international protection 
which was not done at all or it was not done in an adequate manner and such actions are a direct 
violation of article 8, section 1 of Directive 2013/32/EU. Several civil society organizations 
have decided to help migrants, and several initiatives have been established that regularly 
monitor the situation at the Croatian borders and provide assistance to migrants. The Center for 
Peace Studies founded the initiative "Welcome"45, while the Volunteer Center of Zagreb 
founded the initiative "Are you Syrious".46 A "Border Violence Monitoring" platform has also 
been established, which deals with research and data gathering and documenting the 
experiences of violence occurring at the state borders of countries affected by the refugee crisis, 
primarily at the Croatian borders.47 The activists of these associations have repeatedly reported 
reports of violence and unlawful conduct at borders, which violates fundamental human rights 
and dignity, which is in full contradiction with all national and international obligations of 
Croatia.  
According to the report "Welcome" and "Are you Syrious" in 2017, we learned about the 
brutality that  was happening along the Croatian border, that is, the illegal, clandestine 
expulsions from Croatia to Serbia committed by the Croatian police, which in most cases is 
accompanied by various types of violence and humiliation.48 In the interview with asylum 
seekers in Croatia, initiatives suggest that there have been long lasting detentions in police 
stations without a translator, forcible signings of documents in Croatian or any other language 
that asylum seekers do not understand and excesses of powers leading to violent expulsion 
despite explicit asylum claims in Croatia which is in direct confrontation with the article 9, 
section 4 of European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2013/32, OJ L 180/96. Such 
events were accompanied by severe physical and verbal violence, i.e. various impulsions, 
blows, insults, threats, mismanagement etc.49 The mentioned initiatives filed two criminal 
reports, which resulted in the conduct of a criminal investigation, but the response from the 
Ministry of the Interior was always the same, i.e. that the allegations of the complaint were not 
 
45 The initiative brings together more than 60 civil society organizations, one football club and over 400 volunteers 
who provide day-to-day support to refugees - from humanitarian aid, coordination with local organizations, as well 
as information to refugees about current entry and exit procedures from Croatia. He also works in the field in co-
ordination with the Croatian Red Cross, the Asylum Coordination and the institutions. 
46 In addition to providing direct assistance - food, clothing, hygiene supplies, information and friendly support, 
we are continuously working on improving the living conditions of refugees, advocating their rights and informing 
the public about the state of the refugee route. 
47 https://www.borderviolence.eu/about/ (8 May 2019) 
48 Report on Illegal and Violent Displacement of Refugees from the Republic of Croatia, Welcome and Are you 
Serious initiatives, 24 January 2017 
49 Ibid, p. 4. 
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established and that no unprofessional or illegal behavior of Croatian police officers took place 
against migrants.50 In the meantime complaints from asylum and international protection 
seekers in the Republic of Croatia continue to arrive and the requests for initiatives seeking 
urgent cessation of illegal conduct, detailed investigations and the return of displaced migrants 
who continue to seek asylum in Croatia remain unfulfilled. There was a slight, but nevertheless 
deficient shift after the death of an Afghan girl, Madine Hosseini - the Ombudsman sent a letter 
to the State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia, listing many irregularities and 
illegalities in the work of the Ministry of the Interior51. 
4. Hungary in crisis 
The history of the refugee crisis in the European Union (later referred as „EU”) in 2015 goes 
back to the Arab Spring in 2011. As mentioned above, it started from Tunisia and Libya, and 
later refugees came from other African countries too to the EU. In 2015 refugees came in the 
highest number from Syria because of the spread of the Islamic State and the civil war in Syria. 
The problem is a particular concern for Hungary because it is one of the countries that lies on 
the external border of the Schengen area. According to Eurostat data, the number of asylum 
applications started to increase exponentially in the European Union during the asylum crisis 
starting in 2011. In 2011, the number of applications was 309.000 for 4 years, and this number 
rose to 1.322.800, including data from the member states of the European Union. However, in 
2017, 704.600 applications were registered by Eurostat, a slight decrease compared to previous 
years.52 Such a high number of refugees has physically overwhelmed the host countries and it 
showed that the EU’s asylum system is wrong. The reason for the increase in the number of 
asylum seekers is not that the applicants wanted to stay in Hungary, as shown by the 
Immigration and Citizenship Office, as 97% of the incoming applications were rejected and the 
applicants left the country after the registration. However, the number of people who have not 
been registered in the country is unknown, despite the fact that the main goal of the Hungarian 
authorities was to register citizens whom requesting it.53 
Another problem is that some countries do not apply the requirement of solidarity in connection 
with asylum policy (TFEU article 80.). The member states’ asylum systems have been 
overwhelmed and this led to some asylum seekers have been forced to wait for a long period of 
 
50 Second Report on Illegal and Violent Displacement of Refugees from the Republic of Croatia, Welcome and 
Are you Serious initiatives, 7 March 2017 
51 http://ombudsman.hr/hr/npm-novosti/cln/1263-pravobraniteljica-dostavila-dorh-u-sve-informacije-o-
okolnostima-pogibije-madine-husseini-modulnpm (8 May 2019) 
52 Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2008–2018. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics0 (8 May 2019) 
53 A. Juhász & Cs. Molnár: Magyarország sajátos helyzete az európai 
menekültválságban http://old.tarki.hu/hu/publications/SR/2016/13juhasz.pdf (8 May 2019) 
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time for the decision in connection with their asylum applications. In conclusion we can say 
that the reform of the asylum system is necessary and inevitable. 
Thanks to the Schengen Convention border control between states, which allowed member 
states not to proceed with the asylum procedure. It was complicated that in general the betting 
conditions only served to meet basic needs. It is important that applicants are accommodated in 
a place where they can easily access public needs. Long-term issues may also include providing 
food and healthcare. Another main goal of the EU’s asylum policy is that the asylum 
applications must be judged effectively and faster because it is important that the refugees can 
get protection as soon as possible if it is necessary. 
In 2015 Hungary had to face with a mass influx of migrants entering to the country. In 2014 
July there were 1258 applications for refugee status, in 2015 July this number was 72.200.54 At 
the same time, the Hungarian government started a politically motivated campaign against 
migration (it was the „national consultation”). Due to this anti-migration campaign, hungarian 
people started to fear from the migrants, and become hostile about the migration crisis.55 It is 
important to emphasize that Hungary is not the final destination, migrants just simply have to 
go across the country to reach Austria or Germany. They do not stay in Hungary after they have 
been registered. The fear was not fully unfounded: because of this fact (that they do not want 
to stay here for a long time) these refugees left behind convulsion and attrocities. 
The hungarian reaction to the refugee crisis was to close the borders. In 2015 a fence was built 
at the southern borders (hungarian-serbian and hungarian-croatian borders) which closes the 
so-called „green-border“ (the territories between the official border crossing points) and it 
supposed to stop the illegal migration. Moreover the Criminal Code was amended, introducing 
three new crimes related to crossing the border with Serbia, including: unauthorized entry into 
the territory “protected by the border closure,” punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment); 
damaging of the border closure, punishable up to 5 years imprisonment; and obstructing the 
construction or maintenance of the border fence, punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment.56 
In 2016 eight long-term immigration-related detention facilities were created: Budapest 
International Airport, Győr, Kiskunhalas (2), Nyírbátor (2), Békéscsaba and Debrecen. 
 
54 Hungary Immigration Detention  
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/hungary?fbclid=IwAR1qMNkZeveMLSkhr8iyQBd_m
W8ZyXAvpp22jr1jg6JAus5N13CrsYyzvjk (8 May 2019) 
55 T. Drinóczi – Á. Mohay: Has the migration crisis challenged the concept of the protection of the human rights 
of migrants? The case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, in: E. Kuzelewska & A. Weatherburn  & D. Kloza, Irregular 
Migration as a Challenge for Democracy, Intersentia, Cambridge 2018. p. 101. 
56 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee’s opinion on the Governments amendments to criminal law 
related to the sealed border https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/modification-of-criminal-laws-
16092015.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1pGAQBI8HslGoruC6dBKrVP6KivIH6_OE_IxSLyrsE0OMjZVi5oKGrqcw (May 
15th 2019) 
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Nowadays there are only two administrative detention centres, at Tompa and Röszke (transit 
zones).57 
In 2015 the EU created a new asylum policy, and owing to that a decision was made to help 
Italy and Greece cope with the huge refugee wave (Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 
September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and Greece). It was about the balanced relocation of the migrants between the 
member states so the external countries won't be too overwhelmed.58 The decree was accepted 
by qualified majority (however Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania voted 
against it). The Hungarian parliament legislated the Act CLXXV of 2015 in which they rejected 
the quota system. In 2016 there was a referendum which asked the people of Hungary whether 
they want the European Union to resettle refugees in the country without the permission of the 
parliament. In 2017 the European Court dismissed the lawsuits of Hungary and Slovak Republic 
and imposed a fine.59 
5. Conclusion 
Refugee crisis is still an urgent problem and finding a solution to it is necessary and inevitable. 
As we can see from the statistics, there are more and more people are coming to Europe asking 
for asylum, and their situation will not be solved as long as they have to flee from war and as 
mentioned before, countries in which they came and are still coming are not fully prepared for 
max influx of refugees. We can see how two countries on same territory but with different 
leadership reacted to situation they had to face with. Both, Croatia and Hungary can’t boast 
about the way they handled the given situation. As said before, Croatia violated several 
Directives while dealing with refugees and Hungary basically hid behind the wall. There are 
opinions that say that Hungary violate the Article 3 and 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights with its actions but from our point of view the situation is not this simple. The 
migration crisis equally affects refugees and the citizens of the countries they come to. While 
refugees are faced with inhumane conditions, maltreatment and physical, psychological abuse, 
citizens of EU member states are afraid because they do not know what to expect from refugees. 
As a result, there is an increased violation of human rights on both sides. In our opinion, long 
term solution for stopping those violations to happen in the future is education, providing 
information and sharing experiences. 
The problem is very complex but we think that the EU need to cooperate with its member states 
and create a solution which is acceptable for the countries and protection of  their culture but 
 
57 Hungary Immigration Detention Profile,  
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/hungary?fbclid=IwAR2SiEPubeGzUA5aqnS01J3_-
JYBgIiXkhSpO_MBV1LHG6xh-199SoNa3jM (May 15th 2019) 
58 Council decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece  
59 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 [EU:C:2017:631] 
41 
 
also the refugees' rights have to be protected and respected as they are granted both in EU and 
national legislation of each country. 
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The present article aims to highlight the novelties and the most significant provisions of the 
Intra-Corporate Transfer (ICT) Directive, applicable to highly skilled Third Country Nationals 
(TCN) who are assigned to a Member State within the structure of a company. The Directive 
brought remarkable changes in respect of the rights of the intra-corporate transferees 
regarding their working conditions, their mobility within the EU and their family reunification, 
in order to compensate the lack of a qualified labour force in the European Union. The article 
outlines some potential issues emerging from the transposition of the Directive that may affect 
the achievement of the purposes of the ICT Directive. 
Keywords: intra-corporate transfer, intra-EU mobility, labour migration, facilitated 
procedure, right to equal treatment, family reunification 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Why is the issue relevant? 
As a result of demographic changes in the EU a decline in employment can be perceived since 
2010. This decline was foreseeable, since the European Commission indicated it in its Green 
Paper, issued in 2004 on an EU approach to managing economic migration. In the Green Paper, 
the Commission expressed the need to review the immigration policy of the EU in the longer 
term.1 It outlines, that between 2010 and 2030 at the immigration flow of that time, the number 
of employed people will fall because of the decline in the EU’s working age population. The 
long-term demographic projections that Eurostat issued in 2005 revealed that migration will be 
able to counterbalance the decline of the population until 2025, but after that it will not be able 
to outweigh the decrease.2  
Considering these facts, it is essential to admit third country nationals in order to ensure the 
prosperity of the EU by means of compensating the decreasing level of employment. As the 
Hague Programme, adopted by the European Council, stated „Legal migration will play an 
important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic 
 
1 European Commission, Green paper on an EU approach to managing migration, COM/2004/0811, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52004DC0811 (5 February 2019) 
2 Policy Plan on Legal Migration MEMO/05/494. 
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development, and thus contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon strategy.”3 It is quite 
important to establish a migration policy that secures a legal status and guarantees a set of rights 
for the labour migrants. Additionally, in case of a lack of a common criteria for the admission 
of economic migrants, third country citizens are likely to enter the EU illegally.4 
1.2. The background of the directive 
In order to fulfil its mandate given by the Hague Programme, in 2005 the European Commission 
published the Policy Plan on Legal Migration which intended to establish a common policy on 
economic migration.5 It sketched out that the Commission plans to propose a series of 
legislative and operational initiatives on legal migration, however they do not contain any 
factual proposal concerning them.6 It sought to function as a general document that sets out the 
instruments of the development of a consistent migration policy. The Plan consists of four 
sections, namely: the legislative proposals regarding the conditions of the entry and residence 
of TCNs, non-legislative instruments that improve access to information, facilitating 
integration, lastly, enhancing cooperation between the country of origin and the EU. 
Regarding the legislative instruments, the Plan aimed to introduce four complementary 
directives regulating four different areas of labour migration. The four directives intended to 
regulate the entry and residence conditions of third country nationals dividing them into four 
categories: seasonal workers, highly qualified workers, intra-corporate transferees and 
remunerated trainees.  
These directives are in accordance with the purposes of Article 79 TFEU which states that the 
EU aims to develop an immigration policy that ensures the proper management of migration 
flows and the fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States.7  
2. The aims of the directive 
2.1. The importance of the directive 
In order to perceive the significance of the directive, first of all we have to define who intra-
corporate transferees are. Intra-Corporate Transferees are those highly skilled third-country 
nationals who are employed by a multinational corporation and are temporarily sent to 
another country – within the company structure – to perform their jobs there. The sending 
 
3 European Council, The Hauge Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security, an Justice in the European Union 
(2005/C 53/01) https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/The-Hague-Programme.pdf (5 February 
2019)  
4 COM/2004/0811. 
5 Policy Plan on Legal Migration MEMO/05/494. 
6 European Commission: Policy Plan on Legal Migration, (COM/2005/0669) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14507 (5 February 2019) 
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), OJ 2012 C 326/47. 
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company is usually the mother company that is located in a third country and the employees 
are transferred to a subsidiary which can be found in the EU.8 This organisation-dominated 
feature of ICTs is particularly important as it distinguishes ICTs from other highly skilled 
migrants seeking for jobs individually in the EU. The temporary relocation of managers, 
specialists, trainee employees has become more and more recent before the introduction of the 
directive due to the globalisation of business and increasing trade. It is an outstanding 
opportunity of gaining knowledge and new skills both for the host entities and the transferred 
person. The companies choosing the transfer of their employees can tap their human resources 
best.9 
Over the past few years, intra-corporate transfer has become more frequent and the sending 
companies bumped into many administrative obstacles. The complexity of work permit 
requirements, the lack of clear schemes but also the flow of intra EU workforce made for 
companies difficult to transfer third-county workforce into the EU. Further difficulties were 
occurring in securing family reunification as well.10 The directive set up many provisions in 
order to eliminate these drawbacks of intra-corporate transfer. These will be explained in detail 
in the next section. 
To sum up, the main novelty of ICTD is that it covers a group of economic migrants whose 
rights were not protected previously by any economic migration directive. It also reduces the 
administrative burden on ICTs while ensuring them and their families a set of significant rights.  
2.2. Comprehensive aims 
This section aims to summarize the aims of the directive according to its preamble although the 
aims are going to be explained in detail in chapter IV, V, VI. In pursuance of the preamble of 
the ICTD its aims are complex. It includes the reduction of administrative burden on companies 
and taking measures to facilitate the managers’, specialists’ and trainee employees’ entry into 
the area of the EU through a framework of an intra-corporate transfer. In order to achieve an 
easy access to the territory of the EU the directive aims to construe a transparent and simplified 
procedure for admission that is based on common definitions and harmonised criteria.11 
Moreover, the directive wishes to facilitate the intra-EU movement of ICTs during their 
transfer. They are exempt from Schengen visa obligations during their stay and they are entitled 
 
8 P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange, The Intra Corporate Transfer Directive: Central themes, problem issues and 
implementation in selected Member States, 1st edn, Wolf Legal Publishing, Oisterwijk 2018, p. 1. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tesseltje_De_Lange/publication/327542574_The_Intra_Corporate_Transfe
ree_Directive_Central_Themes_Problem_Issues_and_Implementation_in_Selected_Member_States/links/5b950
522299bf147392fe925/The-Intra-Corporate-Transferee-Directive-Central-Themes-Problem-Issues-and-
Implementation-in-Selected-Member-States.pdf (5 February 2019) 
9 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157, 27.5.2014 
10 Minderhoud & de Lange, ibid, p. 1. 
11 ITCD 2014/66/EU. 
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to to enter stay and work in a Member State that differs from the one that issued the ICT permit 
without having to apply for another work permit.12 
The most significant aim of the directive from the transferees’ point of view is ensuring them 
and their family a wide set of rights. For instance, Member States have to secure that ICTs enjoy 
equal treatment with the nationals occupying comparable positions regarding their 
remuneration in order to exclude the exploitation of ICTs and also to guarantee fair competition 
between undertakings established in a Member State and established in a third country.  Family 
reunification is also a priority of the directive and generally the legal migration policy of the 
EU in order to make the Directive more attractive. In accordance with this purpose, favourable 
rights are set fort regarding family members. They are entitled to join the ICTs in the are of the 
EU during their intra-EU movement and their access to the labour market is facilitated as well.13  
These supplemental goals of the directive are part of the main aim which is expressed in the 
impact assessment accompanying the proposal of the Directive. The main purpose is to boost 
the economic competitiveness of the EU and to achieve the Goals of EU 2020 strategy. 
Associated with this aim there is a great need for qualified workers such as senior executives 
who are able to provide resources concerning skill shortages.14 
3. The directive’s scope and conditions 
3.1. To whom can it be applied?  
The directive filled a gap in the legislative instruments of the EU since ICTs were excluded 
from all the other EU directives on third-country migrant workers. 
Article 2 (1) defines its scope as following: “it shall apply to third-country nationals who reside 
outside the territory of the Member States at the time of application and apply to be admitted 
or who have been admitted to the territory of a Member State under the terms of this Directive, 
in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer as managers, specialists or trainee employees.” 
The directive has a specific scope since it is applicable solely to highly skilled third-country 
nationals who are temporarily assigned by a company to subsidiaries located in the EU. The 
definition of “intra-corporate transfer” outlines that the employee has to be bound by a work 
contract with the sending company located outside the EU prior to and during the transfer. The 
scope of the directive is restricted to managers, specialists and trainee employees. These 
 
12 M. Lommers & S. Oehlers, ICT Permit Study, Facilitating EU mobility for third-country nationals, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-ict-permit-
study.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1aEaR4ePQn6F3RABHCwCVSA-mIrW9lHc_qQQv0MPcuZREOO8n9l73Xdxw (5 
February 2019). 
13 Directive 2014/66/EU. 
14  B. Friðriksdóttir, What happened to equality? The Construction of the Right to Equal Treatment of Third-
Country Nationals in European Union Law on Labour Migration, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden 2017, pp. 264–307. 
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definitions are given in Article 3 but also Recital 13 sets out that they should be built on the 
specific commitments of the EU under the GATS15 and bilateral trade agreements.  
The directive lists six type of third-county nationals that are excluded from the scope of the 
directive: researchers16, TCNs who enjoy the right of free movement under an agreement17, 
posted workers18, self-employed workers19, TCNs who are assigned by agencies20 and 
students21. In contrary to the Posted Workers Directive the meaning of “worker” is not defined 
thus the definition of the ECJ shall be applied. The ECJ defines a worker as a person who 
pursues economic activities which are real and genuine.22 Considering the main features of an 
employment relationship which are the following: a person performs services for and under the 
direction of another person, in return for which the direction of another person, in return for 
which the employee receives remuneration it can be set apart from self-employment. 
3.2. Under which conditions can it be applied? 
Article 5 of ICTD governs the conditions of the admission of intra-corporate transferees. The 
requirements – aside from those explained in the frames of the scope of the Directive – are 
hereunder briefly set out: proof of an immediate preceding employment with the undertaking 
outside the EU23, proof of the sending entity and the host entity belonging to the same 
undertaking/group of undertakings24, proof of professional qualifications and experience25, 
proof of the details of the assignment in particular some conditions26, proof of valid travel 
document and if required a visa and a sickness insurance if required.27 
However, the duration of the preceding employment depends on the decision in each Member 
State, it is limited. The limit is from three up to twelve uninterrupted months in case of managers 
and specialist while a three to six months uninterrupted period is required regarding trainee 
 
15 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
16 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (a). 
17 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (b). 
18 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (c). 
19 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (d). 
20 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (e). 
21 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 2 (2) (f). 
22 See recently e.g. Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and  Koupatantze [EU:C:2009:344], para 26., or Case C-46/12 L. N. 
v. Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte [EU:C:2013:97], para. 39. 
23 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (a). 
24 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (b). 
25 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (d). 
26 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (c). 
27 Lommers & Oehlers, ibid. 
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employees.28The purpose of this criteria is to ensure that the skills of the intra-corporate 
transferee are specific to the host entity.29 
Belonging to the same undertaking follows from the nature of intra-corporate transfer.  
Regarding the fact that the conditions of the employment have a great importance in the 
implementation of the Directive, information such as the duration of the transfer, the 
remuneration, the location of the host entity and the return to the third country of the transferee 
has to be ensured in written form in the work contract.30  
Additionally, proof that the transferee has a health insurance in the concerned Member State, 
but if not so the application has already been serviced, is required. The insurance must cover 
all the arising risks which are covered for nationals in the normal case. The same applies for 
the periods in which the employees are not entitled to such insurance or other benefits regarding 
their work carried out in the Member State in question.31  
Article 5 4(a) stipulates that the conditions, laid down in the legislative instruments of the host 
State, which are applicable to posted workers such as instruments concerning maximum work 
periods and minimum rest periods, minimum number of paid annual holidays, minimum rates 
of pay should be met during the transfer.32 Recital 15 confirms that the Directive aims to provide 
the same employment conditions to ICTs that are provided to posted workers except for 
remuneration 
As mentioned above, remuneration is exempt from the provisions applicable to posted workers, 
since ICTs shall be granted a remuneration that is not less favourable than the one granted to 
nationals occupying comparable position in the Member State where the work is carried out.33  
The provisions of Article 5(4)(a) and (b) are just obligation towards Member States to examine 
these conditions while considering a request for admission. However, these rights are not 
guaranteed as individual rights. On the other hand rights laid down in Article 18 are considered 
as individual rights.34 
 
28 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (b). 
29 Directive 2014/66/EU, Recital (16). 
30 E. Guild, Intra-corporate Transferees: Between the Directive and the EU’s international obligations, in 
Minderhoud & de Lange, ibid, p. 38.  
31 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (1) (g). 
32 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services OJ 1996 L 18/1,  Article 3 (1) 
33 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 5 (4) (b). 
34 H. Verschueren, The Role of Employment and Social Security Rights in the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive, 
in Minderhoud & de Lange, ibid, p. 40.   
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4. Transparent and simplified procedure for admission 
The following section intends to outline the main features of the application procedure, the 
permit and the procedural safeguards of the Directive while highlighting the potential issues 
regarding a few provisions. 
4.1. Questions connected to the application procedure 
One of the aims of the Directive is to establish a simplified and transparent admission procedure 
for ICTs. In the frame of the procedure, Member States can decide whether they require the 
host entity or the transferee to submit the application for the permit. The Directive prescribes 
that the application has to be submitted when the applicant resides outside of the territory of the 
Member State to which the admission is sought. In case of an ICT permit the application has to 
be submitted at a stage when the transferee is still residing outside the territory of the EU. In 
case of a long-term mobility the application can be submitted from the territory of the EU but 
from outside the territory of the Member State to which the long-term admission is sought35 
and it can also be submitted from the territory of the second Member State if the applicant is 
already staying there.36 Furthermore, the ICT permit has to be submitted to the authority of the 
Member State in which the transferee stays in the first place, unless it is not the one where the 
longest overall stay should occur.37 The aim of this provision is to eliminate that the applicants 
choose the Member State on the basis of easier admission conditions instead of the actual needs 
circumventing the rules of admission of a Second Member State through intra-EU mobility 
rights.38 
Regarding the purpose of the directive, the Member State issuing the ICT permit qualifies as 
the first Member State even in the case where the transferee commences its work in another 
Member State (the second Member State for the purpose the purpose of the Directive) to which 
the transferees entitled to due to their intra-EU mobility rights.39 
It is also a significant provision of the Directive that the applicant is entitled to lodge an 
application in a single application procedure.40 
There is an option for Member States while transposing the Directive to introduce simplified 
procedures to entities or (group of) undertakings that have been recognized for that purpose by 
the Member States according to their regulations. The simplification can manifest in an ease of 
 
35 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 22 (2) (c). 
36 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 22 (2) (e). 
37 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 11 (3). 
38 F. Lutz, Transposition of the ICT Directive 2014/66/EU: Perspective of the Commission, in Minderhoud & de 
Lange, ibid, p. 24.   
39 Ibid.  
40 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 11 (5). 
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the presentation of some evidence required41, or in a faster admission procedure and issue of 
ICT permits or long-term mobility permits as well as in a facilitated visa require procedure. 
4.2. Duration and the renewability of the permit 
The upper limit of the duration of the transfer is three years for managers and specialists and 
one year for trainee employees.42 Once the duration expired, the transferee is obliged to leave 
the territory of the EU except for the case if they obtain a residence permit on an other basis 
under EU or national law. A lower limit has not been set up for the duration of the permit, 
however it should not be forgotten that the Directive is applicable for stays of more than 90 
days.43 While Member States are empowered to establish a more favourable framework than 
laid down in the Directive, the minimum length is binding.44 Member States can decide if they 
require a maximum of 6 months period to elapse between the end of the maximum duration of 
a transfer and another application submitted by the same third-country national to the same 
Member State.45 These provisions intend to ensure the temporary nature of such assignments 
of ICTs. The transposition of this provision varies. Some countries decided for the longest 
period applicable (for example Germany, the Netherlands) while others chose a shorter period 
of time to be elapsed (Austria, Italy).  
Another key feature of ICT Directive is that Member States are precluded from introducing 
other permits, particularly work permit. Indeed, except for the case of the Blue Card Directive, 
this scheme replaces any existing national schemes, which is essential for the harmonization of 
the intra-corporate transfers.46   
4.3. Procedural safeguards 
Article 15(1) stipulates that the competent authorities of the concerned Member State shall 
decide on the application for an ICT permit or its renewal and notify the applicant in writing as 
soon as possible. The notifying period cannot exceed 90 days from the date the application was 
submitted. 
The restricted length of the decision on the ICT permit application is a crucial factor regarding 
the efficiency of the Directive. Multinational companies operate in a highly dynamic 
environment therefore it is inevitable to react to their needs fast. Most of the national regulations 
are compliant with this requirement, for instance according to the transposition it takes a 
 
41 In Art. 5, or in point (a) of Art. (22). 
42 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 12 (1). 
43 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 1 (a). 
44 F. C. Roda, Light and Dark Aspects of the Legal Framework of Intra-Corporate Transfers in Spain, in 
Minderhoud & de Lange, ibid, p. 130. 
45 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 12 (2). 
46 L. Brieskova, Rights, Mobility and Integration of Intra-corporate Transferees in Europe: The Case of Slovakia 
and England, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, 2017, p. 105. 
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maximum of 8 weeks in Austria, 13 weeks in Bulgaria and 30 days in Croatia for the authorities 
to decide on the ICT permit application.  Usually the decision is made in 90 days but obtaining 
the actual work and residence permit often exceeds this period. Moreover, exceeding the 90 
days issuing period can be problematic since ICTs are not entitled to enjoy their intra-EU 
mobility rights without their permit, they can only rely on their passport or visa which means 
that they can not travel a longer period than 90 days within the Schengen area.47 The so-called 
"accredited sponsorship" scheme can be beneficial to companies since  they are eligible to a 
fast-track admission procedure, the applicant can be exempted from presenting some evidence 
required and a facilitated visa require procedure.48 The application of this scheme is not 
obligatory, it is only optional therefore only few countries are applying it additionally.  
5. Intra-EU mobility 
5.1. A unique regime 
One of the essential features of the ICT Directive is the possibility it offers to the ICT and in 
terms of mobility within the EU.
 
As stated by recital 25 this directive aims at facilitating the 
mobility of ICTs within the Union and at reducing the administrative burden connected to work 
assignments in several Member States. For this purpose, this directive sets up a specific intra-
EU mobility scheme.49 
Under Article 20 third-country nationals who are in possession of a valid intra-corporate 
transfer permit, issued by the First Member State and a valid travel document, are allowed to 
enter, stay and work in one or more Member States under the conditions of short-term50 or long-
term51 mobility.   
The intra-EU mobility provisions of the Directive will lead to a significant and unique 
development in comparison with national systems which do not enable for transferees to work 
in subsidiaries established in other Member State. By introducing the ICTD this became 
possible on the basis of the first residence permit and of an additional document listing the 
entities of the group undertakings in which the transferee is entitled to work.52 Since free 
mobility within the EU is a privilege of EU nationals and third-country nationals are required a 
five year long permanent residence – nevertheless obtaining permanent residence status is 
subject to many conditions – in order to enjoy such rights, this scheme qualifies as a remarkable 
development.53 As it can be seen this scheme qualifies as a remarkable development correlate 
to the existing rules. Following from the abovementioned restricted opportunities for intra-EU 
 
47 J. Antoons & A. Ghimis & C. Sullivan, ibid, p. 78.  
48 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 11 (7). 
49 H. Verschueren, ibid, p. 42. 
50 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 21. 
51 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 22. 
52 Á. Töttős, Negotiations in the Council, in Minderhoud & de Lange, ibid, p. 13. 
53 Brieskova 2017, ibid, p. 105.  
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mobility, it become obvious during negotiations within the Council that a new autonomous 
regulation has to be adopted in order to fit the needs of ICTs.54   
5.2. Short-term mobility 
Under the rules of short-term mobility, ICTs, holding a valid ICT permit, issued by the first 
Member State, are entitled to stay in any second Member State and work for their company’s 
subsidiary for a period not succeeding 90 days in any 180-day period per Member State, if the 
transferee meets the conditions laid down.55 Under Article 21 of the Directive there are two 
possibilities for implementing mobility provisions: the mobility can happen under a “no 
procedure” requirement or under a ‘notification procedure’. The second Member State can 
require the host entity of the first MS to notify the authorities of the first and second MS of the 
mobility. The second may require the notification to include the transmission of certain, which 
were transmitted to the first MS in accordance with Article 5(1)(c). The second Member State 
may object to the move of the ICT to its territory within 20 days from the date it received the 
notification, when the conditions set out in Article 5(4)(b) are not complied with. If the second 
Member State objects and the mobility has not started yet, the ICT can be prohibited to work 
in the second Member State. However, if the mobility has started, in certain circumstances the 
ICT can be requested to seize work and leave the territory. Article 5(4)(b) obliges the Member 
States to require that the remuneration granted to the third-country nationals during the entire 
transfer is not less favourable than the remuneration granted to nationals of the Member State 
where the work is carried out occupying comparable positions.  
5.3. Long-term mobility 
Member States have two options to choose from while implementing the procedure for long- 
term mobility: they can apply the same procedures as for the short- term mobility, or a specific 
procedure for long-term mobility – application for long-term mobility permit submitted to the 
second Member State.56
 
If the second Member State opts for a application procedure of long-
term mobility, Article 22(2) allows that second Member State to require the applicant to submit 
a work contract and, if necessary, an assignment letter, as provided for by Article 5(1)(c) as 
well as evidence of having, or having applied for sickness insurance, as provided for in Article 
5(1)(g).  The second Member State may reject an application for long-term mobility when the 
criteria of the employment conditions, the remuneration as well as the sufficient income 
requirements of the ICTs as are not met (Article 22(3)(a)). Decision on the
 
application will be 
made within 90 days and the ICT can stay and work there, under certain conditions, until the 
 
54 Töttős, ibid, p. 14.  
55 Directive 2014/66/EU, Art. 21 (1). 
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decision is made, without being subject to visa.57If the Member Stat takes a positive decision 
on the application, it issues a permit for long-term mobility.  
Application for long-term mobility and for short term mobility can not be lodged in line.58 The 
aim of this provision of ICTD is to prevent the circumvention of the distinction between short 
and long-term mobility. In case of a positive decision, a permit for long-term mobility is issued 
that allows transferees to stay and work in the second Member State. 
6. Set of rights provided by ICTD 
6.1. Right to equal treatment 
Under Recital 15 of ICTD ICTs should benefit from at least the same terms and conditions of 
employment as posted workers –unless the remuneration- such as maximum work periods or 
safety at work. It means that these conditions will be determined by the laws of the country of 
origin.59 Member States should require that ICTs enjoy equal treatment with nationals 
occupying comparable positions as regards the remuneration which will be granted during the 
entire transfer. Each Member State should be responsible for checking the remuneration granted 
to the ICTs during their stay on its territory. The aim of these provisions is to protect workers 
and guarantee fair competition between undertakings established in a Member State and those 
established in a third country. It ensures that companies established in a third-country will not 
be able to benefit from lower labour standards. Remuneration, employment conditions and 
sickness coverage play a significant role in the implementation of the criteria for admission, 
since once these conditions are not met, it can be ground for refusal, withdrawal or non-renewal 
of an ICT permit. However, these provisions do not qualify as individual rights, they only oblige 
the Member States. 
Article 18 grants individual rights to ICTs, moreover, under Article 4 of the ICT Directive 
Member States are not prohibited to introduce in their national legislation more rights than the 
rights the transferee can draw directly from the equal treatment provisions in Article 18.  
It has to be mentioned that the remuneration appears in Article 5 (Criteria for Admission), 
instead of Article 18 (Right to Equal Treatment). That means that ICTs are given equal 
treatment with EU nationals regarding salary by putting this as an admission criterion but not 
an individual right as the other working conditions. 60 
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Besides remuneration, another important segment of equal treatment between ICTs and 
nationals concerns the branches of social security in particular benefits related to sickness, 
invalidity and old age.61 According to Recital (38), adequate social security coverage for ICTs 
and benefits for family members is important for ensuring proper working and living conditions 
therefore equal treatment should be granted under national law. Also, Member States can also 
decide not to grant family benefits to ICTs who stay less than 9 months in the EU. 
Article 18 (2)(a) and (b) of the ICTD also establish a list of rights for ICTs regarding freedom 
of affiliation to a trade union, recognition of diplomas, and access to public goods and services, 
except housing. 
6.2. Provisions concerning family reunification 
Significant provisions are introduced in the ICTD regarding the rights of family members of 
ICTs.  The purpose of it was to remove an important obstacle to accept an assignment in the 
EU, meaning that the family members of ICTs will be able to accompany the ICTs at the start 
of their assignment, if they apply at the same time. Moreover, the labour market is accessible 
also for the family members of ICTs. ICTs’ family members unlike EU nationals’ family 
members, need a permit in order to accompany the ICTs. ICTs, similarly to Blue Card holders, 
enjoy some favourable conditions for family reunification. Its aim is to facilitate intra-corporate 
transfers to the EU, and thus contribute to the EU’s economic competitiveness. Family 
reunification is an outstanding area of the Directive. ICTs’ and their families’ right to family 
reunification is covered by the Family Reunification Directive62, subject to the derogations from 
it governed by the ICTD.63 
There are several favourable conditions regarding family reunification. Firstly, ICTs do not 
need to have a reasonable prospect of obtaining the right to permanent residence and have a 
minimum period of residence to be able to bring family with them.
 
Secondly, the integration 
measures referred to in the Family Reunification Directive, for example the language and civic 
tests (or courses) can be applied by the first Member State only after the family reunification 
was granted.
 
 
Thirdly, the first Member State must grant residence permits to family members within three 
months, however under the Family Reunification Directive it takes nine months and six months 
under the Blue Card Directive, from the date of the application. 
Lastly, spouses enjoy immediate access to labour market in the host Member State.  
 
 
62 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Rigths to Family Reunification, OJ 2003 L 251/12. 
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As it can be seen numerous favourable provisions are set up regarding the rights of family 
members in order to make the ICT more attractive to the potential transferees.64 
7. Assessment and potential issues of the Directive 
7.1. General assessment of the Directive 
By creating this new EU immigration scheme, the ICT Directive brings more certainty, in 
certain aspects, for economic actors. A quite positive development is that now all EU countries 
will have an ICT permit, whereas before the Directive only 14 Member States had such a permit. 
This makes the EU more transparent and predictable for companies regarding immigration. 
Moreover, the ICT permit increases efficiency, as it creates a combined work and residence 
permit which was not necessarily the case before its introduction. The duration of the 
application procedure has also been significantly reduced in several countries.  
However, the harmonizing effect of the EU ICT Directive is still quite limited. Although most 
EU countries eliminated their parallel national schemes – which was supposed to result in more 
harmonization between the Member States – our practical experience shows that companies are 
still dealing with many variables because national administrations have adapted their schemes 
to the specificities of their job markets.65While challenging, these variables can nevertheless 
create opportunities for strategic immigration planning. What remains to be seen is whether 
these opportunities will become more apparent to companies, or if business operators will 
continue to focus on limitations in the individual Member States. 
According to some opinion, the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive is beyond any doubt a 
unique and valuable piece of legislation in the European migration landscape that contributes 
to a major change in the EU’s and Member States’ economic migration policies. This Directive 
can prove how important is to establish EU-wide schemes and their added value compared to 
purely national ones. As a consequence, the ICT Directive could a huge shift to the entire 
European labour migration policy. According to others, who present a more negative appoint 
of view for example Lörges in his comment66 on the Directive: “Due to its restricted scope, the 
overall impact of this Directive will be rather limited. In addition, its effects might be further 
diminished by its considerable complexity which reduces the attractiveness of the rules and 
raises doubts whether the Directive will indeed be able to enhance the number of intra-corporate 
transfers significantly. However, the Directive might play an important role in the further 
development of intra-EU mobility for third country nationals due to its flexible mobility scheme 
which is independent from the Schengen regime.” It is not possible yet to verify or falsify these 
statements. 
The fact that nine Member states opted for the non-bureaucratic ‘no procedure’ requirement for 
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short term mobility even though they could have chosen the heavier notification procedure, may 
be taken as a positive signal. A significant number of Member States also provided for deadlines 
for taking a decision which are shorter than the maximum of 90 days prescribed by Article 
15(1). It also appears that in many cases Member States did not opt for the less burdensome 
options available in the Directive:  
Only a limited number of Member States seem to have used the option to set up simplified 
procedures for entities or groups of undertakings which have been recognized for that purpose.  
 Most Member States seem to have opted for requiring a cooling off period  Sometimes this 
choice appears to be in contradiction with the wish, expressed by the same Member States, to 
allow for periods of stay of ICTs exceeding the maximum periods of three years (for managers 
and specialists) or one years (for trainee employees).  
Maybe the positive reception of the directive by economic operators and the fact that – so far – 
no complaints were received by the Commission may be taken as a signal for justifying a 
positive assessment. But it cannot be excluded either that a number of problems have not 
surfaced yet. The first application report, due in November 2019, will tell more.67  
8. Summary 
As the present study highlighted it, the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive introduced several 
outstanding developments in the area of legal migration in the EU, such as the unique scheme 
of intra-EU mobility, the facilitated procedure of entering the Union, or the significant rights 
concerning transferees and their family. In the view of the above, it is not certain yet, to what 
extent the implementation of the Directive is going to realize the aim of a facilitated and a less 
burdensome procedure. It is also questionable if the equal treatment and the integration of ICTs 
is going to be achieved easily.  
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This paper will present the Decision of the Council of EU 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on 
the introduction of provisional measures in the field of international protection in favor of Italy 
and Greece and the main provisions which it prescribes. The emphasis will certainly be on the 
lawsuit against the Decision brought by the Slovak Republic and Hungary before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, their lawsuits and ultimately the opinion of the Court and its 
judgment on the case. In his opinion, independent lawyer Yves Bot raises the question of 
whether behind what is called the ‘migration crisis 2015’ is the crisis of the whole European 
integration project based on the solidarity and mutual assistance of the Member States? 
Keywords: asylum crisis, European Union, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Dublin Regulation, 
Common European Asylum System 
1. Introductory remarks 
By the end of 2014 and early 2015, we have witnessed the mass influx of third-country nationals 
who need international assistance and protection in the area of Europe and the European Union1. 
This was caused by frequent disasters and numerous conflicts in the Middle East and in the 
African countries that have a Mediterranean coast, as well as poor living and economic 
conditions.2 
From the unification of European integrations, a common economic and political union, a 
supranational character and as a unique international organization with the powers delegated 
exclusively by the Member States to treaties to Union institutions, was attempted. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, jurisdiction in the field of freedom, security 
and justice is divided between the institutions of the European Union and the Member States. 
This area was created to ensure the free movement of persons and provide a high level of 
security for the citizens of the Union. It also includes asylum and immigration policies and the 
fight against crime. These two policies played a key role in the times of migration crisis and 
brought the Union's institutions as well as the member states to completely new situation. Given 
the border openness, the Schengen Agreement and the ease of movement of people within the 
 
1  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics (20 March 2019).  
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Union, the goal of most asylum seekers was to reach the nearest EU member state and to 
continue to other countries, predominantly in Germany and Scandinavia. Because of the border 
in the Mediterranean and the already established immigration routes, Italy and Greece have 
become the first countries on the route of third-country nationals. In response to the crisis 
situation and the assistance of these two countries, EU institutions have adopted a Decision on 
the introduction of temporary measures in the field of international protection in favor of Italy 
and Greece.  
2. Decision of the EU Council 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015. 
The EU Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on the introduction of provisional 
measures in the field of international protection in favor of Italy and Greece was issued in 
response of the European Union institutions to the migration crisis which, at the end of 2014 
and early 2015, affected Europe, countries whose borders are in the Mediterranean. Due to 
current instability and conflict in the immediate neighborhood of Italy and Greece, the two 
states have been particularly exposed to the unaddressed inflow of migrants, including the 
applicants for international protection whom it is indisputably necessary. All of these points to 
the need for solidarity with Italy and Greece and to supplement the previous measures with 
temporary measures in the area of asylum and migration.3 
The adoption of the Decision itself preceded the adoption of various concrete measures of 
solidarity in favor of the most advanced Member States. At a joint meeting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, on 20 April 2015, the Commission presented a ten-point 
plan on direct action to be taken in response to this crisis, including an obligation to consider 
the possibility of urgent relocation.4 Since then, the European Council has decided to strengthen 
internal solidarity and accountability, and in particular has called for increased urgent assistance 
and help to the most deprived Member States - Italy and Greece and to consider the possibility 
of voluntary relocation among member states on a voluntary basis and to deploy teams of the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in the most complex states.5  
The European Parliament, in its resolution, also stressed the need for the Union to respond to 
Mediterranean tragedy based on solidarity and fair division of responsibility and to step up 
efforts in this area vis-à-vis those Member States that accept the largest number of refugees.6 
Especially emphasized needs are addressed to the most advanced Member States to step up 
their efforts to establish measures to deal with the flows of mixed migration at the external 
 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20171114_relocation_eu_solidarity_between_member_states_en.pdf (21 March 2019). 
4European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration, 
13 May 2015, COM (2015) 240. 
5 EU Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015, OJ L 248/80 
6 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v. Council, [2017] ECR 631 
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borders of the European Union. These measures should protect the rights of those who need 
international protection while at the same time preventing illegal migration. 
On 9 September 2015, the Commission filed, pursuant to Article 78 III of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, the proposal of the Council on the introduction of 
provisional measures in the field of international protection in favor of Italy, Greece and 
Hungary. In addition, pursuant to Article 78 II e) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the establishment of a crisis-management mechanism and a proposal to amend 
Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.7 
The Commission's initial proposal foresees the transfer of 120 000 applicants for international 
protection from Italy (15 600 persons), Greece (50 400 persons) and Hungary (54 000 persons) 
to other Member States. The annex to that proposal contained three tables, each of these three 
Member States being distributed among the other Member States in the form of shares 
established for each of these host Member States. The proposal was passed to national 
parliaments on 13 September 2015 
3. Judgment of 6 September 2017 - Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 
Slovakia and Hungary against the Council of the European Union 
In response to the migration crisis that affected Europe in the summer of 2015, the Council of 
the European Union adopted a decision in order to help Italy and Greece deal with the massive 
inflow of migrants.  
The decision provides for the relocation from those two Member States to other EU Member 
States, over a period of two years, of 120 000 persons in clear need of international protection. 
The contested decision was adopted on the basis of Article 78 III TFEU, which provides that 
“in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation 
characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from 
the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member States 
concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament”. Slovakia and Hungary which, 
like the Czech Republic and Romania, voted against the adoption of the contested decision in 
the Council, have asked the Court of Justice to annul the decision. The Court dismisses in their 
entirety the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary. 
First, the Court rejects the argument that a legislative procedure 3 should have been followed 
because Article 78 III TFEU provides that the European Parliament is to be consulted when a 
 
7 Ibid.  
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measure based on that provision is adopted. The Court notes in this regard that a legislative 
procedure can be followed only where a provision of the Treaties expressly refers to it. 
As Article 78 III TFEU does not contain any express reference to a legislative procedure, the 
contested decision could be adopted in a non-legislative procedure and is consequently a non-
legislative act. The Court holds in that connection that Article 78 III TFEU enables the EU 
institutions to adopt all the provisional measures necessary to respond effectively and swiftly 
to an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of displaced persons.8 
The Court considers that the relocation mechanism provided for by the contested decision is 
not a measure that is manifestly inappropriate for contributing to achieving its objective, namely 
helping Greece and Italy to cope with the impact of the 2015 migration crisis.9 
The Court considers that the relocation mechanism provided for by the contested decision is 
not a measure that is manifestly inappropriate for contributing to achieving its objective, namely 
helping Greece and Italy to cope with the impact of the 2015 migration crisis. In that regard, 
the legality of the decision cannot be called into question on the basis of retrospective 
assessments of its efficacy.10 Where the EU legislature must assess the future effects of a new 
set of rules, its assessment can be challenged only where it appears manifestly incorrect in the 
light of the information available to the legislature at the time of the adoption of the rules in 
question.11 That is not the case here, given that the Council carried out, on the basis of a detailed 
examination of the statistical data available to it at the time, an objective analysis of the effects 
of the measure on the emergency situation in question.12 
4. The reform of the Dublin Regulation as a measure to tackle the asylum 
crisis 
The European Commission created a proposal for tackling the current asylum crisis. This 
proposal has four priorities which must be acquired in order to effectively deal with the massive 
influx of third country nationals into EU member states. These four points are the following: 
improving the Common Asylum System including reforming the Dublin Regulation13, creating 
joint border management, combating crime related to migration14 and cooperation with third 
countries that also have interest in tackling the asylum crisis. This paper concentrates on the 
 
8  Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v. Council, [2017] ECR 631   
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The CEAS consists of a number of directives and the Dublin Regulation. This framework directs the reception, 
qualification and the status of asylum-seekers in member states of the European Union. 
14 Namely smuggling of persons within and outside of the European Union. 
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first point, improving and achieving a truly centralised Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) by reforming the Dublin Regulation. 
4.1. Reasons of the reform 
The Dublin System was created in 1990 with the Dublin Convention signed and created by 
member states of the European Communities.15 The importance of drafting this agreement lies 
in the Schengen Agreement thanks to which internal border management in the Communities 
was formulated. According to the Schengen Agreement passengers don’t need to check their 
identification crossing the inner borders. As it was already mentioned above this makes it 
possible for asylum seekers to apply for international protection in member states they desire. 
The Dublin Regulation operates with a system to appoint the member state which is responsible 
for processing the claim of an asylum seeker in order to disable forum-shopping or asylum-
lottery. 
It is of great importance in connection with improving CEAS to come up with new regulation 
for the previous Dublin Regulation. There are some big omissions in the current regulation. 
First and foremost the Dublin System is not able to even out the weight of processing asylum 
claims between member states since the regulation is formulated in a way which puts the most 
pressure on member states bordering the European Union.16 
The system in almost all cases puts this responsibility on the state in which the asylum seeker 
first entered the territory of the EU. There is only one exception to this rule which has priority 
above all other criteria: the unification of families.17 In practice this means that in the first place 
the member state responsible for processing the asylum claim is the one in which the asylum 
seeker’s family members reside however if there is no family member in any member state then 
the responsibility shifts to the member states in which the asylum seeker first entered the EU.18 
It is worth mentioning that the Dublin System does have a solidarity clause which makes it 
possible for member states to voluntarily take the responsibility for processing the asylum 
claims that must be processed by another member state in the situation when the asylum systems 
of the other member states are overwhelmed.19 However the asylum crisis showed that this 
solidarity clause cannot provide a solution for mass influx of refugees since member states who 
are not primarily responsible for the processing of asylum claims were not eager to accept 
 
15 J. Mitchell: The Dublin Regulation and Systemic Flaws, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
2017, p. 300.  
16  Ibid., p. 318. 
17 Zs. Horváth & Á. Mohay & A. Pánovics Attila & E. Szalayné Sándor,  Európai Közjog 2., PTE ÁJK, Pécs 2016, 
p. 193. 
18 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-information/docs/20160406/factsheet_-_the_dublin_system_en.pdf 21 (21 March 2019). 
19 The current regulation has a mechanism built in to foresee crises. The article drawn up for this mechanism 
contains the requirement for solidarity which can be realized with voluntary transfers of asylum claims from one 
Member State to another. See: OJ L 180/31 
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transfers of asylum seekers based on the Dublin Regulation. This was the reason for introducing 
the temporary measures of resettlement and relocation of refugees in other member states.20 
4.2. The proposed reform of the system 
The reform of the Dublin System revolves around these problems while the aim of the system 
remains the same: appointing the member state which is responsible for processing the asylum 
claim of the refugee. However it is clear that the regulation in its current form can not equalize 
the pressure on member states.21 The proposed short-term solution for this is the creation of a 
correctional mechanism which was created by the European Commission.22 The proposal 
operates with a correctional key that is determined for every member states with regard to their 
GDP and demography. This key must be applied to all asylum claims a member state is 
processing at the moment. Then the correctional mechanism itself would trigger if the member 
state had to process 50% more claims then it was designated with the correctional key.23 
Instead other member states would have to take responsibility for asylum seekers in this 
situation. This means that the mechanism of the relocation scheme would be introduced in a 
directive. On the other hand the proposal provides the possibility for member states to deny the 
transfer of asylum claims in return for financial support for member states taking 
responsibility.24 
This measure could very well have the potential to solve one of the core problems of the asylum 
crisis which is the lack of solidarity between member states. In the current situation there are 
many member states that do not want to deal with refugees. Their intention is realized by the 
Dublin Regulation. This is reason for introducing the possibility to deny transfers in turn of 
financial support. This measure may be able to increase solidarity between member states. 
The European Commission also drafted a long-term proposal for the Dublin System. According 
to this proposal the system would become completely centralized on the long run which would 
replace the asylum systems of member states for one common system of all the EU which would 
contribute to establishing a centralized Common European Asylum System.25 In this system the 
European Asylum Support Office would become a first-instance decision-making agency with 
headquarters in every member state. The EASO would take over processing asylum claims from 
authorities of member states. It is easy to see that sufficient harmonization of the asylum 
 
20 2012 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 78 III 
21 A. T. Rubin: Shifting Standards: The Dublin Regulation and Italy, Creighton International and Comparative 
Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2016, p. 139. 
22 This correctional mechanism is based on the same calculations as the relocation scheme. See: COM(2016) 197 
final 4. 
23  This means that member states would not have to process asylum claims that fall above 150% of all claims 
according to the correctional key. 
24 According to the recent proposal the amount of money to be paid would be 250.000 euro per person. See: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586639/EPRS_BRI(2016)586639_EN.pdf  pp. 4-5. 
 
25 Commission to the European Parliament and the Council towards a reform of the common European asylum 
system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe, 6 April 2016, COM (2016) 197 final, p. 8. 
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systems of member states could only be achieved by this measure since this way every member 
states would have identical asylum procedures with only one authority to adjudicate appeals on 
second instance.26 
5. Social integration as a factor of deciding the host country for an asylum 
seeker 
The current regulation does not provide for a criteria which would incorporate the success rate 
of social integration of refugees granted asylum. This factor could monitor the integration 
process of refugees in every member state. This success rate could play an important role in the 
new framework of the Dublin System. It could be incorporated in the system which appoints 
the member state responsible for processing the asylum claims. As a result a system would be 
created which would evaluate not only the economical strength of a member state but also the 
social aspect of accepting refugees. 
It is important to take into consideration the social aspect as well since those persons are not 
grantees international protection right now have the possibility to abuse rights gained in the EU, 
in the Schengen Area. This means that there tends to be a great tendency of secondary 
movement of refugees in the European Union regardless of the member state they are granted 
protection. That’s why the reform of the CEAS incorporates the idea that these secondary 
movements must be stopped somehow – probably with some sanctions regarding the status of 
refugees.27 
6. Suggestions for the future 
Faced with the sudden mass influx of third-country nationals who need international assistance 
and protection, the European Union has been trying to reach the best possible solution to 
respond to the current crisis situation in the shortest possible time. It was necessary to help 
member states who found themselves in the crisis as the most prominent, namely Italy and 
Greece. In a very short time since the outbreak of the crisis, Union institutions have found a 
possible temporary solution to help the most affected member states face and solve the problem. 
EU Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on the introduction of interim measures 
in the field of international protection in favor of Italy and Greece, based on Article 78 III of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, has proved to be the most appropriate 
solution. The Decision introduced a transfer mechanism based on the mandatory shares 
allocated to the Member States in accordance with the proportionality principle. 
 
26  Ibid, p. 9. 
27 Commission staff working document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 19 December 2017, part ¾, COM (2016) 466 final, pp. 
4-5. 
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The Slovak Republic and Hungary, failing to accept the obligation of the Decision, filed a 
lawsuit against the European Court of Justice against the Council, citing the reasons why the 
Decision was not a favorable resolution of the crisis situation. In its lawsuits, the State 
Prosecutors point out that the Decision was adopted in breach of the procedure for passing legal 
acts, that the principle of proportionality was not respected, that the adoption of the Decision 
was not necessary and that the crisis situation as such did not exist. In the defendant's case, the 
non-compliance of Article 78 III of the UFEU as the legal basis for the adoption of the Decision 
and the legality of the Decision is being challenged. In its judgment, the Court dismissed all the 
defendant's grounds as unfounded by explaining each of them in detail individually. 
The attitude of Slovakia and Hungary, the lawsuit the filed showed that member states lack the 
solidarity towards each other which is the main reason the asylum crisis could not be tackled in 
the early years. However it can also be states that the temporary measures the Council 
introduced are not sufficient to handle the reception of refugees on the long run. In order to 
bypass this problem the European Commission called for the reform of the CEAS including the 
Dublin Regulation which is proposed to have a likewise mechanism for allocation as the 
temporary measures introduced. 
Independent lawyer Yves Bot pointed out that the claims of the Slovak Republic and Hungary 
reminded us that solidarity was one of the basic values of the Union and even made its 
foundation. There is a question of whether it is possible to increase solidarity among the peoples 
of Europe and to imagine all the well-connected Union among the peoples, as suggested in the 
preamble of the Treaty on European Union, if there is no solidarity between Member States 
when one of them faces crisis situations? 
This is the essence of what at the same time represents the purpose and goal of the European 
project. Therefore, it should first be emphasized the importance of solidarity as the fundamental 
and existential value of the Union. Already confirmed by the Treaty of Rome, solidarity is still 
at the heart of the integration process that is being sought in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The particularity of the contested decision is the introduction of a transfer mechanism based on 
the mandatory shares allocated to the Member States. By this decision, solidarity among 
member states is given concrete content and binding nature. This crucial and innovative feature 
of the aforementioned decision explains the political sensitivities of these cases, as it reveals 
the opposition of some Member States of proponents of solidarity who have taken over by free 
will and based solely on voluntary obligations.28 
In conclusion the reform of the Dublin Regulation intends to achieve more solidarity between 
member states by making a compromise – the new regulation would allow member states to 
deny accepting transfers of refugees in turn of financial support. This solution would be 
beneficiary for both rejecting and accepting member states. However – in the end – the faith of 
 
28  Opinion of the Advocate General Y. Bot of 26 July 2017, EU: C: 2017: 618. 
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the proposed reform is decided in the co-decision-making procedure of the European Parliament 
and the Council which will be a political decision. 
65 
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Migration is undoubtedly one of the most topical and much discussed topics not only in Europe 
but on a global scale as well. This paper focuses on the Marrakesh Agreement and analysis it 
mainly from the point of view of the detention of migrants.  
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1. Introduction 
Throughout history, people were on a constant move, trying to reach the shores of Europe for 
various reasons and through different channels. Migrants were trying to find legal channels, but 
they were also risking their lives in order to avoid political oppression, war and poverty, as well 
as to connect with the family, for entrepreneurship and to acquire knowledge and education. 
Behind every migration there is a special life story hidden. Wrong and stereotyped 
argumentation often seeks to focus only on certain types of flows, overcoming the inherent 
complexity of this phenomenon that affects society in various ways and seeks a variety of 
responses. Freedom of movement of people, issuance of residence permits, work permits, brain 
drain, asylum policy, smuggling of migrants and migrants' integration are some of the aspects 
of migration that has become more and more present in the global scene over the last twenty 
years.1 Reasons why people are migrating are many, though in their essence, they are always 
down to the pursuit of a better quality of life and greater earnings. They are classified as 
motivation to depart from country of origin (so-called push factors) and factors of attraction to 
return to the country of origin (so called pull-factors).2 These factors are diverse and can be 
grouped (inter alia) in the following way:3  
1) Economic reasons such as poverty, unemployment or unfavourable entrepreneurial and 
investing climate, which act as incentives to move away, and in contrast to the possibility of 
 
1 R. Mikac & F. Dragovic, Massive Migration: Challenges, Consequences and Way Forward, Security Studies 
Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017, pp. 134-136. 
2 I. Vukorepa, Migrations and right to work in European Union, Digest FLZ, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2018,  pp. 85-120. 
3 Ibid. 
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achieving greater earnings, better living and working conditions in other states that act as 
attracting factors, 
2) Political reasons such as wars, civil conflicts, insecurity due to political and religious 
affiliation, and violations of human rights versus countries where personal and legal security 
and political freedom are guaranteed, 
3) Natural (climatic) reasons such as rainy, flood and damp areas in favour of climate-friendly 
areas, 
4) Social and cultural reasons such as violations of civil rights and the disintegration of society 
based on ethnic, racial, sexual or religious affiliation, and lack of educational services in the 
face of attracting factors such as family reunion, friendly relationships, migrant social networks 
and favourable immigration policies and historical connections.4 
Migration is one of the priority topics on the United Nations’ agenda, which is confirmed by a 
number of discussions in different segments of the UN system. Special attention to migration 
issues is devoted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through its Functional 
Commission - The Population and Development Commission whose theme of the 2012 annual 
session was devoted to migration as well as the Global Migration and Development Forum 
(GFMD) which deals with the world migration trends and brings conclusions and 
recommendations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a major international 
organization that deals with the understanding of migration and monitoring of migration 
management, from social and economic to the criminal law aspect of migrations. The problem 
facing Europe over recent years is the migration / refugee crisis. IOM defines a migrant as any 
person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from 
his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the 
movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what 
the length of the stay is.5  A distinction is made between short-term or temporary migration 
covering movements with a duration between three and 12 months, and long-term or permanent 
migration, referring to a change of country of residence for a duration of one year or more.6    
While according to the Convention, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return 
to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.7  
The issue, which has become the major issue of international and national policies of the world, 
especially the EU, since it has been has been initiated by the adoption of the New York 
Declaration on Refugees and Migrants in 2016 which says that the main aim is to protect human 
 
4 Ibid., p. 113. 
5 https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant (5 May 2019). 
6 https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions  (5 May 2019). 
7 1951 Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees (UNHCR), p. 3. (introductory note)  
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rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status.8 The Declaration sought to improve the 
cooperation between the states on the migration crisis. It was the predecessor of deciding on 
the conclusion of the Global Migration Agreement. 
2. The context of the Marrakesh agreement  
The Global Migration Agreement was adopted on 10 December 2018 in Marrakesh and is 
therefore colloquially called the Marrakesh Agreement. 
The agreement rests on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, the principles of the International Labour 
Organization.9 The Marrakesh Agreement was adopted to better control and manage migration 
at the global, regional, national and local level, given that the number of migrations reached its 
highest level, where over 250 million migrants, including the Middle East refugees, are 
currently on the move. The aim of the agreement is joint cooperation to address migration 
problems. The nature of this phenomenon is such that no country can solve it alone, and this 
way it calls for joint state co-operation. The Marrakesh Agreement is not a legally binding 
agreement and states do not have to incorporate it into their legal systems.10 
It guarantees state sovereignty, which would mean that each country has the right to define its 
own national migration policy and manage the migration within their jurisdiction. Also, states 
can, in accordance with their political and social order, set a border between legitimate and 
illegal migrations and, accordingly, implement policies and measures related to entry, stay, 
departure, migrant work. In addition, responsibility for violation of human rights, respect for 
human rights and freedoms and the prohibition of discrimination and the ban on calling on 
xenophobia and racism are guaranteed.11 
In order to facilitate the migration process, the Agreement calls for understanding, unification 
and assistance to migrants, and therefore the need to strengthen international cooperation is 
great because the migration process is happening globally. The rule of law is considered to be 
based on migration management. One of the primary goals of the Agreement is to reduce as far 
as possible the problems in migrants’ countries of origin as far as possible, i.e. to secure decent 
living conditions and to reduce the reasons why people would emigrate from them. 12The 
agreement calls for regulation, information, assistance and securing the options to migrants, as 
well as the strengthening of awareness of illegal migration, and thus the reduction of illegal 
migrations. 
 
8 2016 71/1. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 1.5 (introduction) 
9 1949 Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No.97); 1975 Convention concerning Migrations in 
Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No.143) 
10 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; final draft, 11 July 2018  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.   
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In order to make the implementation of the Agreement effective, international cooperation 
between the states and the UN is of crucial importance. This should be achieved through the 
voluntary contributions, namely the financial, technical and other help of the state, engaging 
with external partners, including migrants, civil society, migrant and diaspora organizations, 
faith-based organizations, local authorities and communities, the private sector, employers’ and 
workers’ organizations, trade unions, parliamentarians, National Human Rights Institutions, the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, academia, the media and other relevant 
stakeholders at global, regional and national levels, as it is stated in the Objectives of UN 
Network on Migration, which was established  to support the implementation, follow-up and 
review of the GCM13. These capacities are increased, and co-operation promoted through 
consultation, request processing, identification of partners to provide assistance, linking 
requests to similar initiatives, identifying funding opportunities, that is, through the 
establishment of project funds, the receipt of state contributions, and so on.14 
In addition to this, the agreement is foreseen to establish the Global Online Migration Forum 
as a source of all data. The agreement will be implemented in cooperation with migrants, 
organizations, local authorities, cooperation between states which is of crucial importance, in 
cooperation with National human rights institutions 15, and by identifying funding 
opportunities, including by initiating the start-up fund, for whom the solutions and proposals 
are incorporated in the Global Compact itself. 16 
The Agreement has 23 goals for successful implementation of migration policy which are; 
1.collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies, 2. 
minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of 
origin, 3. provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration, 4. ensure that all 
migrants have proof of legal 5. identity and adequate documentation, enhance availability and 
flexibility of pathways for regular migration, 6. facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and 
safeguard conditions that ensure decent work, 7. address and reduce vulnerabilities in 
migration, 8. save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants, 9. 
strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants, 10. prevent combat and 
eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration, 11. manage borders in 
an integrated, secure and coordinated manner, 12. strengthen certainty and predictability in 
migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral, 13. use migration 
detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives, 14. enhance consular 
protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle, 15. provide access to 
basic services for migrants, 16. empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and 
social cohesion, 17. eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public 
discourse to shape perceptions of migration, 18. invest in skills development and facilitate 
mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences, 19. create conditions for migrants 
 
13 https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/UN-Network-on-Migration_TOR.pdf (5 May 2019). 
14 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; final draft, 11 July 2018 
15 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf  (21 March 2019).  
16 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; final draft, 11 July 2018 
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and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries, 20. promote faster, 
safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants, 21. 
cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable 
reintegration, 22. establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and 
earned benefits, 23. strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, 
orderly and regular migration.17 
3. Objective 13 of the GCM 
In this section of the essay, we will take a closer look at the detention of migrants. The reason 
why this topic has been highlighted is because it is an area of debate amongst states across the 
globe. Not all countries detain migrants in the same condition i.e. the treatment of migrants, 
who are detained, differ from country to country. The key question to bear in mind is, should 
there be a set minimum standard across the globe, which would ensure the safety of those 
individuals who are detained. As stated earlier, each person, who decides to migrate from their 
homeland, has a special story; thus, some may have a genuine reason for their action. That said, 
a person who is in fact innocent, should not have undergo further hardship from being detained.  
Immigration detention is the deprivation of liberty for migration-related reasons. In most 
countries, immigration authorities have the power to hold non-citizens on grounds relating to a 
person’s migration situation. This is an administrative or civil power that operates separately to 
the powers given to the police and criminal courts. In contrast, criminal incarceration is the 
deprivation of liberty of a citizen or non-citizen due to criminal charges or convictions.  
Objective 13 of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) ensures the commitment to “Use 
immigration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives”. This in 
detail sets out several actions for the effective commitment to this objective, these actions 
include using human rights mechanisms for the monitoring of migrant detention, consolidating 
a collection of alternatives to migrant detention, providing justice to migrants facing detention, 
and aims to reduce the negative and lasting effects of detention. 
The key aspect of this objective is the protection of human rights for migrants. However, as 
migrant detention is often characterised by little or no independent oversight, and in many 
countries, migrant detention is among the opaquest areas of public administration, the effective 
protection of human rights becomes increasingly challenging. Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enshrines the right to liberty and security, ensuring that 
the arrest or detainment of person effecting an unauthorised entry into the country remains 
lawful. At first instance, upon entry of a migrant, the discretion of the individual’s liberty is up 
to state in question as established in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of 
Khlaifia and others v Italy.  The discretion however must be in line with the general purpose of 
 
17 Ibid.   
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Article 5, which is to preserve the right to liberty and guarantee that no individual is deprived 
of their liberty through arbitrary means as shown in the case, Saadi v United Kingdom. 
The ECtHR case of SK v Russia18 involved a decision by the Russian authorities to detain the 
applicant, a Syrian national, and remove him to his home country.  The applicant complained 
in particular that his continuing detention was arbitrary, given that he could not be removed to 
Syria, and that there had been no domestic procedure which he could have used to have had his 
detention reviewed. The Court held that there was a violation of the applicants Article 5 rights 
as no applicable procedure was available for the applicant to obtain a review of his detainment 
nor to obtain release.  
As detention must only be used as a last resort, alternatives to detention are any policies or 
practices that States must first implement. However, as human migration is reaching 
unprecedented levels, many States are struggling to respond to new migrant arrivals. 
Additionally, the balance between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights is 
heavily affected by the increasing use of human trafficking and smuggling, but it can be argued 
that States that work together to address the humanitarian and protection dimensions of irregular 
movements by addressing the root causes and drivers of displacement, improving protection 
conditions where people are, and creating safer and more orderly ways of securing long-term 
solutions will present States with opportunities. Alternatives to detention is preferred as there 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that the threat of being detained deters irregular migration19, 
alternatives have been shown to be up to 80% cheaper than detention20 and detention has been 
shown to harm health and mental wellbeing in detainees21. One example of an alternative being 
used in an EU Member State is in Sweden, where individuals subject to a supervision order (a 
combination of reporting and a surrender of documents) are obliged to report to the nearest 
police station or the Swedish Migration Board on a regular basis.  
As the GCM is merely an intergovernmental agreement and not legally binding on the 
signatories, the absence of enforcement mechanisms for the agreements objectives is apparent. 
Objective 13 can be further reinforced by legislation similar to the EU Reception Conditions 
Directive22 which provides that an asylum seeker can only be detained if no other coercive 
measure can be applied and obliges Member States to incorporate alternatives to detention in 
national law. However, on the assumption that an asylum seeker is a type of migrant based on 
the UN definition of a migrant being “any person who is moving or has moved across an 
international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence”23, the 
 
18 European Court of Human Rights: SK v Russia (App. no. 52722/15) ECtHR (2017). 
19 H. Crawley: Chance or Choice? Understanding Why Asylum Seekers Come to the UK, UK Refugee Council, 
London 2010. 
20 R. Sampson, There Are Alternatives, International Detention Coalition, Melbourne 2015. 
21 Soorej Jose Puthoopparambil, Magdalena Bjerneld, Carina Källestål: Quality of Life Among Immigrants in 
Swedish Immigration Detention Centres: A Cross-Sectional Questionnaire Study, Global Health Action Vol. 8, 
No. 1, December 2015. 
22 Directive 2013/33/ EU, OJ 2013 L 180/96. 
23 http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/migration/index.html (5 May 2019). 
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directive might be applicable. This paragraph makes the point that the GCM can be reinforced 
and gives the example of Directive which would apply to member states if we assume an asylum 
seeker is a migrant. 
Although Objective 13 of the GCM provides an important safeguard for the detention of 
migrants, it fails to include an action for effective remedies against unlawful detention. This 
include certain legal measures, such as providing detainees with the right to legal advice or 
representation while in detention, detainees being periodically informed of their right to legal 
advice and requiring the state to provide detainees with written reasons for their detention in a 
language they can understand. These rights are protected under Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and more specifically for migrant workers 
under Article 16 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families. 
4. Conclusion 
In order to maintain safe, orderly and regular migration, in particular to those countries affected 
by the on-going migrant/refugee wave in the past few years, this agreement is considered to be 
a significant direction to solving the global crisis. However, countries which have adopted the 
Marrakesh agreement should firstly start by respecting fundamental human rights by 
incorporating it within their own national legislation. Countries which migrants have emigrated 
from should work on strengthening inter-national relationships between the countries of origin 
from which migrants have fled. In regard to the countries of origin, through cooperation 
between other states, certain aspects should be developed on. For example, in the field of public 
safety, public health and public security. By helping the countries of origin to improve in these 
three categories, the overall living conditions of the citizens should improve, which in effect 
should decrease citizens from leaving their countries. As there is no clear framework at a 
European level for alternatives to migrant detention, the GCM provides the first steps for a 
common approach to the treatment of migrants that could be followed by the signatories through 
23 objectives. As one of the alternatives of non-custodial measures, states may consider 
establishing a voluntary return programme which would provide several benefits to both the 
migrant in question as well as the State administering the migrant. These include reducing the 
incidence of detention, reducing the period of detention and providing a dignified and 
sustainable alternative with an effective focus on human rights.  
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FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, promotes, coordinates and 
develops European border management in line with the EU Fundamental Rights Charter and 
the concept of Integrated Border Management.  To answer the main questions around 
FRONTEX, the first step that we had to do is to have an overview of the development of the 
FRONTEX agency from the beginnings to the recent status of the Agency. Just like European 
integration, FRONTEX has also been through many changes during the last 15 years. This 
change resulted in positive and negative aspects as well. In our research we were focusing on 
the presentation of the problems in connection with the work of the Agency and actual 
tendencies about how it should continue its practice, especially as regards the possible ways of 
reforms. Besides the abovementioned questions, our research also aimed to highlight some 
related issues regarding fundamental rights. 
Keywords: FRONTEX, border control, border management, fundamental rights 
1. Introduction 
With the process of European integration gaining stronger traction even nowadays, it has a 
notable impact on the European Union’s security and foreign politics, its border control and 
border protection practice. If the border controls stay firmly within the Member States’ powers, 
it is hard to imagine a unified approach in regards to border management. As each Member 
State has a different practice and policies in place, the idea of a unified approach has emerged 
lately in order to forego the infringements of rights, divergent practices and other problems. 
This “solution” is called FRONTEX (or, since recently, the European Border and Coast Guard) 
which it aims to coordinate border control at the EU level.  
The 2015 migration crisis had put tremendous pressure on the countries at the external borders 
of the EU, and the number of infringements and problematic solutions had also soared.  
The crisis had shed a light on the fact that the FRONTEX solution needs another reform. The 
2016/1624/EU directive has undertaken changes in the Agency that far exceeds its original 
mission. In this study, we aim to answer the following questions: How did border management 
change during the last two decades? How did FRONTEX change since its inception? What 
opportunities still lay within FRONTEX? What does the future hold for FRONTEX and what 
suggestions are there to reform it yet again?  
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In order to answer these questions we have to examine the Agency and its activity from the 
beginning throughout its different reforms to its current state. 
2. Historical overview  
2.1 Background  
With the fall of the communist regimes during the early ’90s, Eastern European countries 
produced an unforeseen westward migration wave. This wave of immigration alone has already 
raised concerns regarding the management of external borders.1 The worries have increased 
among the Western countries with the attacks on the United States on 9/11 in 2001. In pursuance 
of avoiding terror attacks and upholding peace, the agenda of adopting tighter border control 
measures have gained a highlighted importance.2 
The first document to emphasize is the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement, which had entered into force on in 1995. These 
included both internal and external border crossing regulations. The regulations regarding the 
crossing of external borders were included in Article 3-8.  As a matter of principle, it spelled 
out that border crossing of people could only be take place at declared border crossing points, 
only during their opening hours. These measures were implemented to serve the unification of 
control measures, but the border control itself has remained in the hands of the Member States. 
The treaty did not have a supranational edge.3 
The Treaty of Amsterdam that entered into force on 1 May 1999, has transferred parts of the 
justice and home affairs cooperation to the Community institutions, thus incorporating it into 
the first pillar of the Union. Among these affairs, the questions of immigration and refugee 
policies were included along with the management of external and internal borders. The Treaty 
has established a five-year transitional period in order to adopt the unified Community 
legislation. According to that, uniform border control measures and a uniform visa issuing 
procedure should be instituted until 1 May 2004. Furthermore, a Community acquis had to be 
created for immigration and refugee policies, as well as regarding the conditions of entry and 
stay for citizens of third countries.  
Ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the declared aim of the domains in the first and third 
pillar was to create and reinforce this territory of countries, where liberty, safety, and the rule 
of law provide the base for governing.   
 
1 By external border we mean external land and sea borders, along with airports with an incoming or outgoing 
traffic into or out of the European Union coming from or leaving third countries. 
2 I. Rossi: The establishment of FRONTEX and the humanitarian emergency in the Mediterranean: the failure of 
an intergovernmental solution. In: Leonard S., The Creation of FRONTEX and the Politics of Institutionalisation 
in the EU External Borders Policy, Volume 5, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2009, pp. 375–376. 
3 G. Virányi: Az Európai Unió, a Schengeni Egyezmények és a Magyar határrendészet In: Határellenőrzés az 
Európai Unióban, Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2000, pp. 34-36. 
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The provisions of the third pillar provided the governing principles for the cooperation on 
police, judicial, and criminal matters, including the cooperation of police services, customs 
authorities, and other law enforcement agencies through Europol, in addition to the Eurojust, 
where the judicial authorities cooperate; as well as providing a legal basis for the approximation 
of the criminal laws of the Member States.4 
In terms of further inspiration for FRONTEX, regional conventions also played a role, like the 
Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) with Estonia, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden as members, while Iceland 
maintained an observer status.7 
The regional, as well as the bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the projects financed by 
the EU had played a vital role in building the Agency.8 
2.2 The beginnings  
FRONTEX5 was established in 20046, in order to reinforce the external borders of the European 
Union by its own means. The most important argument for instituting FRONTEX was that the 
free movement of people of the Union was highly dependent on the sustained internal security 
of the area, thus the security of external borders.  
Besides those listed above, the Agency's mission is to train and educate the workforce of border 
management organizations7 of Member States. By combining the know-how of various 
Member States, its aim is to create a new and improved theory and practice to implement those 
into national systems.  
The operations of the Agency started on 3 October 2005 in Warsaw, where the headquarters 
were also established.  
It seems clear that FRONTEX had grown itself to significant presence under a short time and 
the ideas and projects that constitute the plans in the past, has been realized and properly 
implemented by now. Among these plans were the formation of Rapid Border Intervention 
Teams (RABIT) units or the formation of border control units in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
4 Z. Horváth & B. Ódor: Az Európai Unió szerződéses reformja – Az Unió Lisszabon után, HVG-ORAC, Budapest 
2010, pp. 264-267.;  http://www.bsrbcc.org/about/history/ (20 March 2019.) 
5 Original name: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004. 
7 Including police, border police, customs duty and other workforce with necessary legal authorisations, specialist 
agreements and financial agreements 
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In the original concept of FRONTEX, the Agency had not had any compulsory decisions 
towards the Member States, they had a more optional approach towards problem-solving.  
2.3 Changes in border management in light of the Treaty of Lisbon  
On 13 December 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon16 was signed, which modified the Treaty on the 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Not only FRONTEX 
received a new legal basis, but the legislature has also envisaged a coming European integrated 
border surveillance system on external borders, similar to what FRONTEX represents 
nowadays.  
The Treaty read as follows:  
“The Union shall develop a policy with a view to:  
a) ensuring the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing 
internal borders;  
b) carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders;  
c) the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders.17”  
Previously, the border surveillance measures, policies concerning immigration were regulated 
by the Treaty establishing the European Community, in Article 62-64, later replaced by Article 
77-80 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.   
The Commission has an exclusive role of making proposals regarding the aforementioned 
issues, thus barring the way for the Member States to submit initiatives to the Commission so 
as to make proposals to the Council. In principle, the decisions are made by an ordinary 
legislative procedure (there are two exceptions to this rule that are regulated by Article 78 (3) 
and Article 20 (2) in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.8 
The gradual implementation of the integrated external border surveillance system after the 
Treaty of Lisbon has also become a part of the Stockholm Program, adopted by the European 
Council. The Council has been clear on the matter that FRONTEX plays a key role in this field, 
and strengthening the role of the Agency has become a necessary condition for furthering 
European integration.9 
 
8 Horváth & Ódor, ibid, pp. 273– 274.  
9 Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01) 
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3. The 2015-16 migration crisis and the 2016 reforms of FRONTEX 
3.1 The effects of the migration crisis on the European Union  
In the year 2015, the external borders have registered more than 1.82 million of illegal 
crossings. This is six times the numbers registered during the previous year, so the magnitude 
of the problem has become clear.   
One of the turning points in the migration crisis were the events in Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia10, where a legislative change has opened the door to lawful passing of migrants, 
but it gave a 72 hour period to every man, to either apply for asylum or leave the country. More 
than 100 000 border crossings have been registered. This legislation has directly led to the 
strengthening of the migration wave until the things have fallen out of control.11 
The fundamental trouble lays in the fact that after an illegal crossing of an external border, it is 
nearly impossible to track down movement of the people within the Union.  
Most prominently, registered cases were reported in the routes crossing the Eastern 
Mediterranean, mainly between Greece and Turkey, while only a small minority of people 
applied for refugee status in Greece and left instead for Macedonia, and continued their way 
through the Balkans up to the Serbian-Hungarian border, where they have decided to apply for 
refugee status.  
On the western side of the continent, due to the strict Spanish legislation and due to the strong 
collaboration between Spain and Morocco, there was an increased chance for migrants to be 
sent back to their home countries, so they choose to go approach through Italy instead, from the 
routes coming from Libya.12 
Another notable problem with illegal border crossing is the fact that most of the migrants arrive 
without any documentation, so in order to verify their citizenship, they have to go through a 
screening process. This is due to the fact that many try to take advantage of the system and 
declare fake citizenships so they may hasten their way. Also, there are people that may possibly 
not receive a refugee status due to their original citizenship or could be forcibly returned to their 
countries.    
An increased volume of violent incidents is another complication surfacing on the external 
borders. Illegal human trafficking can be accounted for most of the violent outbreaks. This is 
due to the fact that the traffickers’ approach directly threatens the lives of the migrants in hopes 
 
10 Since then called Republic of North Macedonia 
11 Frontex General Report 2015  
12 Frontex General Report 2015  
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of realizing a profit. This is also endangering the border guards’ security and lives, because they 
are not properly trained nor equipped to secure violent incidents, especially en masse.13 
3.2 The 2016 reforms  
Due to the events of December 2015, the European Commission has voted for a package of 
measures guaranteeing the free movement of the people, while securing the borders of the EU 
and its internal security, and more effectively manage the migration. This package of measures 
consisted of five main elements that are the following:  
a) Establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency14 that significantly 
expanded the mandate of FRONTEX 
b) The re-evaluation of the border surveillance code of the Schengen Area  
c) A European travel document for returning of the third country illegals  
d) A proposal by the Commission regarding executing and controlling of a handbook for  
European border surveillance system, and the eighth half-yearly report about Schengen 
Area.15 
With the 2016/1624 regulation of the European Parliament and the Council, the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency was established in a form resembling its current state. With 
that, the domains of the FRONTEX were also expanded.16 This expansion included:   
- Rapid Border Intervention Teams,  
- the specialist repatriation teams, 
- vulnerability assessment, 
- coast guard duties.  
One indicator showing serious changes in comparison to the previous period is that the number 
of permanent personnel has doubled and its financial resources have also grown. The total 
 
13 Frontex General Report 2015, pp. 3–10. 
14 Along with deleted provisions: 2007/2004/EC Regulation, 863/2007/EC Regulation, and 2005/267/EC council 
regulation   
15 Frontex General Report 2015, pp. 10-11.  
16 The new of the agency have replaced the name a European Agency for the Management of Operational  
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, the shortened name ”Frontex” 
and the personnel have remained the same. See the Frontex General Report 2016.  
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financial support has increased to 161 562 000 Euros, which makes it 175% of the amount 
distributed in 2015, which was 92 009 000 Euros (this is the 70% of the total budget of the 
Agency - 232 757 000 euros).  
The new regulation introduced new elements to the activities regarding shared resources.  
A revision on the profile of experts was an important step inside FRONTEX. During the 
revision, which was facilitated with the European Commission and the Member States, they 
created two new profiles: a European Coast Guard functional officer and the dog trainer. Along 
with these two new profiles, they have worked out three new profiles for repatriation activities:   
- an expulsion observer  
- an expulsion accompanying staff   
- a returns specialist  
The aim of the regulations was to widen the scope of the Agency by collecting and analyzing 
personal data. Currently, the Agency conducts a wide variety of data management:  
- analysis of the personal data of terrorists during the risk assessment process,  
- ensuring the collection of personal data for the staff of the Agency,  
- forwarding the analyzed data for the recipient countries, and  
- forwarding the data to Europol.17 
4. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency  
4.1 About the Agency in general  
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency18 is an agency providing help to Member States 
of the EU and the Schengen associated countries regarding the border surveillance of its 
external borders, its coordination and improvement of border management, and in its 
Unionwide harmonization19 of border control measures with respect to the Charter of 
Fundamental  
 
17 Frontex General Report 2016, pp. 1-12.  
18 Important notice: despite name change, the Agency retained the shortened version of its name, the “Frontex”  
19 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_hu (20 March 2019.)  
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Rights of the European Union and the Integrated European Border Management concepts.20 
4.2 The Mission of FRONTEX 
The Agency is responsible for a variety of fields, provided for in the legal acts establishing the 
Agency.21 These fields include:  
- Risk assessment: every activity of the Agency is based on assessing risks. After the 
Agency has analyzed the risks and dangers, it creates reports on the tendencies, and the 
shares its findings with the Member States and the Commission. Lastly, it uses the 
assessments in planning its own activities.  
- Shared operations: in case of a dangerous situation on its external borders, the Agency 
can answer the call with units with trained border management specialists, along with 
engineering tools.  
- Quick deployments: in shared operations, quick deployment units can help solve 
problems during the above-mentioned situations  
- Research22: FRONTEX seeks to apply new and useful technologies, both in risk 
assessment and operations. This is done by including industry specialists and 
researchers.   
- Training: one of the most important goals of the Agency is to harmonize the education 
of border policing specialists in Schengen and partnered states. In order to fulfil this 
goal, FRONTEX is working out common training norms for the competent authorities 
to ensure that the same standards are applied across each external border crossings and 
border crossing procedures.  
- Common return operations: each Member State has the right to decide the subject of 
expulsions within their territories. FRONTEX is working out measures and methods 
regarding transporting the repatriated persons to third countries. It also harmonizes 
repatriating operations.   
- Sharing of information: the importance of fast exchange of information between border 
management authorities are unquestionable: for this reason, FRONTEX is developing 
 
20 https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin-tasks/ (20 March 2019.) 
21 https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/legal-basis/ (20 March 2019.) 
22 Important to notice: in the beginnings, Frontex did not work on research and development, it only followed 
certain developments in particular fields that connected to border management, 2007, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_hu (20 March 2019.) 
 
80 
 
and operating certain information systems to ensure the smooth exchange of 
information. 32 
Tasks listed above are only part of the FRONTEX’s activities. Others include:  
- Situation monitoring: The Agency provides a fast way to exchange data between 
Member State authorities and the European Commission. It also grants crisis 
monitoring, early crisis alerts and news about the ongoing events at the external borders.  
- Coast Guard duties,  
- Cooperation with international organizations and third countries,  
- Combating international crime, 
- adhering to fundamental rights23 
It is important to note that FRONTEX itself does not own any tools of engineering or border 
guard staff. In order to fulfil its duties, the Agency has to rely on the Member States to ensure 
the proper personnel and its equipment. FRONTEX, however, provides financial resources for 
the operations (e.g. by reimbursing for the transport of border guards). Most of the work done 
by the Agency is an organization and harmonization work. 24 
4.3 Annual report of FRONTEX 
The new FRONTEX regulation has taken effect on 6 October 2016, which obliges the executive 
director to create an annual report and submit it to the board of director. If the report about the 
Agency's previous year gets accepted by the board, it has to be forwarded to European 
Parliament, to the Council and the Commission, and the European Court of Auditors by 1 July.   
The annual report on activities consists of two parts. The first part includes detailed information 
about the work done by FRONTEX.   
The second part (chapter 4-6) presents a tool that helps audit the board, additionally it includes 
the executive director's responsibilities about accomplishing specific goals, for the bookkeeping 
and the budgetary and financial management, etc.25 
 
23 Frontex General Report 2016, 18. pp.  
24 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_hu (20 March 2019.) 
25 K. Zámbó: A FRONTEX szervezete és működése http://www.pecshor.hu/periodika/XI/zambok.pdf (20 March 
2019.), 221–231 pp.  
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Besides measuring the success rate of the finished projects and operations, the aim of the annual 
report is to provide feedback, help avoid past mistakes in the future and in the planning of the 
operations.37 
5. The future of FRONTEX 
Based on the experiences of the past years and on the problems, many ideas have surfaced that 
aimed to reform both border management and FRONTEX. In this chapter, we will take a look 
at a few of these recommendations.  
The problem itself was defined by György Bakondi, on 6-9 June 2016 during the conference 
“Solutions and possibilities on managing the migration crisis” in his lecture entitled “Does the 
common European refugee system work?”, where he framed the problems the following way: 
according to him, Europe is missing Union-wide external border protections, the screening of 
the economic migrants and the execution of repatriation. He gave a few recommendations to 
handle the immigrant crisis, one of them was the plan to separate the economic migrants from 
the actual refugees at the Schengen borders. He also introduced the idea of decreasing the 
expenses by 1% and increasing the rate of contributions by 1%. The extra financial resources 
could have helped to manage the migrant crisis. He also proposed an advanced partnership 
status for countries stricken by the crisis, like Turkey.26 
Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission in his annual State of the 
Union speech in 2018, has advocated for a solution that would expand both the personnel and 
the assets of the Agency in order to handle the unlawful immigration that would also reinforce 
the Union’s external borders.27 He put forward a plan to increase the size of the staff financed 
by the EU budget to 10.000 men that shall be accomplished by 2020. The plan would also allow 
the EU to expand its operations to partnering countries and it would strengthen the repatriation 
process.28 After their bilateral meeting on 16 September 2018, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz has announced that they support this notion.41 
Not everybody agrees on the future propositions for FRONTEX. Andrej Babis, the Prime 
Minister of Czech Republic and Peter Pellegrini, the Prime Minister of Slovakia has criticized 
the plans of the Commission regarding the development of FRONTEX until the year 2020.  
According to their statements, it is only a “useless parallel structure” to the Member States’ 
already existing border protection forces. In their opinion, it would make more impact to 
 
26 A. Teke, Megoldási lehetőségek a migrációs válságkezelésben. Működik-e a közös európai menekültügyi 
rendszer? Hanns Seidel Alapítvány, 2016, pp. 27-32. 
27 https://emerging-europe.com/news/hungary-czech-republic-and-slovakia-reject-juncker-frontex-plan/ (20 
March 2019). 
28 State of The Union 2018 – Letter of Intent to President Antionio Tajani and to Chancellor Sebastian Kurz 
https://emerging-europe.com/news/hungary-czech-republic-and-slovakia-reject-juncker-frontex-plan/ (20 March 
2019). 
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support and strengthen the national agendas. Pellegrini has also added that he would rather see 
FRONTEX as a coordinating institution.29 
Some opponents had a sharp criticism of this proposition: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán had a highly critical reaction to the plan. According to him, the European Union is trying 
to take away the rights of Hungary to defend its own borders and the next “battle” will be about 
who decides whom to let inside the country.   
A statement of the European Commission has repeatedly argued that FRONTEX does not 
intend to hinder the national commitments to the defence of national borders.30 
6. The operations of FRONTEX – from a fundamental rights perspective 
The migration wave of 2015 has brought with it a number of human rights issues that impacted 
the activities and actions of FRONTEX. A question has come to surface: who is responsible for 
FRONTEX actions and for the human rights damage they cause?  
The FRONTEX Regulation clearly proclaims that: “[T]he extended tasks and competence of 
the Agency should be balanced with strengthened fundamental rights safeguards and increased 
accountability.”31 
That means that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency must respect fundamental right, 
while protecting the citizens of the Schengen area. In 2014-15 border guards have displaced 
people and committed other cruel human rights violations. The problem lay within the joint 
operations, because they were developed on „annual risk analysis reports”.32All guards are 
bound by the FRONTEX Code of Conduct, which includes specific provisions on the respect 
of fundamental rights and the right to international protection. It sets an amount of behavioural 
standards that all staff members should follow within joint operations.33  The eventual human 
rights violations came from the FRONTEX border control activities: these fundamental rights 
violations that are included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are the right to asylum, 
right to social security and social assistance, right to health care. 
The second big problem came from the fact that FRONTEX is an inter-governmental agency 
created by the EU and some third country measures, questioning the autonomy of the countries 
 
29 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/news/babis-pellegrini-are (20 March 2019). 
30 https://emerging-europe.com/news/hungary-czech-republic-and-slovakia-reject-juncker-frontex-plan/ (20 
March 2019). 
31 Regulation 2016/1624, preamble, para. 14. 
32 Annual Risk Analysis Reports analyses the likely future risk of irregular migration and cross-border crime along 
the EU external border 
33 https://frontex.europa.eu/operations/roles-responsibilities/ (20 March 2019). 
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and the competences of the EU. The problems that came from the human rights issues of 
FRONTEX must be solved in the near future.34 
Although the reforms of FRONTEX have explicitly included an obligation to respect 
international human rights, some serious criticisms have emerged about the Agency's work. A 
study conducted by Migreurop, a French human rights organization focused on preventing and 
helping human rights abuses on Europe’s external borders claimed that FRONTEX’s maritime 
interception operations do not offer sufficient guarantees about respect for human rights.  
A prime example of a significant violation has occurred in June 2009, where a FRONTEX naval 
operation, with a German helicopter and an Italian coast guard, intercepted a boat of 75 migrants 
off the coast of Lampedusa, a small island of Italy. The Italians have handed the migrants over 
to a Libyan patrol boat, after which they were reportedly handed over to the Libyan military. 
The incident violated the Article 33 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees:  
“No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened…”   
Another example of human rights violations ignored and neglected by FRONTEX is connected 
to the Nouadhibou detention facility in Mauritania, where repeated inhuman and degrading 
treatments were well documented by various NGO investigations. Despite violating the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for the  
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, FRONTEX has reported that 
Operation HERA was a success in aiming to stop the migration from the unauthorized maritime 
routes, thanks to the close cooperation of Mauritania and other West African countries. After 
these violations have come to a spotlight, FRONTEX said that they do not consider themselves 
responsible for assessing whether or not human rights are respected in countries to which 
migrants are returned.  
Questions were also raised about racial discrimination of the Agency in connection to targeted 
interventions. Operation HYDRA was highly criticized in 2007, where 22 European airports 
have been swept by FRONTEX in 16 Members States and resulted in an arrest of 291 Chinese 
nationals. According to the FRONTEX, the operation was aimed specifically to tackle illegal 
Chinese immigration. A similar case happened during Operation SILENCE, with Somali 
immigrants. Targeted interventions might be conflicting with Article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.35 
At the end of November 2018, FRA published its opinion on the revised European Border and 
 
34 https://www.eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/427 (20 March 2019). 
35 S. Keller & U. Lunacek & B. Lochbihler & H. Flautre, Frontex Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights? 
https://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Frontex-PE-Mig-ENG.pdf (20 March 2019). 
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Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications. Before discussing the opinion, 
it is worth briefly summarizing what the FRA is. The European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) provides independent, factual advice to EU and Member State decision-makers. 
It aims to make the fundamental rights debate, policies and legislation more targeted and based 
on as much credible information as possible. The Agency advises EU institutions and Member 
State governments on fundamental rights.36  In the Opinion, FRA focuses on four issues: 
adjusting the framework to protect fundamental rights; operationalising fundamental rights 
protection in the Agency’s activities; reducing fundamental rights risks when supporting 
returns; reducing risks when cooperating with third countries.37 In the following, we would like 
to briefly summarize the contents of the FRA opinion. In the first chapter, the opinion proposes 
to support existing horizontal fundamental rights safeguards in order to strengthen them in the 
light of the Agency's mandate and activities.38  The second chapter covers specific issues related 
to the Agency's activities, including specific comments on integrated border management, risk 
analysis, operations and training.39  In the third chapter, the FRA provides an opinion on 
reducing the risks of fundamental rights when supporting returns. The aim of the proposal is to 
extend the Agency's mandate and capacity in the field of return, and to strengthen and support 
cooperation with third countries by developing technical equipment and technical and 
operational assistance to Member States in return procedures. The opinion shows that the 
Agency is increasingly relying on its own technical equipment to carry out return operations, 
which, in turn, will make it impossible for external contractors operating under the contractual 
obligations of Member States to effectively exercise their supervisory role.40  The fourth chapter 
covers six different issues, the first section is about the cooperation between Member States 
and third countries and the other five sections cover fundamental rights issues which emerge 
from the cooperation between the Agency and third countries.41     
7. Summary  
Guaranteeing external border protection in the European Union is a huge challenge from a legal 
and a political point of view as well. Thus it is not surprising that very recently the Commission 
president proposed yet another reform of the Agency. The problem – at least politically – seems 
clear: Juncker’s plan is more than controversial with the representatives of Member States. The 
root of the problems is not anything we have not seen before: this is a community of countries 
with different cultures, traditions, and mentality. Whatever desirability it might have, the 
European way of integration is much harder to execute than an American model. As opposed 
to the United States, the Member States of the European Union are trying hard to guard their 
national sovereignty. If European countries want to work towards a higher level of integration, 
 
36 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/fra_en (20 March 2019). 
37 The revised European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications - Opinion of 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
38 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, p. 20. 
39 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, p. 27. 
40 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, p. 36-37. 
41 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, p. 45 
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it is necessary to limit national sovereignty in some cases or confer certain powers and 
authorizations to the Union. But this never comes easily – one needs to just think about the time 
it took to develop a supranational justice- and home affairs policy at the EU level in the first 
place. 
There are opposing viewpoints that they to maintain their countries sovereignty in border 
control matters by a way of negotiations. Janek Magi, the director of the Border Guards of 
Home Affairs Ministry of Estonia wanted to make a modification to Juncker’s plan: the 
expansion of 10.000 recruits should not be recruited from the Member States’ border guard 
personnel, but it should rather serve as an addition to the national border guard forces.42 
Whether we look at the problem from a supporters’ or from a critics’ point of view, we should 
not get bogged down in details. The questions that we ask shall not be about specific workings 
of FRONTEX or certain border management issues, but we should go back to the fundamental 
form of the problems. The proper question should be: do the Member States wants to take 
European integration to the next level or not?  
Summarizing the abovementioned, we can conclude that FRONTEX has been a subject of 
tremendous changes during the 14 years since its inception, those including changes in its staff, 
in its structure and organization, in its mandate and budget. In my opinion, the Agency could 
be a symbol of the European Union. A union that could project inner stability and trust among 
its members to third countries. But a way to reinforce this trust is for the Member States to put 
away their fear of losing sovereignty and acknowledge that the Agency plays a crucial role in 
the future of the Union - especially in border management issues and that they should support 
the strengthening of FRONTEX. 
 
 
 
 
42 https://news.err.ee/863310/estonia-does-not-support-strengthening-frontex-at-expense-of-border-guards (20 
March 2019). 
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Non-refoulement is an essential element of asylum law – without it, international protection to 
asylum seekers can hardly be guaranteed. This paper looks at this fundamental principle from 
the point of view of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, by analysing some relevant cases as well. 
Keywords: refugee status; principle of non-refoulement; principle of non-refoulement on the 
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1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental elements of the right of access to asylum is access to the territory of a 
particular country, including the reception of refugees and the provision of assistance to meet 
basic living needs. In addition, one of the fundamental refugee rights is the principle of non-
refoulement. Due to the importance of such issues, this principle is considered to be an 
international custom.1 Legal literature does not agree to the recognition of the non-refoulement 
principle as a part of customary international law, pointing out that it must apply exclusively to 
subjects of international law and that principle applies to the individual and the state. In the 
legal literature there is no consensus as to whether an individual is a subject of international 
law, therefore, certain authors do not recognize the legal nature of international custom by this 
principle. The ban on returning in legal literature is defined as a principle prohibiting states to 
return foreigners, refugees or asylum seekers to their country of origin or some other state where 
such persons may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or 
have such a return/expulsion that was endangered by life or freedom.2 As already mentioned, 
this principle is a part of customary international law and is binding for all states whether they 
are signatory states of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. (hereinafter referred to ECHR).3 It is necessary to distinguish the 
 
1 G. Lalić Novak, Principle of Prohibition of Return and Access to Asylum System: Two Faces of the same Coin, 
Migration and Ethnic Issues, vol. 31, no. 3, 2015, p. 367. 
2 G. Lalić Novak, Asylum, Europeanization, Institution, Institutionalization, Institutionalism, Refugees, Neo-
institutionalism, Impact Assessment, SIGMA, Prohibition of Returns, Croatia and Comparative Public 
Administration, Vol. 4, 2012, p. 1300. 
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
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prohibition of direct return (in a state where there is a danger of persecution) and indirect return 
(in countries where there is a danger of further departure).4 
2. Legal circumstances and legal elements of prohibited return 
The principle of non-refoulement extends through primary and secondary EU legislation as part 
of the legal regime of fundamental human rights. It thus appears in Article 78 (1) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU5 and Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 6 This principle, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), is a fundamental component of the ban on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, which does not allow deviations, exceptions or limitations. It is an 
absolute ban in this sense, and the categories of persons who are protected by such provisions 
are: refugees in danger of persecution and asylum seekers until a final decision on their request 
to obtain asylum.7 Provisions on the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment are contained in various legal acts such as: the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 United Nations Convention against Torture of 19849 
and the ECHR already mentioned,10 but also all secondary legislation of such connotation. The 
main source of refugee law in this context is the 1951 Convention on the Legal Status of 
Refugees, which states in Article 33.1: "No Contracting State shall in any way expel or refouler 
refugees to the frontiers of the territory where their life or freedom would be jeopardized by 
their race, religion, nationality, belonging to a social group or their political opinions."11 As 
already mentioned, the provisions on the prohibition of torture represent an absolute ban which 
does not allow any restrictions or exceptions, but according to legal literature,, this cannot be 
 
4 Guidelines for Reducing Return Risk in Foreign State Border Management while Working in or with Third 
Countries, European Union for Fundamental Rights, 2016, p.1 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/guidance-how-reduce-risk-refoulement-external-border-management-
when-working-or (28 February 2019).  
5 Which states: "The Union is developing a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection aimed at providing each third country national with international protection needs an appropriate status 
and ensuring respect for the principle of non-refoulement or non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the Status of Refugees and 
other relevant treaties. " 
6 As follows: "The right to asylum is guaranteed, in compliance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and 
the Protocol of 31 January. 1967 on the Status of Refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. "Collective expulsion is prohibited. No one shall be  
expelled, returned or extradited to a state where there is a serious danger of being subjected to death penalty, torture 
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. " 
7 Op. cit. (footnote 5.) p. 1. 
8 Article 7 regulates: "No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
It is especially forbidden to subject a person to a medical or scientific trial without his or her free consent. " 
9 Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2 regulates: "No Member state shall expel, return or extradite a person to another 
state if there are serious grounds for suspecting that he may be subjected to torture. In order to determine the 
existence of such reasons, the competent authorities will take into account all relevant circumstances, including 
possibly the existence of a series of systemic, serious, obvious or gross human rights violations in that country. " 
10 Article 3 of the ECHR reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment." 
11 Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, SFRY Official Gazette - International Agreements (hereinafter SL 
- MU), No. 7/60 
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applied to the principle of a ban on return. Point 2 of the same article states that such a right 
cannot be used by a refugee who, for justified reasons, is considered to be dangerous to the 
security of the state, nor a person who has been convicted of a particularly serious criminal 
offense by virtue of a final judgment, thereby posing a danger to the society of that state.12 The 
Qualification Directive contains a similar provision in Articles 17 and 2113. If a Member State 
assesses a threat to national security or community security, it has the power to revoke, cancel 
or refuse to renew or issue a refugee residence permit.14 Although the above-mentioned 
international treaties prohibit torture, inhumane behaviour and treatment, and in connection 
with their return, there is a lack of determination of the fundamental elements of the principle 
of the ban on return. Thus legal literature determines constituent elements and binding 
standards. The principle of non-refoulement includes refugees, but also asylum seekers 
irrespective of the level of connection with the host state and whether or not they are legally or 
not in the state. The principle will apply from the point of expression of willingness to seek  
asylum or from the moment of entry into the territory of the respective state (non-refoulement  
includes a ban on refusing entry). The scope of application of the principle lies both outside the 
borders of the state and its jurisdiction and extends to those areas where the state has control. If 
the extradition or resettlement is requested by another state, the authorities of the state in whose 
territory the person is located shall determine whether there is any breach of the rights 
guaranteed in the receiving state and to provide protection mechanisms for the requested 
person.15  Domestic legal legislation in Croatia has recognized the principle of the ban on 
returning to the Law on International and Temporary Protection16 (hereinafter referred to as 
ZMPZ). The provisions of Article 6 of the law include statelessness persons and third-country 
nationals, and regulates situations where return is prohibited. Thus a statelessness person or a 
third-country national cannot return nor be forced to leave the country where there is a risk of 
endangering life and security for race, religion, national affiliation, belonging to a particular 
group or political conviction. He/she cannot return to the country where there is a possibility of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The new solution provided by the law is an indirect 
obligation of the state to determine with certainty whether there is a possibility of safe 
deportation and, if so, the state must not return or forcibly refoul the individual in any way.17 
Furthermore, the Act emphasizes the exceptions to the above provisions in the case where an 
statelessness person or a third-country national who fulfils or has been granted international 
protection may be refouled or returned to the country if he/she presents a danger to national 
 
12 Ibid, p. 2.  
13 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of protection 
granted (recast), OJ 2011 L 337/9 
14Novak, op. cit. (footnote 1.), p. 372. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Law on International and Temporary Protection Official Gazette 70/15, 127/17 
17 Art. 6. point 1 ZMPZ 
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security or if he/she is sentenced to a final judgment for offence that poses a threat to public 
order.18 
3. Responsibility of the state 
In the context of the principle of non-refoulement, the question of the area of application is 
raised, so legal literature points out that it also applies to cases in which a person is outside the 
frontier (refusal of entry into a state) at the border or within the jurisdiction of a particular state 
if it is subjected to the opposite mentioned legal acts.19  It is clear from the practice of the 
ECtHR that the responsibility of Member states extends beyond the scope of their jurisdiction 
and it is solely for the State which carries out and not the recipient. This responsibility (in 
respect of the prohibition of torture) will be prolonged even if there is no risk of violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR in the recipient country but, in the case of a person's return, there is a 
risk of being deported to a third country where the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment exists.20 It is clear from the ECtHR’s practice that states are required to assess the 
possibility of violating Article 3 of the ECHR by the receiving state in respect of the rule of 
international refugee law. 
Thus, in the case of Hirsi Jama and others against Italy, a group of two hundred migrants who 
were intercepted in the open sea by the Italian authorities returned to Libya without the 
possibility of filing an asylum application. The Court concluded that the Italian authorities were 
bound to assess the risk of returning migrants to Libya with certainty, which may have resulted 
in a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. It is important to point out that a state cannot deny it’s 
own responsibilities towards migrants which found themselves in an area which is not under 
the jurisdiction of that state. If a state can take supervisory measures in the area, therefore can 
be responsible for the ensuring that the rights of migrants are respected.21 
Concerning the risk assessment or the threat of violations of the guaranteed refugee rights in 
the sense of the ban on torture, ECtHR, through its interpretations, highlights certain criteria. 
In each individual case, there must be a high degree of likelihood that the person or persons 
will be hurt or threatened with guaranteed rights, and that there is inability of the State 
concerned to provide adequate protection. The possibility (probability) of a violation of the law 
is not sufficient, given the specific case, the authorities must evaluate with certainty that the 
person will indeed be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.22  
The factual situation of the case indicated that J.K. had been subjected to violence before his 
asylum application and residence permit. Such circumstances took on the characteristics of 
 
18 Ibid. point. 2 
19 Novak 2015, ibd, p. 374. 
20 Ibid. p. 375. 
21 European Court of Human Rights: Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy (App. no. 27765/09) ECtHR (2012) 
22 Novak 2015, ibd, p. 378. 
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inhumane treatment.23 Although the applicant's concern as well as the competent authorities 
was focused on the general situation in Iraq, the Court found it necessary to examine whether 
the applicant's personal circumstances indicate that he and his family would be exposed to real 
danger from the treatment of the contrary Article 3 of the ECHR. The Court's role in correcting 
previous decisions by lower instances on the same matter highlights the importance of 
considering personal circumstances in each particular case to reach the most favourable 
decision for the vulnerable.24 The obligations of the individual and the state which are provided 
by the aforementioned Directive are very clear.25 Thus the Court correctly concludes and 
activates the institute of shared burden of proof. The state collects evidence based on 
cooperation with migration institutions as well as human legal sources at the international level 
although the situation in Iraq is satisfactory for most of the population, but there still are 
individual cases that may be subject to treatment contrary to Art. 3 ECHR. In addition, the 
Court comes to the crucial findings that the Iraqi authorities as well as the system are 
insufficient to protect the fundamental human rights of this case.  
On the other hand, in case S.H.H against UK, the applicant argued that the circumstances that 
the he will face in Afghanistan will amount to a breach of Article 3. ECHR as a result of ill-
treatment of his disability.26 Although it was acknowledged that the medical facilities in 
Afghanistan were limited and underdeveloped The Court held by four to three votes that there 
would be no violation of Article 3 of ECHR in the event of the applicant's removal to 
Afganistan.27 Unlike the Courts decision in the case J.K. and others vs. Sweden, the Court didn't 
look into the character of the disability within the context of the specific facts of a given case, 
as the 3 opposing judges pointed out in their Joint Dissenting Opinion. 
As noted, in each case, it is necessary to examine the degree of probability of a violation of the 
rights of refugees, and this will be done regularly after an individual proves an individual threat. 
It should be emphasized that ECtHR has also considered issues in which an individual does not 
have to prove an individual threat, but it can exist in view of the state of the country from which 
it comes. In cases where states are in a state of emergency, war or conflict, the intensity and 
level of such status is assessed and whether such circumstances pose a threat to refugees if they 
are returned to the country concerned.28 
 
23 In October 2004, al Qaeda tried to kill J.K. and in 2005 his brother was kidnapped and threatened to be killed 
because of J.K’s affiliation with Americans. In 2006 Al Qaeda ordered his murder, and during October 2008, the 
applicant's daughter was killed when shooting at their car. J.K filed a request on 14 December for asylum and 
residence permit in Sweden. 
24 European Court of Human Rights: J.K. and others v Sweden (App. no. 59166/12) ECtHR (2016) 
25 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection provides that Member States must ensure that they are 
informed in a language which they understand, they shall receive the services of an interpreter, they shall not be 
denied the opportunity to communicate with UNHCR etc. 
26 The applicant is an Afghan national who relied on the fact that his lower right leg had been amputated, among 
other physical illnesses. 
27 European Court of Human Rights: S.H.H. v UK, (App. no. 60367/10) ECtHR (2013) 
28 Novak 2015, ibd, p. 378. 
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4. The principle of non-refoulement and threat to state security  
Legal literature considers that even the most serious offenders are entitled to protection 
guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR, which guarantees a wider restriction on the restitution of 
the guaranteed Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Status Convention. Such an exemption clause in 
the case of a person posing a threat to national security or the society as a whole does not limit 
the application of Article 3 of the ECHR.29 Persons who have committed serious crimes are 
also protected from expulsion and extradition, unless such protection is inconsistent and does 
not lead to the avoidance of punishment or trials.30 With regard to expulsion, the UNHCR 
Executive Committee in 1977 emphasized that refugees could only be expelled in exceptional 
cases and that the receiving state can deal with them in the same way as dealing with their own 
nationals posing a threat to national security and society, but also it points out that a refugee 
can only be detained if the interests of public security so require.31  
It needs to be taken into account the hypothetical situation in which, according to the Article 
12 of the Directive 2011/95/ a third-country national or a statelessness person is excluded and 
has no right to obtain refugee status if he or she has committed a non-political offense of a 
heavier nature outside the receiving state prior to their acceptance or issuance of a residence 
permit. Also here are the perpetrators of particularly cruel acts even if committed with the 
alleged political goal.32 The same persons in accordance with Art. 17 of the same Directive does 
not have the right to subsidiary protection if it falls under the reasons set out in the Directive. 
Accordingly, statelessness persons and third country nationals could find themselves in a 
situation where they were deprived of any status. With regard to the absolute legal nature of the 
non-refoulement principle, the question of further action by the state, but also of the individual, 
is being challenged. Even though the state is, according to the Article 6.1. Directive 2013/32/EU 
as competent authority obliged to register the application for international protection, it is also 
obligatory to consider the same and decide on it33, and there is no possibility of returning the 
person to the country of origin. Irregularity with legal sources or court practice leads to 
uncertainty as to the legal fate and also the life circumstances of migrants. 
The ECtHR through its case-law points out that the exceptions should be interpreted 
restrictively and that certain circumstances that would activate the institute of exception from 
the Convention on the Status of Refugees do not limit Article 3 of the ECHR, even in the most 
serious circumstances such as terrorism. Such a question appears for the first time before the 
ECtHR in Chahal v. The United Kingdom (2001).34 The circumstances of the case were as 
follows: Chahal is a declared Sikh separatist who has been granted unlimited residence permits 
in the United Kingdom on the basis of amnesty. It is included in the passive resistor for the Sikh 
 
29 Ibid. p. 379. 
30 I. Damjanović & L. Tomicevic, Legal Status of Refugees, Pravnik, Vol. 38, No. 79, 2004, p. 80. 
31 Ibid. p. 81.  
32 Directive 2011/95/EU. 
33 Directive 2013/32/EU. 
34 European Court of Human Rights: Chahal v Great Britain (App. no. 22414/93) ECtHR (1996) 
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"Khalistan" independent country. In 1990, the United Kingdom authorities made a decision 
demanding the deportation of Mr Chahal for the protection of national security and the fight 
against terrorism, stating that Mr Chahal was involved in the management of terrorist attacks. 
Mr Chahal denied such allegations and demanded political asylum, stating that he would be a 
victim of persecution and torture if he was expelled in India or that Article 3 of the ECHR 
would be violated. In the proceedings before the ECtHR, the Court emphasizes that it is within 
the competence of the state to control the entry, stay and expulsion of aliens, but the prohibition 
of abuse under Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute in cases of expulsion. If it is clear there are 
certain reasons why an individual with a high degree of probability will be exposed to the risk 
of breaches of the aforementioned guaranteed rights if he is expelled from another state, there 
is a duty of the state to protect such a person by adequate mechanisms to avoid suspected 
violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 ECHR.35 Therefore, the behaviour of an 
individual, no matter how dangerous, cannot be considered, and the return of Mr Chahal to 
India where he seriously threatens the risk of torture, inhumane treatment and punishment 
would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.36 
5. Conclusion 
Although domestic and foreign legal literature is inconsistent with the question of the legal 
nature of the principle of the non-refoulement, the ECtHR case-law points out the need to 
recognize it as a part of international customary law. Most states value the principle as ius 
cogens while retaining the right to certain exceptions prescribed by relevant international legal 
sources. Therefore, we have a relative right which is often connected to absolute right, the right 
to ban torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, which does not allow exceptions and 
limitations. In light of recent events of massive migratory movements caused by conflicts in 
third countries, as well as increasing number of terrorist attacks, it is reasonable to expect that 
all life threatening situations will not be covered by legal norms and that in numerous cases the 
situation will arise without a clearly visible solution. When a person is deprived of refugee 
status as well as subsidiary protection, the principle of non-refoulement, in that case, forbids 
the return legal sources do not regulate or leave empty spaces for acting of the authorities on 
the one hand, and a migrant on the other. It is necessary to point out the need for a clear 
regulation of further action by the legislative bodies, but it is quite certain that a challenge to 
the Court in the forthcoming legal practice will arise in resolving such situations. The Court's 
decision on this issue as a precedent will produce legal effects to the addresses and provoke the 
introduction of the provision into the third generation of the Directive 2011/95/EU. 
International entities are trying to remedy this situation by concluding bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, but also by codifying the provisions of international legal sources. This principle 
 
35 In the case Saadi v Italy, (App. no. 37201/06) ECtHR 2008 in which the Court concludes that acting on the basis 
of the judgment or deportation of terrorists to Tunisia (which was tried in absence of the applicant) has led to 
violations of Art. 3 because Italian authorities have not provided sufficient guarantees that the applicant will not 
be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment. This leads to another indicator of the state's unwillingness to achieve 
full international co-operation. 
36 European Court of Human Rights: Chahal v Great Britain (App. no. 22414/93) ECtHR (1996) 
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should also be understood as a preventative mechanism of violation of fundamental human 
rights, and supervision over the implementation of such provisions must be upon state bodies, 
states themselves and international organizations. 
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Is the EU Principle of Solidarity Just a Political Statement 
or is it a Legal Principle with Real Substance in the EU? 
MALIHA AHMAD, MÁTÉ HORVÁTH 
Law students, London Southbank University, University of Pécs 
The paper reviews “solidarity” as a legal institution. It had been a fundamental principle since 
the establishment of the European Union, and it seems to have become significantly important 
as our continent grows stronger and becomes more united. The text focuses on key elements 
such as the current existence of Solidarity in EU Law and whether the Courts are implementing 
those. The authors attempt to explore the concept of “solidarity” in EU law by reviewing books, 
legal cases, journals, and legal reports in order to understand its importance. It is hoped that 
this study will inform practitioners and those who are interested in EU law to understand the 
fundamental ground on which Europe was formed. 
Keywords: solidarity, European Union, asylum, migration, human rights 
‘Europe will not be made all as once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto Solidarity’ (Robert Schuman, 9th May 1950) 
1. Introduction 
Solidarity has been part of society as early as the nineteenth century, where philosophers and 
sociologists observed that in the process that gave rise to modern society, togetherness and 
social bonds were torn apart. The only way to social integration and social cohesion was through 
Solidarity1. Max Weber and Emily Durkheim, the founder of the academic discipline of 
Sociology, considered Solidarity a fundamental principle of social integration. Émile 
Durkheim, was one of the first to distinguish that Solidarity implies the fundamental ties 
between members of a small or large community2. As a fundamental principle of European 
integration and unity, Solidarity was first mentioned in the 1950 Schuman Declaration3 and 
soon incorporated into the preamble of the 1951 treaty of the European Coal and Steel 
Community. In 1987, solidarity was also added into the preamble of the European Single Act 
and gradually attained a legal framework within the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).4 
Once it became a part of the legal framework of European Unity and Integration and after the 
 
1 S. Stjernø, Solidarity In Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 1.  
2 E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Puf, Paris 1930; M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss 
der Verstehenden Soziologie, Erster Halbband, Mohr, Tübingen 1956) 
3 R. Schuman, 'Declaration of 9 May - Robert Schuman Foundation' (Robert-schuman.eu, 1991) 
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950 (11 May 2018.) 
4 A. Giannakopoulos, Solidarity in the European Union: Challenged and Perspectives, The S Daniel Abraham 
Centre 2017, pp. 13-14. 
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agreement of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, solidarity became a legal principle of primary European 
law. In the TEU it states that Solidarity is a mission of the European Union with regards to 
mutual relations of member states, their citizens and third country nationals5. Even now there 
is still no precise agreement on what solidarity means in the EU and what it should consist of. 
In the search for a legal definition of solidarity within the EU primary and secondary law, it has 
many definitions. In the amending treaty of Lisbon, the principle of solidarity is defined by 
giving importance to the relation between a Member state and its citizen6. Solidarity is a key 
principle mentioned in the ‘EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in which it states that the Union 
consists of four main values namely Human Dignity, freedom, equality and Solidarity7. 
Solidarity duties require Member States to apply Community rules unselectively, even if it was 
against their national interest: ‘failure in duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the 
fact of their adherence of the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community 
legal order’8. This makes it clear that the Court regarded solidarity as a cooperative action that 
was essential for the functioning of the Community system which means that in result EU law 
will prevail national law. The Principle of Solidarity has been distinguished as a fundamental 
principle in the European Union. It is based on sharing advantages and disadvantages equally 
between Member states i.e. burden sharing. Chapter IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union is titled ‘Solidarity’ (Articles 27-38). The first eight articles link directly 
to employment and industrial affairs: (art 27) Workers’ right to information and consultation, 
(art 28) Right of collective bargaining and action, (art 29) Right of access to placement services, 
(art 30) Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal, (art 31) Fair and just working 
conditions, (art 32) Prohibition of child labour, (art 33) Family and professional life and (art 
34) Social security and social assistance.  In the joined case of Poucet v Assurances Générales 
de France and Pistre v Cancava9, the European Court of Justice applied the principle of 
solidarity in relations to social protection. The case concerned self-employed workers 
complaining about that compulsory contributions towards the mutual funds established to 
provide social protection was in violation of the principle of free competition in the common 
marked as stated in the articles 101-102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU; then known as articles 81-82 EC). In its defence, the French government used article L 
111-1 of the Social Security Code. The code outlines the principle of social protection in France 
– Solidarity and Compulsory affiliation10. In their judgement, the court rejected the workers 
complaints, as the French Social Security Code adhered to the solidarity principle. The 
remaining articles of Chapter IV, detail Health Care (art 35), Access to services of general 
 
5 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191 
6 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[2010] OJ C 83. 
7 Chapter IV on Fundamental Rights [2000] OJ C 364/1 
8 Case 39-72 Commission v Italian Republic [1973] ECR 00101. 
9 Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale 
du Languedoc-Roussillon [1993] ECR I-00637. 
10 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Solidarity Principle, Eurofound, 
2018 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/solidarity-principle 
(13 April 2018). 
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economic interest (art 36), Environmental protection (art 37) and Consumer Protection (art 
38)11.  
Furthermore, art 2 TEU also refers to the solidarity principle where it states ‘The Union is 
founded on the values of respect… These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail’12.  This strongly hints that the concept of Solidarity is an important 
principle under EU law.  
2. Solidarity in the area of Asylum and Migration 
Article 80 TFEU states that EU policies should be ‘governed by the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications between the Member States.’13 
The increased number of asylum seekers and refugees in some Member States, creates the need 
for solidarity in the area of asylum and migration. The most important international refugee law 
is the 1951 Convention, Convention Relating to the Status of refugees, adopted 28 July 1951 
and came into force on 22 April 195414. Under article 1a (2) of the Convention, the term 
“Refugee” is described as a person who is under ‘fear of being prosecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country15’. At this point it would be appropriate to also mention article 
33(1), which states that no signee Member States ‘shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee… 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’16. The 
convention also prohibits the torturing and degrading of refugees. In the convention against 
torture, article 3(1) states that Member States must not ‘expel, return (refouler) or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture17’.  
The European Convention of Human Rights also prohibits the torturing and degrading of 
refugees by stating that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
 
11 Chapter IV Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01. 
12 Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C 202/17. 
13 Article 80 TFEU. 
14 I. Goldner Lang, Is there solidarity on asylum and migration in the EU? Croatian Yearbook of European Law 
and Policy, University of Zagreb, Zagreb 2013) http://www.cyelp.com/index.php/cyelp/article/view/172 (13 April 
2018). 
15 Article 1(a) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
 1951 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx (13 April 2018) 
16 Ibid. 
17 Article 3(1) Convention against Torture (1987) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx 
(13 April 2018). 
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treatment or punishment’18. In the landmark ruling of Soering v UK [1989]19, the ECtHR ruled 
that the deportation of a German national to the USA for his capital punishment is in fact in 
violation of article 3 ECHR as the deporting State has ‘substantial grounds… for believing that 
the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country’. Followed by the Soering case, 
a similar case came forth to the ECtHR where a deportation order of Ms Jabari to Iran which 
created a real risk of subjecting her to death by stoning20, Jabari v Turkey [2000]21. 
Under EU law, all Member States must adhere to EU primary and secondary law and 
appropriately implement Union policies. One of the policies involving solidarity is Member 
states helping each other, i.e. Member States who have lesser amount of migration flow, asylum 
seekers and refugees are encourages to assist Member States with higher amounts. Member 
states with higher amount of migration flow, asylum seekers and refugees are usually the ones 
forming the external Union border. The principle of Solidarity has its strongest manifestation 
in the Solidarity clause. It was introduced by Article 222 TFEU providing the Member States 
with three options: 
1. To act jointly; 
2. To prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of an EU country; 
3. To provide assistance to another EU country which is the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster.  
To a certain extent, Member State adhere to this act, in terms of terrorist threats and providing 
assistance to one another. For example after the Paris attacks of 2016, all Member States 
become more cautious of standing unitedly against terrorism, i.e. to act in solidarity. 
3. Responsibility-sharing and the Law 
Within the area of asylum, migration and border controls, treaty articles strongly depend on on 
the principle of solidarity and responsibility-sharing.  As established before, article 80 TFEU is 
the most important construction of the principle of solidarity. Adding to this point, article 4(3) 
TEU which mentions the ‘principle of sincere cooperation’, is applied by the Court of Justice 
in a number of cases such as the case of PPU Hassen El Dridi22 where a third-country national 
refused to obey an order to leave the territory of a Member State. Article 4(3) obliges the EU 
 
18 Article 3 European Convention of Human Rights (1950)  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (13 April 2018). 
19 Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para. 91. 
20 Goldner Lang, ibid. 
21 Jabari v Turkey, App no 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000). 
22 Case C‑61/11 PPU Hassen El Dridi, alias Karim Soufi [2011] ECR I-03015. 
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Member States to ‘assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the treaties’, which 
means to support each other in matters of asylum, migration and border controls.  
Article 67(2) in title V on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice states solidarity which 
must exist ‘between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals’, this ‘shall 
frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control23. Yet, the most 
important and specific law linked with solidarity under title V is article 80, which states that 
‘this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility’24.  
The urge of Solidarity in the area of asylum and migration is due to primarily financial, social 
and political reasons. This is because some geographically exposed Member states incur a 
higher number of migration and refugees which calls for the help of less pressured Member 
States, this can encourage Member States to realise the advantages of burden-sharing and in 
result agreeing to Solidarity measures. In result, if one Member State can successfully handle 
immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, keeping human rights standards ranked high, this 
could have a positive effect for all other Member States as irregular migration will reduce and 
could lead to increased internal security25. 
Some Member States have reintroduced their borders26 due to the recent refugee flow. Within 
the Schengen Acquis, the Schengen border code allows temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at internal borders27. The conditions of granting the temporary border control are 
serious or immediate threats, at times these conditions aren’t apparent in some Member State’s 
applications yet they are granted border control. In the ‘Back to Schengen Communication’ 
paper, the European Commission set out a roadmap for internal borders to be lifted28. The 
Member States which were granted temporary border control have reasons such as a visit of a 
prime Minister or the Pope. This shows the lack of an efficient and fair solidarity mechanism29 
as clearly not all Member States are acting jointly in the no internal border agreement. 
Art. 78 TFEU guides the Union to ‘develop a common policy on asylum… with a view to 
offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection’. 
Special attention should be given to the words of this article, which are ‘ensuring compliance 
 
23 Article 67(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007. 
24 Article 80 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007 
25 Goldner Lang, ibid. 
26 Temporary Reintroduction Of Border Control - Migration And Home Affairs - European Commission 
(Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en (13 April 2018). 
27 G. Malmersjo, Schengen And The Management Of The EU’S External Borders, European Parliament, 2016 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581392/EPRS_BRI%282016%29581392_EN.pdf 
(13 April 2018). 
28 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, COM(2016) 120 final. 
29 E. Küçük, Solidarity in EU Law, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol 23, 2016 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1023263X1602300604?journalCode=maaa (13 April 2018). 
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with the principle of non-refoulement’. The term refoulement has a direct link with solidarity 
which links back to as early as the 1980’s where in the Note by the UN Refugee Agency it was 
highlighted out that ‘solidarity is a concept which plays an extremely important role in the 
protection of refugees… as it assists States to meet their non-refoulement and asylum 
obligations’30. 
Furthermore, in art 78 subsection 2 are detailed factors that should be adopted for a common 
European asylum system such as:  
(a) A uniform status of asylum for nationals of third countries, valid throughout the union; 
(b) A uniform status of subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries who, without 
obtaining European asylum, are in need of international protection;   
(c) A common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a 
massive inflow; 
(d) Common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary 
protection status; 
(e) Criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for 
considering an application for asylum or subsidiary protection; 
(f) Standards concerning the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum or 
subsidiary protection; 
(g) Partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows 
of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection31. 
4. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
The CEAS aims to protect human rights standards and restraining national measures and 
policies that would refuse refugees and asylum-seekers from third-countries. It aims to create 
burden-sharing systems that ‘should go hand in hand’32 with national policies and measures, as 
suggested by Iris Goldner Lang in her paper. Such a system can only run successfully if there 
 
30 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on International Solidarity and Refugee Protection 
(1988) EC/SCP/50 http://www.unhcr.org/afr/excom/scip/3ae68cd4c/note-international-solidarity-refugee-
protection.html (13 April 2018). 
31 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115 0076-0077. 
32 Goldner Lang, ibid. 
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is Solidarity between all Member States.  The CEAS allows to rectify the differences in Member 
State’s asylum systems and practices to form a common minimum standard for asylum33.  
Three most important legislative acts and one regulation was adopted by CEAS by 2005: the 
Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualification Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive 
and the Dublin Regulation. The 2004/83 Qualification Directive which was repealed by 
Directive 2011/95, sets the conditions for the qualification and status of third-country nationals 
and stateless persons as refugees34. Minimum standards on procedures for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status in EU Member States is laid down in the 2005/85/EC Asylum 
Procedures Directive.  
Lastly, The Dublin II Regulation which was later repealed by the Dublin III Regulation after 
the judgements of the cases MSS35 and NS36, is based on the principle that the first Member 
State where finger prints are stored or an asylum claim is lodged is responsible for investigating 
an asylum application. Dublin III Regulation came into force on 19 July 2013, it applies to all 
MS except Denmark. The Regulation has received heavy criticism by the European Council 
and the Refugee and Exiles (ECRE) on their maintained Dublin II regulation principle to have 
‘extensive detrimental effects to Member States and asylum seekers’37. 
5. European Solidarity Corps: from pilot project to reality 
Solidarity is a shared value within the whole European Union. It prevails between its citizens, 
Member States, and in some external and internal actions of the Union. To prove that "solidarity 
in EU" is not just a "fiction" there is an example, such as an initiative created in 2016, which 
gave opportunities for young people to volunteer or work in projects in their own country or 
abroad that benefit communities and people around Europe. At the creation of this institution 
President Juncker said the following in his "State of the Union address": "We often show 
solidarity most readily when faced with emergencies. When the Portuguese hills were burning, 
Italian planes doused the flames. When floods cut off the power in Romania, Swedish 
generators turned the lights back on. When thousands of refugees arrived on Greek shores, 
Slovak tents provided shelter. In the same spirit, the Commission is proposing today to set up 
a European Solidarity Corps."38  The aim of the Corps would be to create opportunities for 
young people across the EU to make a meaningful contribution to society, show solidarity and 
develop their skills. The Bratislava Summit of 16 September 2016 called for greater political 
 
33 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers [2003] OJ L31/18. 
34 Goldner Lang. ibid. 
35 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09 [2011]. 
36 C-411/10 N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department and C-493/10 M E and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011]. 
37 A. Biondi, E. Dagilytė and E. Küçük, Solidarity in EU law, Edward Elgar Publishing 2018, p. 148. 
38 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-4840_en.htm (13 April 2018). 
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momentum to support young Europeans and establish new EU programmes to improve their 
opportunities. As a result of this initiative, eight different EU programmes were mobilised to 
offer volunteering, traineeship or job opportunities to young people across the EU. The 
solidarity project should address a specific challenge within the participants' community and 
show a clear European added value. In June 2018 the European Parliament and the Council 
reached a political agreement on the Commission's proposal to provide the European Solidarity 
Corps with its own budget and legal framework until 2020. By June 2018 European Solidarity 
Corps had almost 65.000 applicants from more than 30 European countries. The legal basis of 
the institution is based on Articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.39 
Article 165(4) allows EU action aimed at "encouraging the development of youth exchanges 
(...) and encouraging participation of young people in democratic life in Europe. The European 
Solidarity Corps aims to strengthen the engagement of young people and organisations in 
accessible and high-quality solidarity activities. The Corps is a means to help strengthen 
cohesion, solidarity and democracy in Europe and abroad and to address societal and 
humanitarian challenges on the ground, with a particular focus on promoting social inclusion.40 
6. Measures for promoting Solidarity in the area of asylum and migration 
In order to create and maintain solidarity a range of measures can be applied. The Greatest 
achievement of the European Union has been the abolition of internal borders between Member 
States to keep them closer, this is to enable free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital41. This was done so in the hope to harmonise Member States’ rules on asylum, 
immigration and external border controls42, this also includes the obvious economic factors.  
Many measures have been adopted in order to develop and promote solidarity in the area of 
asylum and migration. Most of the measures encourage financial assistance such as the 
European Refugee Fund, other being the relocation and resettlements of asylum-seekers and 
migrants. Financial support is not the only solidarity measure applied by the EU but it is 
certainly the most effective one for the assistance of Member States which are in need of help. 
The European Refugee Fund measure is the oldest standing measure for financial support. It 
covers asylum procedures, integration of refugees, reception infrastructure, resettlement and 
emergency measures43.  
 
39 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-solidarity-corps-in-action_en.pdf 
(13 April 2018). 
40 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2018:440:REV1 (13 April 2018). 
41 'Article 26' (Lisbon-treaty.org, 2018) http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-
functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-i-the-internal-
market/168-article-26.html  (13 April 2018). 
42 Goldner Lang, ibid. 
43 European Commission ‘Refugee Fund’ [2000] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-
asylum-borders/refugee-fund_en (13 April 2018). 
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From the period of 2007-2013, there were four funds allocating almost EUR 4 billion under the 
‘Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows’ namely: the European Refugee Fund of 
EUR 700 million, the European Borders Fund of EUR 1820 million, the European Return Fund 
of EUR 630 million and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 
EUR 825 million44. By the time period of 2014-2020, the total home affairs budget should have 
exceeded the 2007-2013 period by 40% with a budget of EUR 10.9 billion.  
To try manage migration, EU Member States need to manage their external borders. Frontex is 
an agency of the EU and was established in 2005 as the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. This agency was created to ensure EU 
Member States’ cooperation in the management of the EU’s external borders45. On the 15th 
December 2015, the European Commission decided to transform the Frontex to the European 
Border and Coast Guard46, this was done due to the European Migration crisis of 2015-16. It 
officially became operational on 6th October 2016. Data published by the Frontex on migration 
showed that between 2011 and 2015, there were 2,426,152 illegal border crossings47. In 2016, 
the Frontex detected more than 7000 people with fraudulent documents at the EU’s external 
borders, compared to the previous year this number was a decrease by 15%48. This suggest that 
the Frontex has been running successfully with their missions.  
7. Conclusion 
The Principle of Solidarity has been a questionable principle since its creation and still has no 
precise definition. It has been mentioned throughout the years in many different treaties, 
academic and legal papers and in various EU law agencies. One certain fact is that the Principle 
of Solidarity has been distinguished as a fundamental Right in the European Union. It is present 
in Chapter IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Over the Years, 
we can see how the Courts are becoming more and more cautious in their use of the Solidarity 
Principle i.e. in the case of social protection as in the case of Grzelczyk.  
Solidarity has been a recognised principle in the Treaties as well, for example in article 2 TEU 
and very importantly article 80 TFEU in terms of Asylum-seekers ‘this Chapter and their 
implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility’. The ’Solidarity Clause’ in art 222 TFEU had been distinguished as the strongest 
manifestation of the Principle of Solidarity and Member State have become more open to the 
 
44 Goldner Lang, ibid. 
45 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/european-agency-management-operational-cooperation-external-
borders-member-states-european_en (13 April 2018). 
46 European Agenda On Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders (2015) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm (13 April 2018). 
47 E. Küçük, The Principle Of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing? 
European Law Journal, Vol. 22, July 2016, pp. 448-69. 
48 Annual Activity 2016 (Frontex General Report Reg No 14665 2017) 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Annual_report/2016/Annual_Activity_Report_2016.pdf  (13 
April 2018). 
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use it. In terms Asylum-seekers, art 78 TFEU direct the Union to ’develop a common policy on 
asylum’. The Common European Asylum System aims to create a system together with the 
Member States for burden-sharing.  The most criticised regulation under the CEAS has been 
the Dublin III Regulation as it is based on the principle that the first Member State where an 
asylum seeker enters is responsible for the asylum application. This creates certain pressures 
on Member States along the external Borders.  
The Inability and reluctance to perform at the external borders by Member States is resulting 
the mutual trust between Member States and faith in the EU institutions to collapse. Member 
States that have been seeking an intra-EU solution based on co-operation and Solidarity are 
being undermined by countries that are objection to a fair sharing of responsibility49. 
Virginie Guiraudon, director of research of the CNRS at the Sciences Po European Studies in 
France, questioned in her paper ‘The European Union and Asylum: A Problem of Solidarity’ 
that “instead of a European asylum Policy a policy of non-access to asylum”50 has been created. 
She criticised that provisions like the Dublin Agreement and the EURODAC database allow 
countries which have created an informal system to stop asylum seekers, to toss them from 
country to country, rather than creating a common policy. One can argue that what we see as a 
Common European Asylum Policy, in reality shows actual little Solidarity and is only a façade 
created by Countries who instead of welcoming asylum seekers, want to discourage them to 
come to Europe 
Some opposing views are also present, where certain Member State made an application to the 
European Council arguing the fact that to act in solidarity is based on the willingness of the 
Member State. This was rejected by the CJEU as it has been made clear from treaty law and 
previous rulings, that the principle of solidarity a legally enforceable obligation. If the Solidarity 
mechanisms of the non-active directive, Temporary Protection Directive, had been enforced, 
they all would have been at risk of breaching art 80 TFEU. A range of measures have been 
adopted to develop, maintain and promote solidarity such as the abolition of internal borders, 
bringing Member States closer. Free movement has been put in place for all EU citizen and 
their Third-Country family members. Some measures have been adopted in order to encourage 
financial assistance to Member states in need such as the longest and strongest standing 
measure, the European Refugee Fund. It has been making regular funds into various Framework 
Programmes and aims to enhance its objectives in the future by raising their budget. Frontex is 
another measure applied by the EU which focuses on the External Border and Coast Guard. It 
has been annually publishing reports detailing the migration flows of illegal border crossings 
or people with fraudulent documents arriving at the border. 
 
49 B. Nagy, Sharing the Responsibility or Shifting the Focus? The Responses Of The EU And The Visegrad 
Countries To The Post-2015 Arrival Of Migrants And Refugees Global Turkey in Europe, 2017 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_17.pdf  (13 April 2018). 
50 V. Guiraudon, Les Réfugiés, Seuil 2013, pp. 79-89. 
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We can definitely see a stronger approach of Solidarity in the EU, for example by the Council 
in March 2012 where they concluded on the possible idea of a common Framework for genuine 
and practical solidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum 
systems51.  
In September 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, stated in 
his address to the European Parliament ‘If I could describe Europe with just one word, it would 
be perseverance’. However, he also criticised the lack so solidarity in the EU during the refugee 
and migrations crisis but expressed his confidence that Europe will finally ‘show their 
resilience.’52    
The exact effect of the solidarity principle depends on the circumstances existing in the sector 
in which the principle will apply. 
 
 
 
51 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum – An 
EU Agenda for better responsibility-sharing and more mutual trust [COM (2011) 835]. 
52 J.-C. Juncker, European Solidarity in a World of Crises, Project Syndicate, 2015 https://www.project-
syndicate.org/onpoint/european-solidarity-greek-crisis-refugees-by-jean-claude-juncker-2016-
01?barrier=accesspaylog (13 April 2018). 
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Statelessness – Insights from International, European and 
National Perspectives 
ANYSSA FATMI 
Law student, Mykolas Romeris University and University of Bordeaux 
This article aims to highlight some crucial issues around and about statelessness. Humbly, it 
stands for the awareness of the reader, alerting on the problematics involved in this regretful 
phenomenon. It is neither new nor recent. It has existed for decades, not only abroad. Indeed, 
statelessness does not only concern other continents, but also happens in Europe and in the 
European Union. Despite the existence of international instruments specifically dedicated, a 
regional approach is required, as an impulse for a change in domestic laws. 
Keywords: statelessness, migration, asylum, European law, international law 
1. Introduction 
While statelessness has existed for several centuries, the international community has only been 
concerned with its eradication since the middle of the 20th century. Indeed, according to some 
authors such as French professor Jules Lepoutre « Since the end of the Second World War, 
nationality has become a human right1 ». From its inception, the United Nations had to deal 
with the mass atrocities of wars, including tremendous refugee populations across Europe 
following the Second World War. It led Hannah Arendt to affirm that nationality is the very 
first right, as it allows someone’s’ right to have rights2. 
Nationality is a contentious issue because it is a manifestation of the sovereignty and the identity 
of a country. It is no wonder that the quarrels around citizenship often lead to tension and 
conflict, both within states and between them. During the 20th century, cases of statelessness 
in the world have increased even as the commitment to human rights grew stronger. 
International law rules on nationality has thus evolved in two directions: the need to protect and 
assist stateless persons and to eliminate or, at least, to reduce statelessness. 
Statelessness is the lack of nationality, or the absence of a recognized link between an individual 
and any State.3. A stateless person is not considered as a national by any state under the 
operation of its law, he or she has no citizenship nor nationality. Some stateless persons are 
also refugees but not all and many persons who are stateless never have crossed an international 
 
1 https://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/04/au-ps-allons-ensemble-vers-l-apatride_1424318 (20 May 2019). 
2 https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-right-to-have-rights-and-the-plight-of-the-stateless (20 
May 2019). 
3 1954 Convention on Statelessness, article 1. 
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border. Therefore, the stateless persons do not benefit of the State protection. It has practical 
consequences. In some countries, they cannot obtain an accommodation or a bank account, they 
cannot have healthcare or send their children at school, as they have no official document 
provided for by a public authority. The access of civil status is sometimes impossible; therefore, 
they cannot get married for example. 
According to the UNHCR, it is hard to precisely know the number of stateless people in the 
world, as, by definition, they are not in any public record4. However, the UNHCR estimates 
that number around 10 million in the world, and has the ambitious, not to say idealistic, goal to 
eradicate statelessness for 2024. Roughly, it is possible to say that there are 370,000 registered 
in the Middle East and North Africa; 715,000 in Africa; 2,500 in Americas, 1.500 million in 
Asia and the Pacific.5. It is not a phenomenon only happening outside Europe. Indeed, there are 
570,000 registered, mainly due to the collapse of old States.  
Causes of Statelessness varies. It can occur because of wars, when countries collapsed (such as 
the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia), and new were created. It can also be the consequence of some 
conflicting nationality laws. Indeed, some countries nowadays do not allow female citizens to 
confer nationality of their children.6. In most large-scale statelessness situations, statelessness 
is a result of discrimination.  
Many states define their body of citizens based on ethnicity, leading to the exclusion of large 
groups7. Another reason comes from the administration of a country. Indeed, individuals might 
be entitled to citizenship but may be unable to undertake the necessary procedural steps8.  
In rare cases, individuals may become stateless upon renouncing their citizenship because of 
philosophical, political, or religious beliefs may desire or seek statelessness. There were also 
some famous stateless persons , such as Albert Einstein when he renounced his German 
nationality in 1896. A final cause of statelessness is non-state territories, the Palestinian 
territories being perhaps the most prominent example. 
The practice of creating statelessness is forbidden by the international community. Prior to the 
existing tools to fight against this phenomenon, some initiatives were taken. For instance, the 
Nansen-Passport can be seen as the very first protection for refugees and Stateless. It was a 
certificate of identity and travel created at the initiative of Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian 
diplomat, at the intergovernmental conference of July 1922 in Geneva. It was initially intended 
 
4 https://www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html (20 May 2019). 
5 https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR-Statelessness-2pager-ENG.pdf (20 May 2019). 
6 https://www.statelessness.eu/issues/ending-childhood-statelessness (20 May 2019). 
7 For example, over a million of people living Rakhine State in Myanmar (Burma) are stateless because of the laws 
currently into force, stating that only members of specific ethnic groups are eligible to the Burman nationality (The 
International Observatory on Statelessness: http://www.nationalityforall.org/burma-myanmar) (20 May 2019). 
8 For example, the country of origin of the individual might have collapsed, such as it was the case for Yugoslavia, 
and a former citizen may not meet the requirements for the gratification of the successor State’s citizenship (CMS 
– Center for Migration Studies, https://cmsny.org/the-stateless-in-the-united-states/ (20 May 2019). 
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for refugees and stateless Russian after the collapse of the Russian Empire9, it was extended in 
1924 to the Armenians and in 1928 to the Assyro-Chaldeans. In 1924, thirty-eight states, 
including France, adopted this document. The passport was written in French and in the 
language of the refugee's country of origin; the same solution was adopted in the other host 
countries. Its definitive status was laid down by the Geneva Convention of October 28, 1933. 
Its name was officially abolished after the Second World War, while remaining present in the 
current administrative language. Nowadays, the Travel Document replaces the Nansen 
Passport.10 In total, between the two world wars nearly 450,000 Nansen passports were 
granted,11 leading some authors to strive for a new kind of Nansen-Passport because of the 
Refugee crisis occurring in Europe12. 
With the collapse of the League of Nations, the United Nations had to come up with stronger 
and more stable guarantees. Those are to be found in several instruments, such as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UEDHR) which provided both a right to asylum (Article 14) 
and a right to nationality (Article 15). The declaration also expressly prohibited arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, which had affected many of the wartime refugees – although it needs 
to be said that the UDHR is not a binding instrument. 
In 1954, the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was adopted, which provides 
a framework for the protection of the stateless. In 1961, the UN adopted the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. This convention provided a definition of a stateless person (which 
has since become part of customary international law, according to the International Law 
Commission) and sets out several rights that stateless persons should enjoy. The convention 
thus became the basis for an international protection regime for stateless persons. 
However, in order to ensure that the rights enumerated in the convention are protected, States 
need to be able to identify stateless individuals. On the 14th of April 2018, 91 states are parties 
to the 1954 convention. There are also regional instruments of great importance which protect 
the stateless persons such as the European Convention on Nationality signed in 1997 under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe which tends to reduce statelessness in the European region, 
as it is still occurring.  
Statelessness often is the result of policies aiming to exclude people considered as outlanders, 
foreigners, notwithstanding their profound ties with a given country. For example, over a 
million people living Rakhine State in Myanmar (Burma) are stateless because of the laws 
currently into force, stating that only members of specific ethnic groups are eligible to the 
 
9 It concerned refugees from the former Russian Empire fleeing the October Revolution, because a Soviet decree 
of 15 December 1922 revoked the nationality of all emigrants who became stateless. 
10 Definition of the Nansen-Passport : https://ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/passeport-nansen  
11 J-P Dubois, “Nansen-Passeport, first protection for refugees in international law history”, CAIRN 
https://www.cairn.info/revue-apres-demain-2016-3-page-48.htm (13 April 2018). 
12 D. Ducret, Recréons le “passeport Nansen”, pour répondre à la crise des réfugiés 
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2019/01/22/diane-ducret-recreons-le-passeport-nansen-pour-repondre-a-la-
crise-des-refugies_5412512_3232.html (13 April 2018). 
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Burman nationality. On the other hand, policies can help to solve statelessness situations. 
Indeed, the Baltic Countries, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia recently adopted measures to 
facilitate the acquisition of nationality for people born in those two countries from two non-
nationals parents from the ex-USSR13.  
Despite an international protection regime against statelessness, this phenomenon still exists in 
many countries of the world. The consequences of statelessness depends on the country. Indeed, 
the status of a person who might be stateless ultimately depends on the viewpoint of the state 
with respect to the individual or a group of people. Today, some of the largest populations of 
stateless persons are found in Burkina Faso, Thailand, Lithuania and the Dominican Republic. 
The country most concerned by the statelessness is Burma where more than 1 million Muslims 
have had their nationality refused by a law from 198214.  
The UNHCR, the UN's refugee agency declared that every 10 minutes, a stateless child is born 
in the world. Antonio Guterres described this situation as unacceptable in the 21th century. The 
UNICEF also estimated in 2013 that 230 million of children under the age of 5 have not been 
registered15.   
The struggle to identify and to eradicate the statelessness phenomenon relates to the fact that 
statelessness is only the surface of a bigger and almost endless vicious circle. Indeed, 
statelessness can be a consequence of but also a cause of migration. During the collapse of 
Yugoslavia or the USSR, many nationals became temporarily, or still are, stateless as they could 
not enjoy any effective protection from their State of origin as it had disappeared. On the other 
hand, it can also be a cause of migration, as it can be regretfully illustrated by the Rohingyas 
crisis in Burma. Accordingly, Rohingyas are deprived or their possessions and from their 
nationality because of racial laws, leaving them in the impossibility to cross lawfully any 
border.  
There is a strong connexion between the statelessness phenomenon and migration issue. They 
are migrants, as they hope to find a better treatment and greater opportunities elsewhere. It 
implies the right to emigrate, protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights of 196616.  
 
13 R. Vejonis, Latvian president, speech at the Latvian Senate https://bnn-news.com/latvian-president-proposes-
giving-citizenship-to-all-children-born-in-latvia-198581 (13 April 2018). 
14 European Parliament resolution on the situation of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, 2017 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2017-0529_EN.html?redirect (13 April 2018). 
15 UNICEF, Press release, “one in three children under-five does not officially exist” 
https://www.unicef.org/media/media_71508.html (13 April 2018). 
16 Article 12 of the ICCPR: “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” If we focus on the second paragraph, it shall 
allow persons to leave freely his/her own country also.  
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However, the conditions of admission and entry are left to the discretion of the hosts States17. 
The only limitation of the host state’s immigration policy is the need to give “due consideration 
to the situation of vulnerable persons, including those who might be stateless.”18 Those 
elements mentioned above combined, allow to define the international freedom of movement, 
which shall include three rights: the right to enter, re-enter and return to a country; the right to 
remain in a country; and the right to leave a country.19 The broadness left to the use of “a” 
country instead of using the qualification of “country of origin” can be seen as a more adequate 
way to protect stateless persons. However, there is still an issue as the absence of a country of 
nationality obliged to readmit them remains.20 
This article intends to contribute to provide a humble insight into the rights and protection of 
stateless persons. The aim of this article is, firstly to focus on the different factors involved in 
the avoidance and eventually eradication of the statelessness phenomenon. Regardless whether 
it occurs by birth, or by the arbitrary deprivation of nationality by a state, this paper aims to 
stress that the creation of stateless people is something that can easily happen, and is 
inextricably linked to political  willingness, and that no right is indefinitely acquired. Indeed, it 
was an issue in France when the French government wanted to amend the Constitution to set 
out the possibility of deprivation of nationality regarding terrorist persons. To do so, this paper 
aims to explain and define what is statelessness; provide a brief insight of the legal tools used 
both internationally and at the European scale, and how France deals in practice with 
statelessness. 
2. Statelessness and international law 
The very core definition of a stateless person is established by the 1954 Convention on the 
status of stateless persons (2.1.). Considered as amending this convention, the 1961 Convention 
on the reduction of statelessness is the other instrument provided for fighting against this 
phenomenon internationally (2.2.). 
2.1.  The cornerstone convention of 1954 on the Status of Stateless Persons 
The 1954 Convention aims to ensure that stateless persons can exercise a minimum of 
fundamental rights. It sets out the legal definition of a stateless person as "a person who is not 
recognized by any State as its national under its law"21. In simpler terms, this means that a 
stateless person is a person who does not possess the nationality of any country. The 1954 
Convention also sets minimum standards for the treatment of stateless persons with respect to 
 
17 Human Rights Committee, General Comment n°15 on the position of aliens under the Convenant, 1986 
18 Human Rights Committee, General Comment n°15 on the position of aliens under the Convenant, 1986 
19 L.E. Van Waas, Nationality Matters, Statelessness under International Law, School of Human Rights Research 
Series, Volume 29, 2008. 
20 N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden 2008. 
21 UNHCR, UN Conventions on Statelessness: the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons  
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a number of rights. These include the right to education, employment and housing. It is 
important to note that the 1954 Convention also guarantees stateless persons the right to identity 
and travel documents, and administrative assistance. 
Persons covered by Article 1 (1) of the 1954 Convention are sometimes qualified of "de jure" 
stateless persons, although this term is not used in the Convention itself. On the other hand, the 
Final Act of the 1961 Convention refers to stateless persons per se, or "de facto”. Unlike 
stateless persons falling under Article 1 (1), the term “de facto” statelessness is not defined in 
any international instrument and there is no regime Convention specific to this category of 
persons. Indeed, the reference in the Final Act of the 1961 Convention is not being developed 
and not binding22. 
Focusing on the specific issue of statelessness, it should be read in accordance and as a lex 
specialis to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (hereinafter: the1951 Convention), 
as stateless persons are often migrants and my seek asylum.23 It seems to provide a solution, 
even a flawed one. Indeed, article 33 of the 1951 Convention codifies the principle of non-
refoulement, prohibiting the return of a refugee to a State or territory where their life or liberty 
would be at risk due to persecution because of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality 
or membership in a particular social group.24 It represents a distorted layer of protection as it 
will depend on the conditions and procedures implementing the obligation of non-refoulement. 
The minimum protection is to be found in the 1954 Convention on statelessness, as it aims to 
establish a minimal requirement for States Parties to issue travel documents to stateless persons, 
when lawfully staying in their territory.  
By its very wording, it excludes stateless people that crossed borders without any legal 
document, or with the aid of smugglers that provided them false or fraudulent documents. It 
creates a vicious circle as “fraus omnia corrumpit” in international private law25.  
In 2014, when the UNHCR launched the campaign to end statelessness in 10 years, there were 
83 States Parties to the 1954 Convention. 
2.2.  The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
The objective of this Convention is to prevent statelessness and to reduce it over time. It creates 
an international framework to guarantee the right of every person to a nationality. It requires 
states to provide safeguards in their nationality laws to prevent statelessness at birth and later 
in life. Perhaps the most important provision of the Convention is that children must acquire 
 
22 UNHCR, Expert Meeting - The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law (“Prato Conclusions”), 
May 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ca1ae002.html  (13 April 2018). 
23 H. Massey, “UNHCR and de facto Statelessness”, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Series, 2010 
24 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.  
25 B. Ancel and Y. Lequette, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence de droit international privé, Sirey, Paris 1992: 
accordingly, this theory tends to explain that in international private law, fraud corrupts the whole claim. 
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the nationality of the country in which they were born if they acquire no other nationality. It 
also establishes important safeguards to prevent statelessness related to the loss or renunciation 
of nationality and state succession.26 The Convention also provides for the very limited 
situations in which States may deprive a person of his nationality, even if that would render him 
stateless. 
In 2014, when UNHCR teams launched the campaign to end statelessness in 10 years, there 
were 61 States Parties to the 1961 Convention. 
As it was said previously, currently in the world, there are about 10 million of stateless people. 
This issue touches the children in the first place: at least third of statelessness are children born 
statelessness. First to understand the issue regarding the statelessness as it concerns the lack of 
nationality, it is crucial to understand how to obtain a nationality, and what the international 
law provides about the nationality. There are various international legal documents focus on 
the stateless status. However, any treaty or legal text provides the fundamentals criteria to 
determine the acquisition of nationality. Thus, every States are legally autonomous to determine 
its own rules about the citizenship (nationality). 
Two main legal models can be identified. The jus soli principle stands in Latin for the law of 
the territory. Under this concept, citizenship of a person is determined by the place where a 
person was born. The other one is the jus sanguinis principle, standing in Latin for the right of 
blood. Under this concept, the citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one 
or both parents who are citizens of the state. Some other countries as in France accept the 
acquisition of citizenship by both ways.  
Consequently, the issue of statelessness can happen in countries which only recognize jus 
sanguinis. On the American continent (except Haiti) the right of territory is use as a citizenship 
model, therefore the statelessness issue does not exist there. Despite the international treaties, 
despite the rules provided by the UDHR and both UN conventions, 1 child is born each 10 
minutes without any nationality27.  
Some causes are possible to identify. The first one would be the failure of the administration. 
For instance, if children are not registered in official document about where and when they were 
born. Thus, they will not be able to prove their citizenship.  It is usually the case in the country 
in war, or where the power has overturned by insurrection (in that case, usually former 
documents are destroyed by the new government). Some people decided to be statelessness: 
because of their ideology or for their way of life. Also, countries that recognizes just the right 
of blood, implying that the children born from stateless parents will also be statelessness. It 
happened usually is case of refugees. Moreover, a lot of Arabic countries refuse to recognize 
 
26 The 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
27 UNHRC, The urgent need to end childhood statelessness, UNHCR Division of International Protection, 2015 
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/the-urgent-need-to-end-childhood-statelessness/ (13 April 2018). 
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the parentage by the mother. For instance, in Syria, children can only obtain the Syrian 
nationality by descendance from the father.  
Currently it is a crucial issue as 25% of the children born during the Syrian conflict, have lost 
their fathers. Furthermore, they were usually born in refugee camps, and do not have any 
administrative document asserting their father’s citizenship.  
Statelessness could also be caused by a non-state territory, as is the case in Palestine. Finally, 
the main cause of creation of statelessness in the world is the discrimination (ethnic, race, 
religion, gender) and the non-recognition of a minority. This situation causes the highest 
number of statelessness in the world.   
The 1954 Convention on Statelessness could be effective under several conditions: the 
threshold of ratification must be attained; that the State has effectively signed and ratified the 
Convention, and that the States has acknowledged the ICJ’s jurisdiction as it has competence 
to settle the disputes arising on any point of international law. If one of those countries were a 
State Party to the European Convention of Human Rights, which would prevail for 47 States, 
this regional institution is binding on its Member States. The issue is that the jurisdiction of 
other international jurisdictions is to be accepted. It is not automatically compulsory (besides 
for 72 States that decided otherwise, for the International Court of Justice).  
Within the European Union, not all Member States are party to the 1954 Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons.28 
3. Statelessness:  tools available at the European level 
Statelessness is a phenomenon to be found in the European Union. In 2015, UNHCR estimated 
the total number of stateless persons at in Europe 592,15129, despite the provisions aiming to 
eradicate, or at least reduce, statelessness. In Europe, mainly two organisations are trying to 
solve this issue. The first one is the Council of Europe, using the European Convention of 
Human Rights and several other instruments (3.1.). Then, on the EU level, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights aims to contribute to tackling this phenomenon (3.2.).  
3.1.  The protection of stateless persons under the auspices of the Council of Europe 
Perhaps surprisingly, only one convention specifically addresses the issue of statelessness. In 
1997, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the European Convention on nationality was 
 
28 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. EU Member States which are party to the 1954 
Convention include France, Ireland, Lithuania, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Austria 
and Portugal are not States Parties to the 1954 Convention.  
29 https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html (13 April 2018). 
113 
 
born. Unsurprisingly, and even predictably, not all Member States ratified this Convention, 
notably France, Italy, Latvia and Poland. France even decided not to transpose it in its domestic 
legal order. Therefore, it is crucial to look at the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and how it deals with statelessness.  
In 2010, in the “Kuric v. Slovenia” case30, it held the impossibility for a State to “eradicate” the 
nationality of its nationals without breaching their right to privacy. Moreover, although it does 
not guarantee "any right to acquire or retain a particular nationality", the Convention prohibits 
"in certain circumstances ... the arbitrary denial or withdrawal of citizenship" (para. 353). 
Indeed, the applicants lived in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia for several years;most 
of them for decades [and / or] were even born there (para. 356).  
As a result, in "passing [a] substantial part of their lives in Slovenia [...], they have developed 
a network of personal, social, cultural, linguistic and economic relations that make up the 
private life of every human being" (para. 359). 
Once the interference with the right to private and family life was established (para. 361), the 
finding of lack of justification for the interference appeared not surprising. Indeed, the ECHR 
merely repeated (para. 373) all the criticisms of the contested legislation as formulated by the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court (para. 367-372: “vagueness of the textual conditions, 
discrimination against "erased", inadequate legal regime”). As a result, it also emphasized that 
"the legislative and administrative authorities did not act in accordance with the judicial 
decisions" (para. 373). While acknowledging the difficulty of the situation and the Slovenian 
efforts (§ 374), the European Court of Human Rights also considers "in the light of the relevant 
standards of international law relating to the difficulties of stateless persons, especially in 
situations of succession of States"(para. 260 and followings), that the situation of the "erased" 
constitute a violation of Article 8 (para. 376). 
3.2. The EU’s fight against the proliferation of statelessness 
Only 24 EU Member States are States Parties to the 1954 Convention relating to the 1954 
Convention and 19 Member States are States Parties to the 1961 Convention.31   
Among the Member States, there is no homogeneity in the procedures used to determine 
statelessness. Current practices may include special procedures for administrative 
determination; a general administrative procedure or other administrative procedure; ad hoc 
administrative procedures; and legal proceedings32. Sporadic rules but still the Charter 
represents a protection. Several rights apply to everyone, regardless of a condition of nationality 
or migration status. Some are meant to be and remain universal, such as human dignity, right 
 
30 Application no. 26828/06 
31 EMN Inform synthesis report, « Statelessness in the EU” 
32 EMN Inform synthesis report, “Statelessness in the EU” 
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to life, right to physical integrity, the prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading 
treatment, non-discrimination, effective remedy, etc.  
In December 2015, the EU Council adopted conclusions on statelessness. The EU and its 
Member States expressed their willingness to put an end to this phenomenon, inscribing/fitting 
the plan taken by the UNHCR to end it by 2024. They acknowledged the importance of 
strengthening the existing systems of protection and put in relief the vulnerability of stateless 
people. Indeed, Statelessness should be allowed to “enjoy core fundamental rights and reducing 
the risk of discrimination or unequal treatment”33. Despite this layer of willingness from the 
Member States and the EU, conclusions do not hold any legal binding effect, it is just the 
expression of a political commitment.34 
Notwithstanding, this willingness is carved in stone elsewhere. Indeed, it is to be found and 
binding Member States and the EU through the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter the 
Charter), having the same legal status as the other treaties of the European Union. For instance, 
an effective protection to Stateless people can be provided for in the letter of Article 21, 
establishing the right to non-discrimination. The second paragraph of the Article 21 invokes 
“any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”.  
However, what happens when there is no nationality at all? The first paragraph of the same 
article stands for an absolute non-discrimination right, regardless of the origin, genetic features, 
property or birth. By the combination of those paragraphs, stateless people can benefit from this 
protection.  
This other protection Stateless people can benefit from, is settled in Article 6 of the Charter, 
ensuring the right to liberty and security, but also including the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention. In the Al Chodor case (C-528/15, para. 37-39), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
held that “given the importance of the right to liberty and security of the EU Charter, and the 
severity of the interference that detention presents, limitations on this right shall only be allowed 
when strictly necessary.”35 Further on, the Court added that the detention process must be 
“subject to compliance with strict safeguards, namely the presence of a legal basis, clarity, 
predictability, accessibility and protection against arbitrariness.”36   
The interpretations of the ECJ help to create a more effective protection, on the judicial 
perspective as, compared to other jurisdiction, especially international ones, the ratione 
personae criterion might not be satisfied. Indeed, for instance, before the International Court of 
 
33 EU Council conclusions on Statelessness, 2015 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/12/04/council-adopts-conclusions-on-statelessness/pdf) (13 April 2018). 
34 As they are not foreseen in the article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, they cannot be adopted, 
and therefore have no legal binding effect. 
35 Case C-528/15 Al Chodor [EU:C:2017:213], para. 37-39 
36 Ibid, para. 40. 
115 
 
Justice, the litigation is only for States and between them, whereas the ECJ or the ECtHR have 
jurisdiction for legal persons. It helps to provide an effective remedy for Stateless people.  
On the other hand, the ECJ can also hold different positions. In the C-135/08 Rottman case, it 
stated that a Member State of the EU may withdraw its nationality, though granted through 
naturalization, from a citizen of the EU, even if it implies that the person loses both his or her 
nationality and the EU citizenship – of course it must be noted that the case revolved around 
fraudulent acquisition of citizenship. This demonstrates that the creation of Stateless persons 
also happens in the European Union and is ultimately left at the discretion of the Member States 
by one of the EU institutions, in that case, the ECJ, even if in the case in question the ECJ held 
that the national court deciding on the case must have due regard to EU law and in particular 
the principle of proportionality. 
The usual threshold used by the Court was the proportionality test. As it was a preliminary 
ruling on interpretation of EU law, the ECJ cannot rule instead of the national jurisdiction. It 
gives a binding judgement but does not amend the national law or decide the basic case. It even 
decided not to address the question whether Austria is obliged to restore Rottman’s original 
citizenship, as it would have ruled ultra vires. Indeed, according to international law, the 
acquisition or loss of nationality and the conditions towards it, remain in the sole competence 
of the Member States37. Consequently, the applicant was left stateless. Appropriately, as due to 
the proportionality test and the facts of the case, as the applicant obtained the naturalization by 
fraud38. It is possible to presume that, only when fraudulent behavior is occurring, fraus omnia 
corrumpit39, meaning that fraud corrupts everything. It also implies that the withdrawal of a 
nationality, leaving the applicant stateless, is a proportionate sanction to criminal behaviors. It 
outstandingly shows the fact that, as it remains in the sole competence of the Member States, 
granting and withdrawal of citizenship is not harmonized in the EU and is not likely to be 
anytime soon. Indeed, nationality is inherent to the idea of sovereignty. 
4. Statelessness: protection provided at the domestic level - an overview of 
the French System 
About 50 years ago, a number of laws regarding the deprivation of nationality were enacted 
under the Vichy Regime. The laws of 23 of July and 10 of September 1940 allowed the 
withdrawal of nationality from individuals who left French territory without mission order. 
Under the Act of July 23, 446 people, including Charles de Gaulle and Pierre Mendes France 
 
37 Case C-149/79 Commission v. Belgium [EU:C:1982:195]: the ECJ held that it is within the exclusive 
competence of Member States to determine the conditions of acquisition and loss of nationality, referring to the 
solidarity and reciprocity between rights and duties between Member States. 
38 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [EU:C:2010:104], para. 52 : “a person may be deprived of the nationality of a 
Contracting State if he has acquired that nationality by means of misrepresentation or by any other act of fraud 
[…] even if he thus becomes stateless, when that nationality was acquired by means of fraudulent conduct, false 
information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to that person” 
39 Cass. Requêtes, 3 juillet 1817, Princesse de Bauffremont: this case establishes the theory of fraud to the law, 
providing for the “fraus omnia corrumpit” principle.   
116 
 
were deprived of their nationality by the Vichy Regime. It is still a recurrent debate. The 
following part of this paper aims to focus on the protection of stateless people in France (4.1.) 
and the practical effect of this protection (4.2.). 
4.1.  Historical background: the elaboration of the protection for Stateless persons 
The deprivation of nationality for binational individuals is already in the French Civil Code - 
for foreigners who have acquired French nationality and only for them. The government 
intended to expand in 2016 with the French born binational. The measure was very hard to 
reconcile with French republican values that it would have required amending the Constitution, 
which failed in the end. 
It was a very crucial moment. As Montesquieu said, "it is sometimes necessary to change 
certain laws. But the case is rare, and when it happens, it must be done with a trembling hand." 
The hands of parliamentarians have all reasons to tremble as the only time France has 
denaturalized French people, it was by law of 22 July 1940, under the Vichy Regime during the 
Occupation - just before voting legislation regarding the status of Jews. Finally, the repeal of 
Decree Cremieux, on the 7th of October 1940, deprived 100,000 Jews of Algeria of French 
citizenship. 
The parallel is not absurd, "foreigners should not forget that the quality of French must be 
earned,"40 said Raphaël Alibert, the Ministry of Justice of Maréchal Pétain, according to the 
Journal des débats of 24 July 1940. “Being French is earned”41 writes Robert Ménard (Front 
National – now Rassemblement National), mayor of Béziers on Boulevard Voltaire site. "Being 
french, it must be earned. French citizenship must be earned. All rights and duties that go with 
it must be respected"42 asserted Xavier Bertrand, secretary general of the UMP (so called 
Republicans) on the 31st of July 2010. It is a recurrent debate. This part of this paper aims to 
focus on the protection of stateless people in France (A) and the practical effect of this 
protection (B). 
4.2.  Practical views on the functioning of the French system  
The 1998 Guigou Act forbids the creation of stateless people. On an initiative of the former 
minister of justice this prohibitions was added to Article 25 of the French Civil Code. The 
French statelessness-specific protection mechanism (the oldest in the world) was created in 
1953, thus it pre-dates the 1954 Statelessness Convention.  
 
40 B. Laguerre, les dénaturalisés de Vichy », 1940-1944, Vingtième Siècle, Revue d’histoire, Vol. 20, 1988, pp. 3-
15.  
41 R. Ménard, French politician, Nouvelles de France 2012 https://www.ndf.fr/identite/21-10-2012/etre-francais-
ca-se-merite/ (13 April 2018). 
42 X. Bertrand, French politician, interview https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/bertrand-lr-favorable-a-la-decheance-
de-nationalite-pour-tous-les-individus-04-01-2016-2006846_20.php (13 April 2018). 
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Since then, a centralised administrative authority, namely the French Office for the Protection 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides, 
OFPRA) has overseen assessing claims for stateless status. French law does not stipulate 
detailed and specific rules on how such claims should be dealt with (e.g. regarding evidentiary 
matters), however, the procedural framework can still be considered settled, partly based on the 
OFPRA’s brief guidance published on its website. Applicants are commonly (yet not 
obligatorily) invited to an oral hearing by the determining authority. The OFPRA’s negative 
decision can be appealed in the regular framework of judicial review of administrative 
decisions, before a local administrative court (tribunal administratif), and at second instance, 
before a regional administrative court of appeal (cour administrative d’appel).  
These courts can only quash decisions made in breach of law and refer the case back to the 
OFPRA for a new procedure, they are not entitled to rectify an erroneous legal conclusion and 
grant stateless status themselves. In cases of an error of law, further review can be sought with 
the Conseil d’État. 
Statelessness determination represents a minuscule proportion of the OFPRA’s caseload. 
Between 2006 and 2010, for example, 931 persons claimed stateless status in France, while the 
country registered hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers in this five-year period. Applicants 
come from various parts of the world; yet Europe (in particular Southeast Europe) regularly 
constitutes a significant region of origin. The ‘recognition rate’ in the administrative phase 
usually verges around 30 percent (a higher proportion than in asylum cases). Between 2006 and 
2010, the OFPRA recognised 311 persons as stateless. 
 
Applications for stateless status in 2016, according to the country of birth  
Source: OFPRA website – latest data available. 
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Yearly applications for stateless status and admission rate 
Source: OFPRA website – latest data available. 
In France, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) 
oversees the statelessness determination procedure since its creation in 1952. It is the first 
country in the world to have established such a procedure, even before the 1954 Convention. 
In 2017, 341 applications for statelessness were newly filed with OFPRA, representing an 
increase of 19.2% over 2016. 52% of requests come from persons originating from Europe, 
32% are from Africa and 16% from Asia. In 2017, OFPRA took 298 decisions, 65 of which 
were positive. The admission rate is 22%, up from 2016 (15.3%). It should also be noted that 
114 adults who have already filed an application for international protection were ultimately 
granted a dual status of refugee-stateless. 
The result is that in theory a person’s nationality may be withdrawn and so France could make 
a person stateless. This is underlined by the fact the country did not ratify to the 1961 United 
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The convention has been ratified by only 
40 countries worldwide and says that contracting states shall not deprive someone of their 
nationality if it would render that person stateless.  
France signed this convention on 31 May 1962 but has not ratified it. In addition, France made 
a reservation based on art. 8.3 of the Convention, allowing it "to deprive an individual of his 
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nationality, [... if he] has behaved in such a way as to cause serious prejudice to the essential 
interests of the State [...]». 
Similarly, the European Convention on Nationality of 1997, which provides that "every 
individual has the right to a nationality", has been signed but not ratified by France, and Article 
15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. states that "every individual has the right to 
a nationality"; but this text has a weak legal effect, for the Conseil d’Etat it has no normative 
value. 
Consequently, for the constitutional expert Didier Maus, "legally there is no international text 
that commits France to prohibit statelessness"43. But for another constitutionalist, Dominique 
Rousseau, "its simple signature [of the 1961 convention] commits [France] to respect the spirit 
and purpose of the text"44. 
Nevertheless, a contracting state may strip a private individual of his nationality under certain 
conditions like showing a lack of loyalty to that state or displaying the kind of behaviour to be 
seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state. 
In other words, even if France did ratify the convention it could still make a person stateless. 
Legally yes, but would it dare to act at a time when the UN has heightened its campaign against 
statelessness? Such a move would create the wrong sort of headlines for the French government. 
Neither the Constitution nor the implementing bill will no longer reference to the binational 
persons, therefore making theoretically possible the deprivation of nationality for a French 
having no other nationality. The government has just promised to ratify the UN Convention of 
1961 on the "Reduction of Statelessness."45  
The treaty, however, allows states to practice statelessness in limited circumstances, including 
"an individual who has had a course of action to be seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
of the State". Understand here terrorism and preparation, as the plotting phase before taking 
actions. Consequently, there is only French law to prevent the withdrawal of a person’s 
nationality whom only nationality is French. This prohibition, inscribed in Article 25 of the 
Civil Code, is provided for by the Act of 16 March 1998 on the nationality brought by the 
government of Lionel Jospin, in this case by the Minister for Justice of that time, Elizabeth 
Guigou, stating that it "would allow, while respecting our international commitments, to no 
 
43 D. Maus, legal expert in French Constitutional law, interview https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/l-
interdiction-de-l-apatridie-n-est-pas-actuellement-dans-les-obligations-de-la-france-dit-un-juriste-7781170563 
(13 April 2018). 
44 D. Rousseau legal expert in French Constitutional law, interview  
https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/01/05/la-decheance-pour-tous-juridiquement-difficile-a-
imposer_4842065_823448.html?xtmc=decheance_pour_tous&xtcr=4 (13 April 2018). 
45 M. Valls, former French Prime Minister speech 
 https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/01/27/apatrides-valls-s-emmele-dans-les-ratifications-de-
textes-internationaux_4854861_4355770.html (13 April 2018). 
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longer distinguish between French with regard to the crimes of terrorism". "Certainly, we might 
create stateless people", notes the former minister. Constitutional reform would, in any event, 
that a mouthful of this provision now judged expired, including by its initiator 46. 
Only the European Court of Human Rights47 could prevent France from taking that action. 
However, in order to fight the action through these courts could take years. 
At the same time, going opposite to France, the Canadian government opened the way for the 
repeal of the deprivation of nationality that applies to binational individuals guilty of terrorism 
or espionage, explaining that "there is only one class Canadians."48 
There will be no revision of the French Constitution to include the principle of deprivation of 
nationality against perpetrators of terrorist acts, such as those of the attacks in Paris in January 
2015 and November last. After four months of controversy in the state of emergency, the head 
of state François Hollande finally gave up on March 30 to convene a Congress at Versailles to 
achieve this political response. Senate President Gérard Larcher highlighted the "divisions" 
aroused by the project, rewritten after each vote. But a single text should have been adopted by 
a majority of 3/549. 
5. Conclusion 
Statelessness is not a new phenomenon. Both the 1954 and 1961 Conventions are specifically 
dedicated to this issue. Those were merely the first steps to stem the proliferation of stateless 
persons. However, the collapse of old states, and the arising of new ones, implied also a change 
of nationality status for the inhabitants with very practical consequences, even in Europe. Those 
old instruments also appear to be not sufficient enough to fight against statelessness, as it is a 
recurrent and topical issue. Indeed, this is what explains the commitment of the UNHCR, 
illustrated by its very ambitious - though probably too ambitious - action plan to eradicate 
Statelessness by 2024. On the other hand, the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 was 
not ratified by all the EU Member States, including France and the United Kingdom. It 
highlights a visceral condition, but also a critical dilemma here: the will of states is the corner-
stone of the well-functioning and effective protection for stateless people, created by States 
 
46 E. Guigou, newspress, “reflexions autour de la déchéance de nationalité » : 
http://www.newspress.fr/Communique_FR_293467_2970.aspx (13 April 2018). 
47 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) ICJ. Reports 1955: “Nationality serves above all to determine 
that the person upon whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law of the 
State in question grants to or imposes on its nationals. This is implied in the wider concept that nationality is within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the State.” Furthermore, the litigation conditions before the ICJ are very strict. It 
consists on three elements: to settle a dispute, between States, according to international law. The main issue 
concerns the State to act on the basis of the protection on diplomatic action for the stateless person, a protection 
nowadays obsolete. Only the ECtHR would be a viable option for an effective protection.  
48 J. Trudeau, Canadian Prime Minister, interview https://globalnews.ca/news/2245012/watch-trudeau-would-let-
convicted-terrorists-keep-canadian-citizenship/ (13 April 2018). 
49 G. Larcher, speech at the French Senate https://www.senat.fr/presse/cp20160330.html (13 April 2018). 
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themselves, sometimes even allowed by the European Court of Justice. The questionable 
proportionality test to allow the deprivation of citizenship to a human being because of a 
fraudulent behaviour brings up a lot of criticism. As Simone Veil said, “no right is to be taken 
for granted”, and French debate towards the unilateral withdrawal of a sole nationality, shows 
that it can occur, and it had occurred in the UK, as a woman got her citizenship revoked by the 
Home Office, leaving her stateless after leaving for Syria.50 Therefore, migration, asylum and 
statelessness are inextricably connected, either being the cause or the consequence of one 
another. It seems that creating a stateless person is a punishment, unilaterally with no chance 
for a fair hearing or an effective remedy. If the States do not have enough will and commitments 
put in practice to solve the statelessness issue, it will remain a challenge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 N. Wayne, I. Forbes, C. Tomalin, S. Eccleston and W. Schabas, Shamima Begum citizenship decision sets a 
dangerous precedent, The Guardian, 21 February 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2019/feb/21/shamima-begum-citizenship-decision-sets-a-dangerous-precedent (13 April 2018). 
122 
 
Free Movement of Workers in EU: Current Status, 
Outcomes of Implemented Legislation and Challenges to 
Deal with 
OLENA HALAHAN, TETIANA LOZYK, VOLODYMYR OSTAFIICHUK,  
Law students, Mykolas Romeris University 
In this paper, we will consider the legal status of workers in accordance with the principle of 
"free movement of workers" in the European Union, and the legal status of workers originating 
from non-EU countries. Attention will be paid to such problems of free movement of workers 
as: discrimination, recognition of workers' qualifications, etc. Also, an analysis of legal 
instruments aimed at ensuring and encouraging the free movement of workers in the EU was 
conducted. The final part will be the study of the positive and negative effects of free movement 
of workers in the host country and home country. 
Keywords: free movement of worker, workers from non-EU countries, protection of employees 
1. Introduction 
Labor is the main source of the existence, prosperity and progress of any human being. Since 
the existence of homo sapiens and to date, and since the creation of the first wheel and to the 
serial launch of high-tech machines, the main and constant life-companion of a man was his 
work. With the development of information and technologies and the process of globalization, 
the work became publicly available and gave rise to such processes as "labor migration", 
including illegal border crossing.  
In the European Union this is a subject that has been faced with labor migration and the 
consequences of the movement of workers. Being one of the most economically powerful 
associations in the world, the EU is an attractive place for possible employment for citizens 
from less developed countries of the EU and third-country nationals. 
From a legal point of view, freedom of movement for workers includes the rights of movement 
and residence for workers, the rights of entry and residence for family members, and the right 
to work in another Member State and be treated on an equal footing with nationals of that 
Member State. Movement of workers means their physical movement from the territory of one 
state to another, for the purpose of performing work, providing services or staying at a 
permanent place of work. 
The movement of workers in the territory of the European Union can take place in two ways: 
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a) movement of workers within the European Union, from the economically weaker developed 
countries to countries with a stronger economy, directly depends on the level of wages of the 
host country; 
b) movement of workers from the third countries to the territory of the European Union for the 
purpose of employment and further migration. 
Every year, the level of labor migration to more developed countries is increasing, and the EU 
focuses on the legal instruments for this issue. The question arises as to what legal instruments 
regulate the movement of workers between EU countries and third countries? And what socio-
economic impact is the labor migration for the donor country and the host country? 
So, let's start with what legal instruments regulate issues related to the movement of workers. 
2. Free movement of workers within the European Union 
The free movement of workers in the EU is regulated by the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) (Article 3(2) and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) (Articles 4(2)(a), 20, 26 and 45-48). Furthermore, the free movement of workers 
is regulated by secondary legislation, including several directives and regulations. Some of 
them are: Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; Regulation (EU) No 
492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union; Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and its implementing Regulation (EC) 
No 987/2009. 
And, of course, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is another 
important source of rules on the free movement of workers in the European Union. By virtue 
of its judgements and broad interpretations of the provisions regulating the freedom of 
movement of workers, ECJ has contributed substantially to the development of this part of the 
EU law. The ECJ firstly provided a definition of the concept of a worker, which was not 
previously provided in the treaties. For example, in the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
lawsuit 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986], it was stated that "it is a person who, during a certain period 
of time, carries out economic activities under the direction of another person and receives a 
reward for it". Persons who work part-time also referred to this concept.1 
Currently, the movement of EU citizens throughout the European Union  is one of the four  
‘fundamental freedoms’2  of the EU  enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU. This article consolidates the principles of fighting against any form of employees’ 
 
1 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [EU:C:1982:105] and Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie [EU:C:1986:223]. 
2 Case 7/75 Mr. and Mrs. F. v. Belgian State [1975] 
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discrimination due to their state affiliation in the field of employment, wages and other 
conditions of work. EU citizens are entitled to: look for a job in another EU country, work there 
without needing a work permit and reside there for that purpose, stay there even after 
employment has finished, enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, 
working conditions and all other social and tax advantages. Also, Article 18 of the TFEU 
generally prohibits any form of discrimination based on nationality, and this extends to the field 
of labor law of the participating countries. The legal framework governing the issue of 
discrimination rests with the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination. 
The EU's policy on combating discrimination is that, on the one hand, workers have the right 
to use every new job offer in the EU, and on the other hand, employers and Member States can 
not discriminate workers based on their origin from other member states. This has led to the 
first precedents for recognizing the laws of some Member States that are not in line with EU 
law. 
For instance, the decision in case 167/73 Commission v. France [1974] of the ECJ. There was 
a provision in the French Code du Travail Maritime, which determined the percentage of the 
national composition of the merchant ship's crew. Namely, it allowed the imposition of 
restrictions on persons who are not French nationals for inclusion in the ship's command (not 
more than 25%). The EU Commission argued that France violated Art. 39 Treaty on the 
Establishment of the European Community (now Article 45 TFEU), since as this restriction 
may be applied to citizens of the EU Member States. The French government used the 
arguments that the restrictions practically did not apply to citizens of other EU countries and 
stated that provisions of free movement of workers of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community did not apply to maritime transport, as the Council of the EU did not take decisions 
on this in accordance with Art. 80.2 (now - Article 100.2 of the TFEU). The EU Court, rejecting 
France's arguments, ruled that mentioned Article from the French Code du Travail Maritime 
violates Art. 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now article 45 TFEU), 
and also noted that the prohibitions contained therein are of an absolute nature and provide 
citizens of any State of the European Community with free access to employment in other 
Member States, as well as in accordance with Art. 234 (now - Article 267 of the TFEU) grant 
them a guarantee against unfair terms of employment and pay.  
3. Legal regulation of the movement of workers from third countries to the 
EU. 
Legal status of workers from third countries on the territory of the EU is not defined, much 
attention is paid to workers from other EU member states.  From the analysis of EU legislation, 
the division of employees into: 
 A) seasonal workers from third countries; 
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 B) Workers on an ongoing basis.  
In the area of work safety of seasonal workers, the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted an instrument of harmonization which defines the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purpose of employment of seasonal workers and defines the 
rights of seasonal workers 3.  In particular, the European Parliament has established unified 
conditions for the process of establishing a permit for seasonal work (by issuing a short-term 
visa or a work permit).  Also, a great deal is given to the terms of seasonal work, in particular 
the minimum period must be at least 5 months and not more than 9 months for every 12 months.  
This provides more opportunities for earning a worker from a third country.  Also, the host 
countries are required to protect the rights of seasonal workers and give them the legal status of 
the national workers of the host state (the principle of equal treatment). 
The procedure for registration of time-wage workers is carried out in accordance with the 
national legislation of the host state (exclusive competence of the EU member states). 
Regarding workers who work on an ongoing basis, the procedure for access of workers to the 
labor market of a Member State of the EU is determined by the national legislation of the host 
country and bilateral agreements on the regulation of relations in the labor markets. 
The national law of the participating countries establishes appropriate conditions for admission 
to its market, in particular, the mandatory issuance of work visas and work permits (according 
to the EU visa code).  Access to the labor market is usually limited, due to the host country's 
need to protect its domestic labor market, and access to a worker from a third country is usually 
provided when there is an urgent need for workers of the profession in the national market.  
Responsible for the implementation of such a system of permits are various agencies.  For 
example, the National Employment Agency (France), the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Insurance (Cyprus).  In addition, responsibility lies with local authorities (Belgium). 
Frequently the requirements for the level of qualification of employees are set, this issue is 
rather sharp and raises the issue of discrimination (the problem of discrimination is discussed 
below), so the EU has issued a legal instrument to Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of representatives  third countries to ensure high-quality 
employment.  According to the latter, the procedure for legalization and conditions of stay in 
the territory of the receiving state is established. 
Analyzing the foregoing, one can say that the European Union legal system contains a well-
established and sufficient legal regulation mechanism, but the modern legal system has in 
practice revealed a significant number of conflicts, and problems that are not sufficiently 
regulated by EU legislation and national law of the participating countries. Typically, these 
 
3 Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and  stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers. 
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problems are related to wage discrimination, problems of recognition of qualifications and 
illegal employment in general. This is a serious debate, and so far there is a problem in their 
legal settlement. In particular, we will consider some of them: 
3.1. Wage discrimination 
Wage discrimination occurs when the employer provides unequal treatment to foreign workers 
in comparison to local ones. Thus, the employer hires workers from less developed countries 
offering them lower wages for the same quality and amount of done work than is usually offered 
to the residents of the host country. 
Reverse discrimination also takes place. In this case, employer artificially creates more 
favorable conditions for foreign employers in comparison to local ones. 
Some of the solutions on how to deal with this issue is provided with adoption of Posting of 
Workers and Enforcement Directive . Though posted workers differ from EU mobile workers, 
as they come to the host country for specific period and do not integrate into internal market, 
they still reflect EU’s approach on protection of all workers who come to any Member Sate on 
work purposes. This directive provides standards on conditions of posted workers employments 
and protects them from wage discrimination through equal pay principle. 
Moreover, this is clearly stated in the articles of TFEU that employers have right for free 
movement and shall not be subject to any discrimination.4  
3.2. Recognition of worker’s qualification in the host country. 
Recognition of worker’s qualification in another country is one of the key factors which may 
influence his/her ability to be hired in another country. Subsequently, it is especially important 
to provide European countries with some legal basis for this procedure. 
The recognition system for vocational qualifications has been reformed to help make labor 
markets more flexible and encourage more automatic recognition of qualifications. Directive 
2005/36 / EC5  on the recognition of professional qualifications integrates and updates 15 
existing directives covering almost all recognition rules, and provides for innovative features 
such as the European professional card and mutual assessment of regulated professions. 
It is also important to note that Member States also implement national laws which facilitate 
freedom of movement for workers within EU. An explicit example of the positive effect of 
labor migration is the adoption by Germany of a new law that simplifies the mechanism of 
 
4 Article 45 of TFEU  
5 Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, modified by Directive 2013/55/EU 
amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications. 
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access by foreign workers to the German labor market. The new law was adopted in 2018, and 
this year should come into force. The main task of the law is to facilitate the conditions of labor 
migration from non-EU countries. Thus, those law is targeted to facilitate the process of 
employment for job seekers from third countries. According to this law, non-EU workers now 
will be able to go for a job in Europe if the have a minimum degree or vocational training 
certificate, and contract with an employer.6  
4. Legal Measures to encourage freedom of movement 
Due to the mentioned above issues with freedom of workers’ movement, European Union took 
decisive measures to solve them. 
Generally, it is recognized and legally implemented within EU that EU citizen is eligible to 
work in any member state. In practice though there are many court cases claiming that national 
requirements for certain positions in host countries do not comply with mentioned above 
principle of equal access to the vacancy by any EU citizen. EU reacted with legal rules and 
directives called to overcome this issue.  
A direct link to the freedom of movement of workers was firstly made by the ECJ in the Heylens 
case [1987] regarding a Belgian football trainer who carried out his profession in France even 
though his Belgian football trainer’s diploma had not been recognized, and therefore was 
summoned before a criminal court in France. In this judgment the ECJ declared that – in the 
absence of harmonization of conditions of access to a particular occupation – the Member States 
are entitled to lay down according conditions, but need to ‘reconcile the requirement as to the 
qualifications necessary in order to pursue a particular occupation with the requirements of the 
free movement of workers’, and that the procedures for the recognition of foreign diplomas 
therefore need to meet certain standards. Referring to the Heylens case, the ECJ in later 
decisions consequently declared that ‘national requirements concerning qualifications, even if 
applied without any discrimination on the basis of nationality, may have the effect of hindering 
nationals of the other Member States in the exercise of their right of establishment or right to 
freedom of movement of workers’,11 and that ‘the analysis does not differ according to whether 
it is freedom of movement for workers or the freedom of establishment which is relied upon’ if 
the national rules at issue fail to take account of the qualifications already acquired by the person 
concerned in another Member State.7  
The recognition system for vocational qualifications has been reformed to help make labor 
markets more flexible and encourage more automatic recognition of qualifications. Directive 
2005/36/EC  on the recognition of professional qualifications integrates and updates 15 existing 
 
6 https://www.germany-visa.org/germanys-new-immigration-laws-open-door-for-skilled-labor/  
7 Online Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union, European Union, 2010, p.7 
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directives covering almost all recognition rules, and provides for innovative features such as 
the European professional card and mutual assessment of regulated professions. 
There are certain measures taken on the EU level to ensure workers’ mobility. These measures 
include but are not exhausted to: 
− Coordination of social security schemes through Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 and 
implementation of Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009, which is currently under revision 
(2.3.4); 
− The adoption in April 2014 of the Directive 2014/50 / EU on minimum requirements 
for increasing the mobility of workers between member states by improving the 
acquisition and retaining additional rights to retirement; 
The importance of this directive is in its support of values proclaimed in article 46 of TFEU 
which says that free movement is a fundamental principle of EU functioning. And provisions 
of this directive are focusing on reducing barriers to free movement of workers caused by 
difficulties with supplementary pension schemes. Thus, this act is aimed to improve 
preservation and acquisition of pension by the worker who has pension scheme which is 
connected to work place within the EU but in the country other than country of worker’s 
citizenship.8 
So, we have determined that the EU legal system for regulating relations with workers’ 
“movement” is imperfect due to the constant development of labor relations, and in member 
countries there are a number of problems with the unification of legal norms and compliance 
with the standards related to the fight against discrimination and compliance working 
conditions. However, in spite of  the large number of problems, host countries and donor 
countries are positively tuned to this process, and there is a tendency in the world to simplify 
the legal requirements for access to national markets for foreign workers.9 And there are such 
questions : Why is the positive attitude of countries to the process of movement of workers? 
What are the positive and negative aspects of the impact of the “movement” of workers on host 
countries and donor countries? 
As it follows from the said above, legal framework of free movement of workers in the EU has 
some issues to work on. In order to improve the European laws on labor migration, it is 
necessary to analyze what are the outcomes of current legislation. 
 
8 https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/112466fb-d031-11e3-8cd4-01aa75ed71a1 
9 Poland : Compared to 2016, the number of such work permits increased by more than one third. If compared 
with 2014, according to experts, this number has increased by 350%.), Germany, Czech Republic. 
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We think, that more appropriately is to distinguish advantages and disadvantages separately for 
donor and host countries, as each of them has its own interest and outcomes from migration. 
Among significant advantages of labor migration legislation for donor countries it is necessary 
to outline the following:  
Reduction of unemployment rate in the donor country 
As we see from the statistical data of Eurostat below, the rate of unemployment EU citizens 
even decreased. 
 
Constant inflows of foreign currency into the donor country, causing economic growth and 
GDP growth. 
An example is the situation in Ukraine. With the strengthening of the process of European 
integration of Ukraine, EU countries are loyal to the movement of workers from Ukraine and 
promote their employment. The National Bank of Ukraine has published statistical data that 
from 2017, money transfers to Ukraine from abroad amounted to approximately $ 9.3 billion. 
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This amount is more than five times the foreign direct investments of the same year that the 
National Bank estimated at $ 1.8 billion.10 
And the national bank is trying to simplify the procedure for the transfer of cash boats abroad, 
for this were provided relevant proposals to the government. 
• Deepening of labor relations between the country as an exporter and importer of labor 
resources. 
Usually, the deepening of labor relations between states is realized through a system of mutual 
employment contracts between them. Typically, these treaties regulate relations regarding the 
legal registration of employees and working conditions. For example, an agreement between 
the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany (in the middle of the EU) or an 
agreement between Ukraine and the Czech Republic on cooperation in the field of labor and 
employment. 
Negative consequences for donor countries are: 
The loss of working resources and the loss of highly skilled workers will lead to worsening 
production, lack of staff in servicing various spheres of the country's economy. 
The deterioration of the demographic situation. 
Due to the outflow of young people, and their further residence in other countries. For example, 
we will take statistical information from the Republic of Lithuania. 
Professor Stankuniene from the Department of Sociology at the University of Vytautas the 
Great, March 9, made a presentation at a conference in the Parliament: "Every year we are 
reduced by 1%, this is largely due to emigration - more than 650,000 people left Lithuania in 
25 years"...   "Again and again, it is necessary to recognize that the cause of emigration is 
primarily economic: they leave where their level of well-being is lower, where their incomes 
and wages are lower, they go to where they are better in terms of welfare and income This is a 
rule, not an exception. " - said the professor.11 
Inflation growth due to excessive inflow of foreign currency; 
Elimination of workforce shortage by filling vacancies by labor migrants; 
 
10 https://112.international/opinion/labor-migrants-transfer-almost--10-billion-a-year-to-ukraine-30781.html  
11 See further: https://ru.file.lt/news/live/prognoz-na-nedalekoe-buduschee-situaciya-v-litve-serezno-
uhudshaetsya.d?id=706448      
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According to the State Labor Service of Germany, last year difficulties with filling vacancies 
were reported by 47% of enterprises. The construction industry has especially big problems in 
finding workers. On December 19, 2018, the German government approved a bill that should 
simplify immigration to Germany of qualified specialists from third countries. 
Involving highly qualified specialists from a foreign country can lead to increasing of profits 
and to exchange of information between employees, that is, to improve their qualification. 
Growth of production at enterprises. 
The presence of a sufficient amount of labor at the enterprise leads to the expansion of the 
latter's capabilities. That increases the quantity of produced products and the profit received as 
a whole. The shortage of labor in Germany leads to the impossibility of functioning of 
enterprises in full force and led to losses to the economy of 33 billion euros.12 
Growth of the economy and budget revenues through the taxation of income of migrants and 
through receipt of tax revenues from products sold by enterprises; 
Due to the constant labor migration from Ukraine, GDP growth in the Republic of Poland, 
according to analysts, reached 4.5%.13 
Solving demographic problems, reducing the problems of aging of the nation. 
Negative consequences for host countries on the other hand include: 
Reduction of wages and conditions of work due to the availability of cheap labor.  
Wages in the European Union increased 2.7 percent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2018, 
following a 2.8 percent growth in the previous period. Wage Growth in European Union 
averaged 1.94 percent from 2009 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 3.60 percent in the 
second quarter of 2009 and a record low of 0.90 percent in the third quarter of 2010. 
 
12 See further: https://www.dw.com/uk/%D0%B4....-17008044  
13 See further: https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/news/2018/01/30/633547/ 
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Increased competition for the workplace due to the presence of a large number of manpower. 
But, actually the activity rate of the EU-28 working-age population varies somewhat according to 
country of birth or citizenship (as illustrated in Figure 1). During the period 2008-2017, non-EU-
born migrants (hereafter referred to as migrants born outside the EU) systematically recorded lower 
activity rates than EU-born migrants (those born in a different EU Member State to the one in which 
they were living) or the native-born population, with these differences increasing over time.  
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Problems with housing and placement of migrant workers, great influence on housing 
infrastructure; 
A leakage of the national currency in connection with the transfer of funds to the territory of 
another country; 
In the case of a large number of migrants without proper employment, they will be concentrated 
in one place and further problems with the law (smuggling, drug trafficking, other criminal 
offenses). 
Negative relations of the local population, refusal to accept the culture of local residents. 
5. Conclusion 
After analyzing the causes of the movement and migration of workers, its impact and economic 
consequences for the states, it can be concluded that the movement of workers has positive 
consequences for the host country and helps to reduce the unemployment rate in the donor 
country, on the one hand.  
On the other hand, there’s another side to this issue. With an annual increase in the flow of 
labor migrants to the more economically developed countries of the European Union, an 
increase in the flow of migrant workers from third countries and their illegal employment, some 
gap in the legislation of the European Union became obvious. Hence, the effectiveness of the 
mechanism of protecting workers' rights and protection against discrimination have not been 
fully realized. More attention must be paid to combating illegal employment, discrimination in 
the field of pay and conditions of access to the labor market of the host country. It is also 
important to note, that national legislation of Member States should comply with European 
standards provided by the bodies and agencies of European Union. Therefore, only common 
efforts of Member States and European Union will lead to maximum effect in the sphere of 
guaranteeing free movement of workers to EU citizens. 
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The last decades are characterised by significant changes in international financial relations. 
Growing financial flows and increasingly sophisticated financial instruments bear witness to 
the phenomenon. The mobility of capital on an international and unprecedented degree inspired 
the phrase - ‘financial globalisation’. Today, the financial sector is becoming increasingly 
detached from the productive sectors, which is also one of the main reasons for the financial 
crises that have repeatedly shaken the societies. In the process of financial globalisation, tax 
havens play a central role. Tax evasion has become a complex problem which extends beyond 
borders. This academic paper investigates the resultant effects of tax havens on the Internal 
Market and provides the possible EU Member States’ determined policy responses which are 
needed to be implemented at all levels in order to reduce the effects of tax avoidance 
phenomenon and crack down on the tax havens per se. 
Keywords: tax havens, financial globalisation, Internal Market, free movement of goods, tax 
evasion, international tax law, tax fraud. 
1. The phenomenon of financial globalisation  
1.1. “Without understanding tax havens, we will never properly understand the economic 
history of the modern world.”1 
For a quarter of a century, active measures were repeatedly taken to create the European single 
market, allowing people and businesses to move freely and trade in different EU countries, as 
well as to modernize and deepen this market through a series of targeted legislative actions and 
non-legislative actions. Macroeconomic data indicates the progress achieved in 26 years, as 
well as the economic importance and power of today's Single Market and its attractiveness.  
Tax policy in the European Union (the EU) has two components: direct taxation, which remains 
the sole responsibility of Member States, and indirect taxation, which affects free movement of 
goods and the freedom to provide services in the single market. 
 
1 Nicholas Shaxson, author of “Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World”. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-03/offshore-tax-havens-in-spotlight-after-200-year-history  
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The European internal market, also referred to as a single market, allows people and businesses 
to move and trade freely across the 28-nation group. The free movement of goods has been one 
of the most significant advantages of the EU membership. However, there are clearly occasions 
when national industry and specific sectors have been disadvantaged for the greater good. 
Moreover, the co-existence of different tax systems still makes life difficult for companies and 
individuals operating across borders. 
The last decades of the 20th century and the first few years of the 21st century were 
characterized by significant changes in international financial relations. Growing financial 
flows, the opening up of markets, and new and increasingly sophisticated financial instruments 
bear witness to the phenomenon. The mobility of capital on an international and unprecedented 
degree inspired the phrase ‘financial globalisation’ which enshrines the idea of a globalized 
financial market on an international scale. 
The current financial globalisation is not only characterised by the use of sophisticated financial 
instruments and their circulation worldwide, but also by the gradual decoupling between 
financial flows and production. We live in an age when the financial sector is becoming 
increasingly detached from the productive sectors, allowing for speculation. This phenomenon 
is at the root of the financial crises that have repeatedly shaken our societies. 
1.2. The problem of ‘aggressive tax planning’ de facto  
In the process of financial globalisation, tax havens play a central role considering their growing 
importance in recent decades, one could argue that they represent a fundamental pillar in 
economic and financial globalisation. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), about half of all the investments made by multinational 
companies originate in tax havens.2 To quote an example that merely hints at the true scale of 
the phenomenon, the Channel Islands (Jersey and Guernsey) have invested more in China than 
have Japan and the USA whilst Mauritius was India’s largest foreign investor.3 As reported by 
ATTAC Switzerland, there are currently more than 700 tax havens around the world 
concentrated in three geographical areas: the Caribbean, Western Europe and South Asia.4 All 
of them are linked to and are highly dependent on the major industrial and banking powers that 
dominate the world’s economy: the USA, Western Europe and Japan Tax havens have grown 
exponentially over the last three decades and have become the core of the world’s financial 
system. 
 
2 See UN World Investment Report [2014]: Chapter 3. Recent policy developments and key issues 
3 See Telegraph Weekly World Edition, “Jersey and Guernsey: Channel Islands look East for new opportunities”  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/expat-money/8043135/Jersey-and-Guernsey-Channel-
Islands-look-East-for-new-opportunities.html (07 October 2010). 
4 See Financial Secrecy Index [2018], e.g. Narrative Report on Switzerland,  
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/Switzerland.pdf  (25 March 2019). 
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Unrevealed examples of aggressive tax planning by some multinationals - e.g. Starbucks, 
Apple, Google, Amazon, Fiat, etc., and the leaked “Panama Papers” have caused huge anger 
and despair of many developed nations and international community.  
By way of illustration, according to the BBC News dated on 06 November 2017, the Paradise 
Papers revealed how Apple sidestepped a 2013 crackdown on its controversial Irish tax 
practices by actively shopping around for a tax haven. It then moved the firm holding most of 
its untaxed offshore cash, now $252 billion, to the Channel Island of Jersey.5 Apple said the 
new structure had not lowered its taxes. It said it remained the world's largest taxpayer, paying 
about $35 billion in corporation tax over the past three years, that it had followed the law and 
its changes “did not reduce our tax payments in any country.” In a further statement he company 
stressed that no operations or investments had been moved from Ireland. The Paradise Papers 
served as a huge leak of financial documents that is throwing light on the world of offshore 
finance.  
The pervasiveness of this economic misconception is testified by the reaction to the Paradise 
Papers scandal – and more generally by how the debate about tax havens is framed, especially 
on the left. Progressives tend to couch the argument about the offshoring of wealth first and 
foremost in terms of its impact on the domestic tax base (the tax or revenue loss) – and therefore 
on the budget balance – of ‘source’ countries. A few years back, for example, Richard Murphy, 
director of Tax Research UK, estimated that tax evasion and tax avoidance together ‘cost’ EU 
Member States around 1 trillion euros a year in lost revenues, equal to around 105 per cent of 
total healthcare spending. 
The implication of such analyses is obvious: if only governments could find a way of tackling 
tax evasion/avoidance and could get their hands on some of that offshore cash, they could afford 
to spend more – on nurses, for example – and bring their fiscal deficits and public debt under 
control. In his report, Murphy even went as far as writing that ‘tax evasion and tax avoidance 
undermine the viability of the economies of Europe and have without doubt helped create the 
debt crisis that threatens the well-being of hundreds of millions of people across Europe for 
years to come’ – thus establishing a causal link between offshoring, the European debt crisis, 
and the related economic and social crisis. 
2. Tax havens: need for the EU’s response to the global problem. 
2.1. What such tax planning practices do actually entail? Whether they are legal under 
currently existing international tax law rule?  
Today, many nations are scrutinizing their national tax legislation with a view to fill the 
remaining loopholes.  
 
5 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41889787 (25 March 2019). 
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According to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Chapter 2 “Fundamental principles of 
taxation”, the right to levy taxes is a necessary attribute of each sovereign state.6 Hence, 
collecting taxes is the competence of each individual EU country.  And it is also for national 
authorities to deal with those who do not pay the taxes they owe. However, tax avoidance and 
evasion are complex problems which extend beyond borders. EU countries need to work closely 
together to tackle these problems at home and abroad. 
European legislation and bilateral tax treaties e.g. the Mutual Assistance Directive for the 
Exchange Information on reportable Cross-Border Arrangements7 and Mutual Assistance 
Directive for the Recovery of Taxes,8 provide for cooperation and information exchange 
between EU countries. To further strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, the 
European Commission presented an action plan in 2012, with over 30 planned actions in this 
area. There are now several EU initiatives in place or under development, such as: 
− a platform for tax good governance to monitor EU countries’ progress in tackling 
aggressive tax planning and in clamping down on tax havens; 
− EU rules whereby each EU country automatically passes to other EU countries information 
it has on the income or financial accounts of individuals resident in those other EU countries; 
− a quick reaction mechanism to combat VAT fraud; 
− rules for assistance between EU countries in recovering claims for taxes, customs duties and 
certain fees as well as taxes on income, capital and insurance premiums; 
− cooperation to combat VAT fraud through the use of information exchange systems to alert 
other EU countries of fraudulent activities.9 
2.2. Tax Havens – ‘sunny places for shady people’? 
Money laundering is a specifically targeted area of the EU Criminal Law because of its obvious 
links with cross-border crime. While the legal regimes that tax havens set up to enable this 
secrecy are complex, their basic outline is simple – banks, companies, trusts, or other financial 
 
6 See, generally OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy, Action 1: 2014 Deliverable, Chapter 2 “Fundamental principles of taxation”, OECD, 2014, pp. 29-49 
7 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements. 
8 Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating 
to taxes, duties and other measures. 
9 See, generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An Action 
Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM (2012) 722 final. 
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actors in the country are allowed to accept money from basically anywhere without reporting it 
to the authorities in the country where it originates or from which it is controlled.  
In some cases, it is actually illegal to disclose that information, but in many places, it is simply 
because the banks or other entities aren’t required to disclose it and there is no mechanism to 
force them to do so. For the less criminally inclined, tax havens often also offer a great legal 
ways to avoid paying taxes, simply by characterizing income as passing through that country 
and using loose tax treaties or loopholes in one’s home country tax law to claim that the income 
is untaxable there.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has adopted so-called 
15 Actions Points to tackle base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) practices (2013).10  
EU has followed the OECD recommendations by adopting the Anti Tax Avoidance Directive 
(ATAD)11 in relation to corporate tax (2016) and the DAC6 Directive in the area of 
administrative cooperation (2018).12 
On 16 May 2013, Google executives were called to the UK Parliament for questioning by the 
public accounts committee about their tax practices. Apparently, Google paid £10 million in 
UK corporate taxes on revenues of £11.9 billion - less than 0.1% - between 2006 and 2011. 
Apple CEO was called in front of the US Senate on 21 May 2013 to face similar questions. 
Amazon and Starbucks were also questioned in the UK Parliament in November 2012. 
According to various estimates from $8 trillion to even $123 trillion could be held offshore by 
various taxpayers worldwide.  
President of the European Commission, called for EU countries to exchange income tax data 
automatically, saying tax evasion and illegal fraud in the EU cost $1.2 trillion a year, "nearly 
double the 2012 combined annual budget deficit of all member states”.13 
Tax should not drive business strategy and should only be considered once a location is 
determined as being suitable.  
The EU Member States do not wish to give up any tax sovereignty, but they do not wish to lose 
any policy race to the bottom from their fellow Member States either, so they sat together to 
agree on a non-binding code of conduct to curb what they see as harmful tax competition by 
their fellow Members. That Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, a political rather than a 
 
10 See, generally 2013 OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
11 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market. 
12 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements. 
13 See Independent Business News: Google paid £36 million in tax on UK revenues of £1 billion, reports show, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/google-tax-36-million-annual-report-corporation-tax-
george-osborne-johnmcdonnell-susan-kramer-a7661221.html   (31 March 2017). 
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legal instrument, was agreed on in December 1997. It distinguishes ‘good’ (fair) and ‘bad’ 
(unfair) fiscal policy competition and is aimed at preventing a policy race to the bottom, the 
‘bottom’ being a situation in which too little tax revenue is raised to keep up decent public 
service, infrastructure and social security, to the unjustified benefit of internationally mobile 
capital. The Commission (Commissioner Monti) called this effect of excessive harmful tax 
competition ‘fiscal degradation’. The Code in principle targets non-selective incentives for 
especially mobile foreign investors not reflecting the true balance of taxes and public service. 
National governments are broadly free to design their tax laws according to their national 
priorities. However, in doing so, they must respect certain fundamental principles, such as 
non-discrimination and respect for free movement in the internal market.  
The EU supplements this with cooperation procedures and a legal framework to ensure the 
fair and efficient taxation of cross-border activities in the EU.  
3. Should tax havens be closed down?  
To this respect, I would like to provide some reasons for tackling tax evasion/avoidance and 
closing down tax havens, and for collecting more taxes in general. However, these have little 
to do with the financing of public expenditure (with the possible exception of the Eurozone).14 
They largely have to do with social justice, inequality and the distribution of political power. It 
is a well-established fact that today’s soaring levels of inequality – which have returned to levels 
of over a century ago – represent a grave economic and social problem.  
As acknowledged even by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), inequality hampers growth 
(“when the rich get richer, benefits do not trickle down”, one IMF study notes, consigning 
decades of trickle-down propaganda to the dustbin of history), exacerbates financial instability, 
erodes social cohesion, and leads to political polarization. Even more importantly, various 
studies show that extreme inequality represents a threat to democracy itself. Allowing a small 
minority to amass obscene amounts of wealth leads them to wield disproportionate influence 
and power, and allows them to capture the legislative process and push through laws that further 
cement their power and influence. As Branko Milanovic writes, the “higher the inequality, the 
more likely we are to move away from democracy toward plutocracy.” It is important to admit 
the importance and often the effectiveness of huge expenditure in many political campaigns 
today, despite national legislation which attempts to prevent it. The current scenario of outright 
impunity in tax matters requires a thorough response from political actors. However, merely 
scratching the surface will not do It cannot focus only on one or a few cases involving well-
known multinational companies that received significant media coverage. Such cases are 
 
14 M. Jarociński & B. Maćkowiak: Monetary-fiscal interactions and the euro area’s malaise, European Central 
Bank Working Paper Series No. 2072, June 2017, pp. 1-46. 
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important because they attract public attention and force governments to act. Nevertheless, they 
are not isolated cases.  
Tax fraud and tax evasion are widespread, benefiting from a legal and political ecosystem that 
has been set up laboriously over decades by key governments in the western world, along with 
the backdrop of the liberalisation and financialisation of economies.  
Hence, fighting tax fraud and tax evasion means fighting such a system and proposing 
alternative measures based on greater public control over the financial system and capital flows. 
Tax havens and offshoring, by facilitating the concentration of wealth, exacerbate the problem 
of inequality. For this reason, they should be shut down. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Arrest Warrant is one of the most important instruments of judicial co-operation 
in criminal matters among the member states of the European Union. Since I did not know 
much about the European Arrest War, except what I heard from the media, I decided to write 
and research about it. The more I read about the European Arrest Warrant, I realized how much 
the problems of the European arrest warrant itself were complicated, and how far a complicated 
path to the adoption of the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant, and how much 
and what problems the implementation of the Framework Decision had to implement. Through 
this seminar I went into the issue of the adoption of an instrument to facilitate the extradition 
of the perpetrators or suspects to serious criminal offenses to EU member states. In addition, I 
have explored a historical review of the progress made by the judicial cooperation between the 
member states of the European Coal and Steel Community, as it is today, by which the Member 
States have been instrumental in judicial co-operation in criminal matters. I also presented the 
difference between the traditional extradition and the European arrest warrant, and the paper 
also outlines the principles underlying the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant 
and some of the Member States' concerns about the implementation of the European Arrest 
Warrant mostly because of the constitutional constraints around extradition of their own 
nationals. I have also studied the positive and negative side of the European Arrest Warrant and 
whether it actually fulfilled the purpose for which it was made. At the end of the work I have 
analyzed the statistical data related to the issuance and issuance of the European Arrest Warrant 
and analyzed two known cases related to the European Arrest Warrant. 
2. Extradition and the historical development of European countries' 
cooperation 
Extradition means the surrender of someone from the government of one state to the 
government of another state for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the sentence. Given 
the complicated nature of the extradition, especially because one country leaves part of its 
sovereignty over the criminal proceedings of another state, the extradition is subject to 
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numerous restrictions. Some restrictions have already been set in the constitution itself, such as 
the Croatian Constitution, which until 2010 revoked the extradition or expulsion of its own 
nationals. Extradition represents the oldest co-operation between states in criminal matters, and 
the concept of extradition has emerged in ancient societies. In the antiquity and medieval times, 
extradition was primarily for the surrender of persons for religious and political delictions, 
whereas in today's society extradition for political delinquency is explicitly prohibited by 
constitutions and international conventions. The purpose of extradition is to combat criminal 
offenses that violate the peace and security of the society as a whole.1 One of the main sources 
of extradition rights is the European Convention on Extradition of 1957, together with its 
additional Protocols, and among other important sources of the right of co-operation between 
European States in criminal matters are the Schengen Agreement of 1985, the Schengen 
Convention of 1990 and the Final Framework Council Decision 2002 on European Arrest 
Warrants and Surrender Procedures Between Member States. The idea of a united Europe was 
first proclaimed on May 9, 1950. through a proposal on combined coal and steel production of 
Germany and France into one organization that could be accessed by other European countries 
as well. The Treaty signed in Paris in 1951 created the European Coal and Steel Community. 
With the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community, all the way to the European 
Union as it is today, there is an awareness of the need for mutual cooperation in criminal matters 
between the countries of Europe. The next step towards the unification of European states is 
the 1957 Treaty signed in Rome, Community, and came into force in 1958. Further, the 1990 
Treaty of Europe signed in 1992 in Maastricht entered into force. The Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the Treaty on European Union are the founding treaties of the 
European Union and constitute its legal basis. Beginning of co-operation between Western 
European countries in criminal matters dates back to 1975 when a European Council meeting 
was held on which a forum for the fight against crime was established by the ministers of justice 
and home affairs of member states. The next step was the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 
1990 Schengen Convention, which "represent state efforts to deepen operational cooperation in 
the field of combating crime".2 The first document that systematically edited this matter was 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which established the structure of three pillars, the second and 
third ones being added to the already existing first pillar of the European Community, and for 
this work is the third pillar in which the police and Member States' judicial co-operation with 
the remark that the third pillar was not over-national because of the opposition of the member 
states to the idea of transferring part of their sovereignty over justice and home affairs, meaning 
that the right does not apply by the EU itself but that the member states have themselves in their 
legal system implement the decisions made. The Maastricht Treaty envisaged three possible 
instruments of legal influence on member states: common positions, joint actions and 
conventions.3 The adopted legal acts did not have binding force and therefore were not efficient 
 
1 I. Turudić & B. Pavelin & T. Borzić & I. Bujas, European arrest warrant with examples from case law, Novi 
Informator, Zagreb, 2014, p.15 
2 I. Vuletić, Pravo EU u kaznenom i kaznenom procesnom pravu, in: B. Ljubanović & T. Petrašević & P. Poretti 
& I. Vuletić – M. Župan, Procesnopravni aspekti prava EU, Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera Osijek, 2016, 
p. 68 
3 Vuletić, ibid. 
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enough. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, the third pillar becomes 
exclusively criminal and has been fully transferred to police and judicial cooperation. The 
European Union is defined as a space of freedom, security and justice.4 In addition, the 
Amsterdam Treaty introduces a Framework Decision that has had similar effect as a directive 
because the state could impose an obligation to harmonize certain provisions of national 
legislation, with the significant difference that the framework decision could not produce direct 
effect on national legislation. Furthermore, following a recent attempt to introduce the 2004 
Constitution of the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon, which abolished the structure of 
Stage 3, was signed in 2007, introducing a single legal system and transferring the provisions 
on police and judicial cooperation to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The 
Treaty of Lisbon established a supranational jurisdiction of the European Union law in criminal 
matters and the obligation to interpret domestic law in accordance with the law of the European 
Union was the responsibility of national or national courts. 
2.1. Extradition in Europe before the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant 
The extradition procedure before the adoption of the Framework Decision on a European Arrest 
Warrant was governed by the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 issued by the 
Council of Europe. The extradition was a sovereign act, the proceeding was of an administrative 
nature and was conducted through the competent ministries, most often the foreign ministry. 5 
Thus, the final decision on extradition was made by an executive and not by the judiciary, even 
in the state in which the judicial authority had decided to extradite a final decision, the 
competent minister would have made on the basis of a discretionary assessment, and extradition 
was more political than legal. With numerous barriers to extradition, such as prohibition of 
extradition for political offenses, prohibition of extradition of their own nationals and the 
principle of double punishment, the procedure was complicated and lengthy. As the European 
Community, and later the European Union, changed with the gradual abolition of the border 
between Member States by introducing the Schengen Zone, member states began to realize the 
need for more effective co-operation in extradition. Since a common space with the free 
movement of persons was created, border controls were abolished, which hampered the cross-
border escape of perpetrators, and there was no supranational body for criminal prosecution, 
thereby facilitating and facilitating the perpetration of perpetrators while not permitting the 
border crossing to the police, judicial and judicial bodies. In order to prevent a certain 
weakening of the efficiency of criminal prosecution, it is necessary to strengthen the police and 
judicial cooperation of the Member States and find new ways to overcome the difficulties that 
existed in the traditional extradition procedure. After the abolition of the border, the Second 
Schengen Agreement gave two new extradition conventions between member states, which 
sought to address the shortcomings of the traditional extradition procedure but unsuccessfully 
because the conventions showed "a contentious and formally inappropriate legal instrument for 
 
4 Turudić & Pavelin & Borzić & Bujas, ibid, p. 18. 
5 Z. Đurđević, Europski sud pravde i legitimitet Europskog Uhidbenog Naloga. Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo 
i praksu, vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 1021-1028.  
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achieving their goal".6 The two main problems of these conventions are that they did not have 
binding force until all the member states ratified it, and because of the delayed ratification, none 
of the conventions has survived to this day, the second problem was that conventions contained 
reserves for political offenses and for extradition own nationals and what the Member States 
used. It has become clear that a new way of overcoming the difficulties of cooperation between 
Member States needs to be found. 
3. Council Framework Decision on European Arrest Warrant 
As stated earlier, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a framework decision as a new legal 
instrument of the European Union, the implementation of which did not require ratification but 
implementation in national legislation. At a meeting of the European Council in Tmapere in 
1999 the solution to the extradition problem was found in the principle of mutual recognition 
of court decisions and also in the framework decision as an implementing instrument. The 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, replacing existing international treaties 
on extradition, greatly facilitated the extradition procedure, which was adopted in 2002, and 
has begun to apply in 2004. Extradition entities are no longer a member state, but their courts 
based on mutual trust the legal systems acknowledge the decisions on the arrest warrants of the 
courts of other Member States, the Framework Decision repeals the principle of double 
criminality for the more serious criminal offenses listed in the Framework Decision. The ban 
on the extradition of its own nationals and the ban on extradition for fiscal and political offenses 
was also lifted. Such a new teaching process became depoliticized, and with the exclusion of 
many reservations and foundations, it became more efficient and faster.7 
3.1. Validity of the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant before the European 
Court of Justice 
The Member States implemented the Framework Decision by April 2005 and due to the 
complications of the extradition issue and the large newspaper that came with the European 
arrest warrant, the courts of the Member States made various decisions. Some of the 
Constitutional Courts of the Member States have declared implementation laws 
unconstitutional and abolished them.8 First of all, because of the constitutional ban on the 
extradition of their own nationals, ie the constitutional right of non-extradition of a member 
state, they have changed their own constitutions. Given that the national constitutional courts 
are not competent to evaluate the validity of the legal acts of the European Union, only the 
European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to assess validity and to give an interpretation of the 
framework decisions. The Belgian Constitutional Court sought assessment of the validity of the 
European Court of Justice in its review of the constitutionality of Belgian implementing 
 
6 Đurđević, ibid, p. 1023. 
7 Đurđević, ibid, p. 1024. 
8 The German Federal Constitutional Court declared it unconstitutional and abolished because of the provision for 
the extradition of its own nationals. The Polish Constitutional Court also proclaimed a national implementing law 
to be contrary to Poland’s constitution. 
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legislation. The European Court made its decision legitimized by a framework decision and 
confirmed that the use of the European Arrest Warrant as an instrument of criminal co-operation 
between the Member States is consistent with the fundamental principles of the European Union 
legal order.9  
4. Schengen Information System (SIS) 
The Schengen information system is an information system that greatly facilitates and facilitates 
the co-ordination of co-operation between the competent authorities of the Member States of 
the European Union. The system provides information on the requested persons for which 
European arrest warrants, missing persons and those who need to be found for judicial purposes, 
such as witnesses, convicts, and the like. In addition, the Schengen Information System also 
includes information on the things that are alienated and the data for checking suspected persons 
involved in criminal activities. The Schengen Information System allows access to alerts and 
information to the bodies responsible for border control, the bodies responsible for police and 
customs control, national judicial bodies, bodies responsible for issuing visas and residence 
permits, vehicle registration authorities. 
4.1. European Arrest Warrant 
The European Arrest Warrant was adopted to replace the traditional extradition system between 
the European Union countries, mainly for the purpose of accelerating and simplifying the 
commission of perpetrators, facilitating the prosecution, and executing prison sentences or other 
security measures. The term extradition was replaced by an expression of surrender. The 
European Arrest Warrant is a warrant issued by a judicial body of a member state of the 
European Union for the purpose of arresting and surrenders of persons arrested in other Member 
States, and the purpose of the warrant is the prosecution or execution of a prison sentence or 
other measure involving the confiscation of liberty. The European Arrest Warrant is considered 
to be fundamental in establishing judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member 
States of the European Union. The same judicial cooperation is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition as the European Court has stated in its decision C-388/08 PPU, where in point 51 
clarifies the principle of mutual recognition, based on the Framework Decision, also means, in 
accordance with Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Framework Decision that Member States are, as 
a rule, required to act on a European Arrest Warrant, that State must or may refuse the warrant 
only in the cases referred to in Articles 3 and 410. Obligatory reasons for non-execution of the 
European Arrest Warrant are: „1. if the criminal offense for which the arrest warrant has been 
issued is subject to amnesty in a Member State of execution, and that State is responsible for 
prosecuting a criminal offense in accordance with its criminal law; 2. if the judicial authority 
of execution is informed that the requested person is legally convicted in one of the Member 
States for the same offenses, provided that in the case of pronouncing the sentence, that sentence 
 
9 Đurđević, ibid, p. 1026. 
10 Turudić & Pavelin & Borzić & Bujas, ibid, p. 18. 
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has been or is currently being served or the judgment can no longer be enforced the law of the 
Member State in which the judgment was pronounced; 3. if a person against whom a European 
arrest warrant has been issued can no longer be punished for the criminal offenses underlying 
the arrest warrant for his age, in accordance with the law of the Member State of execution.“11 
Apart from three cases of compulsory non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant, Article 4 
of the Framework Decision also lists cases of optional failure to execute a European Arrest 
Warrant, which are: 1. already existing criminal prosecution in the Member States and the 
warrant was issued for the same criminal offense for which prosecute a Member State; 2. The 
judicial authorities of the Member State in which the citizen of the European Arrest Warrant is 
detained have suspended the persecution or there is already a final court judgment on the same 
criminal offenses as stated in the warrant; 3. the statute of limitation of the criminal prosecution 
or the execution of the punishment has occurred; 4. the requested person has already been 
legally convicted of the same criminal offenses in the third country; 5. if the European Arrest 
Warrant is issued for execution of a prison sentence or forfeiture of liberty, and the requested 
person is in the executing State or is a national of that Member State, and that Member State is 
obliged to execute the sentence in accordance with its legal order; 6. if the European Arrest 
Warrant relates to criminal offenses which are: in accordance with the law of the Member State 
of execution, in whole or in part committed in the territory of a Member State of enforcement 
or at a place deemed to be such; or committed outside the state territory of a Member State of 
the issuing officer of the arrest warrant, and the law of the executing Member State does not 
allow prosecution for the same offenses if committed outside its State territory; 7. if, in one of 
the cases referred to in Article 2, paragraph 4,12, the offense for which a European Arrest 
Warrant has been issued does not constitute a criminal offense in accordance with the law of 
the Member State of execution; however, the execution of a European Arrest Warrant can not 
be refused on the basis of the fact that the law of the Member State of enforcement does not 
prescribe the same type of tax or duty or does not contain the same kind of rules as regards the 
grant, taxes and duties and currency exchange regulations as the law of the Member State in 
which the arrest warrant has been issued.13  
4.2. Characteristics of the European Arrest Warrant 
As has been said in this paper, the extradition was in the sphere of politics or state executive 
power, while the European Arrest Warrant, a court order and is attempted to "eliminate the 
possible political influence of the surrender in such a way that the warrant can be issued only 
by the court. ''14 Judicial decisions are enforced on the basis of mutual recognition while the 
 
11 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States. OJ 2002 L 190/1. 
12 For criminal offenses not covered by paragraph 2, the requested person may be committed provided that the 
offenses for which a European arrest warrant has been issued constitute a criminal offense in accordance with the 
law of the Member State of execution, regardless of the elements or description of the criminal offense. Paragraph 
2 lists criminal offenses covered by the European Arrest Warrant. 
13 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, Art. 4. 
14 A. Blagojević & Cs. Herke & Á. Mohay, Pravne karakteristike Europskog uhidbenog naloga, njegova 
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role of the state authorities is reduced to practical and administrative assistance in the execution 
of the European Arrest Warrant. Further, the European Arrest Warrant and the Framework 
Decision partially eliminated the duplicate (double) punishability requirement by listing 32 
serious offenses that are sufficient to be punishable in the country issuing the European Arrest 
Warrant and do not require duplicate punishment. Apart from the partial abolition of the double 
punishability, the ban on the surrender of its own nationals was also illegally abolished. 
According to the traditional extradition, the states are generally defending the extradition of 
their own nationals, whereas according to the European Arrest Warrant their own nationals of 
the EU Member States may be surrendered to the other Member State in the same way as those 
who do not have the nationality of the State in which they are detained. And finally the 
difference is also in the speed of the procedure "unlike the traditional system, where the average 
extradition period was nine months, the European Arrest Warrant has an average of 43 days ... 
and if the attendant person agreed to surrender, the process is even faster , and the average time 
is 13 days. ''15 It is evident that with such changes, the European Arrest Warrant, or the 
Framework Decision, significantly increased the efficiency and speed of the surrender of 
persons found in other countries, and greatly reduced the complexity of traditional extradition. 
4.2.1. Negative side of the European Arrest Warrant 
Despite the fact that the European Arrest Warrant greatly simplified and expedited the process 
of handing over persons suspected or convicted of a criminal offense between the EU Member 
States, the European Arrest Warrant fails. Given that the European Arrest Warrant has been 
accepted primarily for the purpose of combating serious and organized criminal offenses, the 
problem is an insignificant ie easy criminal offense for which a European Arrest Warrant has 
been issued. For this reason, the European Commission has stressed the need to carry out a 
proportionality test before issuing a warrant, in its European arrest warrant. The Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant does not include a proportionality test, and the 
European Commission has issued a recommendation to avoid issuing a warrant "where a person 
is expected to be released after a first trial or for a serious criminal offense ... or if the requested 
person remains to endure less than 4 months in prison. ''16 It is recommended to assess whether 
the costs of the proceedings, arrests and resignation of the requested person are proportionate 
to the offense, the amount of the expected punishment and whether it is possible to achieve a 
mild measure such as a fine. There are different forms in which irreverence may occur. Like 
the disproportion between the severity of the offense and the punishment imposed in the various 
Member States, a deed in one Member State in another can be characterized as a criminal 
offense again depending on the legal systems. The professional literature cites an example of a 
violation of the principle of proportionality, the issuance of orders for the theft of a mobile 
device, stating that the criminal offense of theft in all Member States corresponds to the 
 
implementacija u Mañarskoj i njegova buduća implementacija u Hrvatskoj, in: Pravni aspekti prekogranične 
suradnje i EU integracija : Mađarska – Hrvatska, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku, 
Pečuh – Osijek 2011, p. 58. 
15 Blagojević & Herke & Mohay, ibid, p. 59. 
16 Turudić & Pavelin & Borzić & Bujas, ibid, p. 37. 
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conditions set out in the Framework Decision. An example shows that proportionality can only 
be assessed with regard to the specific case. Furthermore, it is possible that the issuance of a 
warrant is justified but the measure shows a precaution in relation to the individual and the life 
circumstances of the person who violated the European Convention on Protection of Human 
Rights and Freedoms.17 In addition to the lack of rationality, there is also a problem that there 
are no other ways of conducting criminal proceedings without the presence of the requested 
person, which poses a risk of non-punishment of perpetrators, as well as the lack of grounds for 
refusing to execute the issued orders because the Framework Decision does not prescribes 
proportionality as a reason for rejecting a lecture. 
5. Statistics on issuing and executing a European Arrest Warrant 
According to the data collected from 2005 to 2015, 133977 European Arrest Warrants were 
issued in total during that period, with 34193.18 Observed by the years 2005 to 2009, the number 
of European arrest warrants issued has exponentially increased, which may indicate that the 
state has increasingly begun to apply and accept the European arrest warrant, but also to 
increase mutual trust and cooperation in criminal things. From 2010 to 2011, the number of 
orders issued was down but it should be noted that in these two years the statistical data on the 
number of issued arrest warrants have not been issued by eight member states and the data are 
therefore incomplete, since 2012 the number has again started to grow. According to the reasons 
for the issuance as set out in the European Union questionnaire addressed to Member States 
regarding the issuance and execution of the European Arrest Warrant for 2015. The total 
number of orders issued in 2015 was 16144, of which the majority of the issued warrants were 
issued for the criminal prosecution of the perpetrator while the issuance of the punishment was 
already reduced to a lesser extent with the exception of Romania, France and Poland.19 
According to the category of criminal offense for which a European arrest warrant was issued, 
18 Member States responded to this question in the questionnaire, and according to these data 
it is apparent that the European Arrest Warrant was most often published for the criminal 
offense of theft and damage (2983 European Arrest Warrants) , due to fraud and corruption 
(1875 EUN), and the third most common reason for issuance was due to drug offenses (1137 
EUN). According to the number of arrests and surrenders of suspects according to which the 
European Arrest Warrant was issued, in total 10388 persons were arrested in 2015 and 6518 
were handed over to the state issuing the European Arrest Warrant. Out of the total number of 
submissions, 49% agreed to surrender.20 Looking at the length of the procedure, 25 Member 
States responded to the question in the questionnaire, and the average time of the procedure for 
the persons who agreed to submit was 14 days, which exceeded the deadline of 10 days, while 
for persons who objected to the referral procedure on average it lasted for 56 days21 , which is 
 
17 Ibid, p. 38. 
18 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-hr.do (18 February 2019) 
19 Comission Staff Working Document : Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical 
operation of the European arrest warrant – Year 2015, SWD(2017) 320 final, page 4. 
20 Ibid, p. 5. 
21 Ibid. 
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within the deadline for enforcement of 60 days under the Framework Decision. Observed 
according to the number of rejected European arrest warrants for the surrender of persons to 
statistics, the execution was rejected in 712 cases (a response to this question was given by the 
26 Member States), which is roughly 8% of the issued warrants issued in 2015.22  
6. Issuance and application in practice 
In order to facilitate issuance and related to this, and to reduce translation costs, the Framework 
Decision also provided a unique form of the European Arrest Warrant which needs to be 
carefully filled out prior to issuance. In addition, one of the conditions for issuance is that 
„judicial authorities issuing a custody warrant must always ensure that there is a national 
executing court order“ before the issuing of a European arrest warrant23, scope of application: 
criminal prosecution or execution of a prison sentence, that there is proportionality, that the 
offense for which it falls falls under one of the 32 listed in the Framework Decision and that 
the work is described in detail so that the judicial body of the issuing Member State has 
sufficient information. One example of where the court, the state where the suspect was found 
to have been ordered, rejected the European Arrest Warrant because of insufficient information 
in the case is Frederick Toben's case, which will be analyzed in the next section. 
6.1. Case of Gerald Fredrick Against SR Germany 
Gerald Frederick Töben was arrested on October 1, 2008. in London on the basis of the 
European Arrest Warrant issued by the Federal Republic of Germany. The European Arrest 
Warrant was issued for suspicion of committing a criminal offense of anti-Semitism, which was 
promoted by Töben on its web site.24 According to the order, it was alleged that during the 
period from 2000 to 2004 Toben denied the Holocaust on its own website and reduced the 
number of Jewish victims who had been killed during World War II and doubted him for the 
reign of Nazi crimes. In the order form, the court of the Federal Republic of Germany stated: 
racism, xenophobia and cybercrime. The problem with the warrant was that it was not stated 
where a criminal offense was correctly committed and it should be noted that anti-Semitism 
was not a criminal offense against commonlaw but could be judged for racism, the court 
assessed whether the offense was committed in Great Britain, whether it was committed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and whether it could, for that reason, extradite Töbena SR to 
Germany as required for the European Arrest Warrant. Given that the court found that there 
was insufficient information in the EUN, he did not agree to extradite Töben because the 
perpetration of the offense was "the worldwide internet", which the court considered to be 
insufficiently precise with the objection that the exact name of the page on which the disputed 
material and also extradited by Töben to the fact that it would be a direct violation of freedom 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 European Commission, Handbook on how to issue and execute a European Arrest Warrant, OJ 2017 C 335/1, 
p. 16. 
24 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/joshuarozenberg/3132331/Man-accused-of-denying-
the-Holocaust-may-escape-extradition-from-Britain.html (18 February 2019) 
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of speech and thought since anti-Semitism is not a criminal offense in the UK and is in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.25 At the end of all, SR Germany withdrew the European Arrest 
Warrant following advice from the English side. 
6.2. The case of Julian Assange against Sweden 
Julian Assange is an Australian citizen who currently resides in the London Embassy in 
London, which has given him political asylum. His case started in 2010 when a criminal report 
was issued against him for rape and sexual abuse. In November 2010, Sweden issued a 
European arrest warrant for the capture and surrender of Julian Assange in order to prosecute 
him. At that time Assange resided in the UK, London. Assange has lodged an appeal against 
the issued European Arrest Warrant which was dismissed by the High Court of England and 
Wales.26 According to the order Assange is suspected of: 1. Illegal coercion; 2. Sexual assault 
from 13 to 14 August 2010; 3. Sexual assault on August 18, 2010; 4. Loss on 17 August 2010 
Assange lodged an appeal for all four reasons, stating that the European Arrest Warrant was not 
issued by the Swedish court, that the said criminal offenses are not subject to the double 
punishment of the State in which the crime was committed and the state in which he was 
detained; he complained that the principle of proportionality was violated and that he was not 
"accused" under Swedish law. The High Court dismissed all of the appellative grounds given 
by Assange.27 Since Assange was unavailable to British authorities since 2012 as a political 
asylum in London's Ecuadorian Embassy, Sweden decided in 2017 to withdraw the European 
Arrest Warrant and does not demand extradition from the UK. But Assange is still in the 
Embassy of the United States because the United Kingdom authorities are suspected of 
violating the suspicion.28  
7. Conclusion 
By analyzing the effects of the European Arrest Warrant, I consider that the European arrest 
warrant fulfilled its purpose, extradition or surrender is significantly more efficient, less 
complicated and much faster than the traditional extradition procedure. I also believe that the 
European Arrest Warrant is indeed one of the most important instruments of judicial and 
criminal co-operation between the Member States and that the principles on which the European 
Union is based are not a dead letter on paper but that the Member States really adhere to them, 
such as the principle of mutual recognition judicial decisions. From the positive side of the 
European arrest warrant, I would like to state the partial abolition of the ban on the extradition 
 
25 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/JCHR_EXT_Written_Evidence_11.pdf 
(18 February 2019) 
26 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130310021505/http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgmen
ts/assange-summary.pdf (18 February 2019) 
27 Ibid. 
28 https://abcnews.go.com/International/wikileaks-julian-assange-evicted-ecuador-embassy-providing-
asylum/story?id=56808551 (18 February 2019) 
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of own nationals, because I believe that this was one of the main obstacles to international 
criminal co-operation, with the drastic increase in the procedure, saying that the European arrest 
warrant really serves its purpose . I would add that moving the extradition from the executive 
branch, from the sphere of politics to the hands of the judiciary, is the main reason why the 
process is significantly accelerated. From the negative characteristics of my opinion, I should 
introduce a proportionality test not listed in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant. This is also a problem when the warrant is issued for the offense and what is actually 
contrary to the very purpose for which the Framework Decision was made, namely to punish 
and find offenders of more serious offenses, which, of course, are not covered by the offense. 
The statistical data analyzed can see the usefulness of the European Arrest Warrant as it would 
take so many years of action for years that the EUN Framework Decision had not been reached 
and that it was achieved to execute the warrant within a short period of two months. Although 
there is still negation of the state, especially in terms of double punishment, I believe that the 
European Arrest Warrant is one of the most useful decisions of the European Union and that it 
is of utmost importance for judicial cooperation between the EU Member States. 
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1. Introduction 
In our paper we are covering the topics of terrorism and organized crime. On the topic of 
terrorism there are many questions, first of all the definition of the term. Because it cannot be 
clear and obvious what terrorism means in general, especially what kind of offences can be 
evaluated as terrorist attacks. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon (it dates back to the first 
century), but it is not a constant thing. It is changing, evolving so we must be prepared to counter 
it and its effects. On the topic of organised crime there are similar problems with the definition. 
The definition of organised crime is a widely debated term however the theme of organized 
crime is not new as it appeared a long time ago in the USA. There is still no generic definition 
because many countries worldwide have refused to agree on it. This is mainly because 
organized crime differs state to state based on the geographic, social and economic factors of 
the countries however there are specific characteristics of organized activities. Numerous 
organised crime groups are active in the EU and worldwide, often with cross - border reach and 
multi - ethnic composition. However, in order to prevent and combat these crimes efficiently it 
is necessary to understand their model, structure, ideology and activities. If we look at the two 
phenomena at the same time we need to examine a few features: the goal, structure, income, 
and the victims of crimes. We also need to talk about terrorism in the EU, and in the Middle 
East, as they show significant differences. The main question that arises is whether we should 
come up with a common legal framework to combat these phenomena. The growing threat of 
these two phenomena and their obvious relation requires a common framework for fighting 
them. It would give us a better chance at monitoring the network and identifies the members 
and groups. 
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2. Defining terrorism 
There are many concepts, what we understand under terrorism, and what kind of offences we 
call terrorist attacks. In Bruce Hoffmann’s phrasing: „[…] the word terrorism is politically and 
emotionally charged, and this greatly compounds the difficulty of arriving at an exact 
meaning.”1 It has more than a hundred academic definitions, and these typically concentrate the 
criminological side of the concept. Nicholas Perry described it as „the search for the Holy 
Grail”.2 The definitions have different aspects and representations, but it’s an unquestioned 
fact, that terrorism is a crime. That’s why the nations and the international factors – such as the 
European Union – individually or collectively have to fight against this type of crime. It follows, 
that we must have a standard term for this offence, what is causing a big threat against the 
nations and the organisations. 
The Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations reaffirmed that terrorism is a 
criminal act, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”3 This very 
circumstantial wording gave a good base for the further declaration of terrorism. Although the 
Resolutions of Security Council are binding for the member states of United Nations, this 
definition was non-binding for them. 
As the time flew it was necessary to make general definition for terrorism in an EU level, 
because of a couple of reasons. One of these was to differentiate the terrorism from other 
political violence, because it is not really obvious to separate offences from each other. Another 
one was the harmonisation, because of the same understanding between the nations. The 
member states had already had their own definitions for the term, but those were not similar 
enough, moreover the general definition make it easier to interpret the criminal offences as a 
terrorist crime. In 2002 the Council released a frame resolution, which included a description 
of the terrorist offences. It banded the states to criminalise the offences, which attacks upon a 
persons’ life or attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, etc.4 At that time it was a suitable 
definition for the states to criminalise these offences and understand the character of this crime. 
The Council of the European Union developed a strategy, named the EU Counter-terrorism 
Strategy. It is based on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, respond. The first one had more 
 
1 B. Hoffmann: Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, 2006. 34. p. 
2 N. J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails. Journal of 
Legislation Vol. 30:2. 2004. p. 249 quoted by A. Greene: Defining terrorism: one size fits all? International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 66, No. 2, 2017, p. 411. 
3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)  
4 Council Framework 2002/475 on combating terrorism (2002) OJ L 164 
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key priorities, one of them was to develop a common approach. Besides this the strategy did 
not declared a general definition for terrorist offences. 5 
In 2017 the European Parliament and the Council modified the definition of terrorism and 
incorporated it in a directive, because of the raising chance for violence and the terrorist attacks 
against European cities (for example: London, Madrid, Manchester). The Art. 3 describes the 
offences, which must be criminalised as a terrorist crime: 
“[…] offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage 
a country or an international organisation, are defined as terrorist offences where committed 
with one of the aims listed in paragraph 2: (a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause 
death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage-taking; (d) 
causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the 
continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in 
major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of explosives or weapons, 
including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, as well as research into, and 
development of, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; (g) release of dangerous 
substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions, the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural 
resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) illegal system interference, as 
referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(1) in cases where Article 9(3) or point (b) or (c) of Article 9(4) of that Directive applies, and 
illegal data interference, as referred to in Article 5 of that Directive in cases where point (c) of 
Article 9(4) of that Directive applies; (j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points 
(a) to (i). 2. The aims referred to in paragraph 1 are: (a) seriously intimidating a population; (b) 
unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act; (c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.”6 
3. A brief history of terrorism, and the most intense elements 
The brief history of terrorism demonstrates some of the distinctive features of terrorism as it 
appeared in various chronological times. Such reference is relevant as it demonstrates that 
terrorism is a unique criminal activity that should be differentiated from any other form of 
crime. The first appearance of terrorism can be traced back to the political movements the 
Sicarii and the Zealots.7 The two group were fighting against the occupying roman forces. Their 
 
5The EU Counter-terrorism Strategy. Council of the EU, 2005 
6 Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism (2017) OJ L 88/6 
7 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120511140810/http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID
=1502 (20 March 2019) 
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instruments of causing terror were the assassinations against the romans and the peoples that 
were collaborating with them. An another appearance of terrorism in this era was the order of 
Hashshasins (or Assassins) in the eleventh century. The Hashshasins were an offshoot of the 
Isma’ili sect of Shia Muslims, a group that opposed the Fatimid rule. The members of the order 
carried out assassinations against political and military leaders (it is important to note that in 
certain definitions of terrorism the act of political assassination is not considered as a terrorist 
activity). 
The second era in the history of terrorism starts in the eighteenth century. The term „regime de 
la terreur” (which later became the English word “terrorism”) appears at the time of the French 
revolution (1793 – 1794). The goal of the “regime de la terreur” was the consolidation of the 
newly - installed revolutionary government. Although initially it was a positive term (the French 
revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre proclaimed that: “Terror is nothing other than 
justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a 
special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our 
country's most urgent needs.”), in the next years terrorism became a negative word because of 
the public executions and the continuous imprisonments. 
David Rapoport divides the history of terrorism to four „waves” which are the following:8 
• The „Anarchist Wave”, which started in the 1880s and continued nearly 40 years (the 
Russian populist group „Narodnaya Volya” came to life in this wave.9 
• The „Anti – Colonial Wave” started in the 1920s and ended in 1960.  
• The „New Left Wave” started in 1960 and lasted nearly the 1990s (certain terrorist 
group in this wave is still active nowadays for example in Srí Lanka). 
• The last wave is the „Religious Wave” which started in 1979 and it is still active. 
Religion is the most determinative aspect of the Religious Wave. In this wave terrorism became 
a global phenomenon (opposed to the preceding waves), its core elements changed, and the 
numbers of terrorist attacks increased. 
With the new wave of terrorism, the elements of the phenomenon are changed. One group of 
the changes is the methods of committing the act of terrorism, the targets, and the weapons used 
in the act. Causing the most damage became an important aspect, for which the use of weapons 
 
8 D. C. Rapoport, „The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11”, Anthropoetics no. 1 (Spring / Summer 
2002), https://wrldrels.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Terror.pdf   (20 March 2019) 
9 D. Rapoport, The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism. Current history (New York, 2001). 
pp. 419-424. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287623980_The_Fourth_Wave_September_11_in_the_History_of_Ter
rorism (20 March 2019) 
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of mass destructions became the primary method. In the choosing of targets instead of political 
targets, indiscriminate attacks became the trend. There is no distinction between the military 
and civilian targets. 
Another important change in the topic is the using of new technologies and the globalisation of 
terrorism. In the field of the new technologies the use of devices and applications to send 
anonymous text is one of the important aspects.10 New technologies are emerging, and the 
globalisation of terrorism also means an important change. Among the new technologies the 
most problematic ones are the mobile applications that provide anonymous ways of 
communication. This proves to be troublesome when identifying potential terrorists. Unlike 
until recent time nowadays we can see terrorism gain international characteristics. Both terrorist 
attack and the organisations can be found in more and more countries around the world. Even 
the aims of terrorist organisations reach through the borders of states. 
4. Definition of organised crime 
The theme of organised crime is not new as it appeared a long time ago in the US during the 
prohibition period in relation to corruption of local police/mayors by groups of people 
producing alcohol illegally. Later on, the Italian mafia got involved and the organised crime 
groups began to distinguish by the name of the diaspora they belonged to. Talking about 
international organised crime, it appeared as soon as trans-border activities were involved in 
either the traffic of products like drugs or arms or in the recycling of money. By the late 
seventies, drug trafficking including mostly cocaine trafficking become more common, 
especially in the Latin America, and the terminology has moved from international to 
transnational organised crime or trans-border crime.11 
During the eighties the EU MSs have considered using the common term of Transnational 
Organised Crime (TOC) instead of drug trafficking, arms trafficking, financial crime/corruption 
under the influence of the US.12 
However, there is still no generic definition as many countries worldwide have refused to agree 
on it. Analysis shows that there are quite a lot of definitions of organised crime and that there 
are several common features in those definitions (by scholars such as Albanese, 2016; 
Finckenauer, 2005; Hagan, 1983; Maltz, 1985). They include the purpose of organised crime 
which is to financially profit through the crime and the corruption is the most common 
protection of the organised crime operations as well as fear, threats and force needed.13 All 
 
10 https://www.wired.com/story/terrorist-groups-prey-on-unsuspecting-chat-apps (20 March 2019) 
11 J. Sheptycki, H. B. Jaffe, D. Bigo, International Organised Crime In The European Union, European Parliament, 
2011. 
12 Ibid. 
13 M. Riccardi & G. Berlusconi, Measuring organised crime infiltration in legal businesses, in E.U.  Savona & M. 
Riccardi &  G. Berlusconi (Eds.), Organised Crime in European Businesses, Routledge, London 2016, pp. 16-17. 
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these explains why it also referred to as a “serious crime” but also importantly it must be 
“organised”, so it includes planned, rational acts of the groups with specific objective.14 
As said above, there were several attempts to define phenomenon of organised crime and in 
1998 Sam Porteous, in a report to the Solicitor General of Canada offered the following 
definition: 
“economically motivated illicit activity undertaken by any group, association or other body 
consisting of two or more individuals, whether formally or informally organized, where the 
negative impact of said activity could be considered significant from an economic, social, 
violence generation, health and safety and/or environmental perspective.”15 
However, it was not successful as there was no notion of duration of criminal activity, no 
requirement for the “organised” activity and no mention of the capacity to enforce violence and 
corruption used by the group. Thus, the organised crime in this context implies all criminal 
activities that involved two or more people with some kind of economic motivation and 
therefore most corporate crime and financial frauds by this definition can be referred to 
organised crime activities.16 
Academic criminologists have been researching another approach to define organised crime 
and came to an idea that there is a unique process that makes organised crime activities different 
from other form of criminal conduct and even more of a threat to society and therefore needed 
a special legislative procedure. Characteristics involved within this approach are exactly the 
characteristics that are missing from the definition of the Porteous – continuing criminal 
enterprise, potential to use corruption/violence/threat and on-going conspiracy between the 
members of the group.17 
However, now there are a lot of examples that suggest that this insistence on a specific “process” 
by which serious crimes are committed ineffectively resolves the issue of what is seen to be 
organized crime.  
Thus, one of the potential bases for the unified definition of organised crime is through 
identifying and comparing the organised crime features mentioned above in different countries. 
Unfortunately, numerous trials of European countries in the field of the international co-
 
14 Organized Crime - Module 1 - Key Issues: Defining Organized Crime, UNODC, 2018 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-1/key-issues/defining-organized-crime.html (20 March 
2019) 
15 S. Porteous, Organized Crime Impact Study: Highlights, Solicitor General Canada, 1998, p. 2. 
16 M. Beare and R. T. Naylor, Major Issues Relating To Organized Crime: Within The Context Of Economic 
Relationships, Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, 1999 
(https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/10284/Nathanson%20Centre%20Research%20Economic
%20and%20Organized%20Crime%20EN.pdf?sequence=1) (20 March 2019) 
17 Ibid, 
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operation, focused on the search of strategies and tactics of suppression of organised crime, 
have given only limited results.18  
The first international effort to provide a clear and precise definition of organised crime at 
international level through the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime in 2003. For the purpose of this Convention the term “serious” crime, the offence must 
be punishable for at least four years. However, countries are not obliged to follow the definition 
of Convention but at the same time the Convention is applicable in case of transnational level 
of organised crime – usually when offence is committed in more than one country. 
Talking about the EU, now there are three types of method to criminalising organised crime:  
− Civil law approach consists of criminalising participation in a criminal association  
− Common law approach based on conspiracy - an agreement to commit a crime 
− Scandinavian approach, rejecting "criminal organisation" offences and relying instead 
on the general provisions of criminal law (collaboration, aiding and abetting)19 
However, even within the same approach, Member States in the EU have adopted completely 
diverse definitions of organised crime. For example, Article 416-bis of the Italian Criminal 
Code dealing with mafia-type associations is of a nature unknown to many other civil law 
countries.20 
After the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, it has opened new paths for the 
approximation of national criminal laws in the EU including legislation on the organised crime. 
For example, Article 83(1) of the TFEU establishes minimum rules for the definition of serious 
crime with a cross border dimension and organised crime is also involved there. Also, Article 
83(2) TFEU gives a possibility for approximation of criminal laws when considered necessary 
for the effective implementation of EU policy in the field that has been subject to harmonisation 
measures.21 
4.1. Structure and activities of organized crime  
Numerous organised crimes are active in the EU and worldwide, often with cross-border reach 
and multi-ethnic composition. In the EU a few of the leader groups are Italian, Russian and 
 
18 B. Dobovšek, Organised crime – can we unify the definition? In: Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, 1996 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/org323.htm (20 March 2019) 
19 P. Bąkowski, The EU Response To Organised Crime, Library of the European Parliament, 2013, p. 1 
20 F. Calderoni A definition that does not work: The impact of the EU Framework Decision on the fight against 
organized crime- Common Market Law Review No.4, 2012, pp. 1378-1379. Quoted by Bąkowski 2013, p. 2 
21 Bąkowski 2013, pp. 3-6. 
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Albanian. EU Member States are not equally exposed to those activities; however, the 
development of the internal market, unfortunately gave new possibilities to criminals to extend 
their sphere of action22. The EU takes actions and adapts its response with the growing 
complexity of the situations. Special agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust and CEPOL were 
developed to combat these crimes23, but further action is needed to prevent them. Examining 
the different academic’s opinions, we can see why it is so hard to find one standard definition 
and why is so difficult to completely define it24. One of the first difficulties comes from the fact 
that the term organised is ambiguous. Most academics agreed that there must be two or more 
persons conspiring together on continues basis to commit serious crimes to maintain a financial 
or other benefit25. Also, they agreed that typically they will have a hierarchical organisation 
with a set of rules and regulations. Therefore, a gang which temporarily groups or a couple of 
youth involved in small illegal activities, most likely will not be considered organised crime. 
Also, the primary goal of organised crimes is economic profit; therefore, terrorist organisations, 
even if they are well organised and meet some of the characteristics typical for Organised crime 
groups, are not usually considered organised crimes-groups, because the goal is different26.  
Furthermore, depending on their target, objectives and mechanisms they can be larger or 
smaller, local or global, domestic or transnational, centrally directed or highly decentralized. 
Commonly, these organisations engaged in enterprises and these includes various criminal acts.  
Albanese J. pointed that it emerges three main categories of criminal activities. These include 
provision of illicit services, provision of illicit goods and infiltration of legitimate business or 
government27. The provision of illicit services involves for example prostitution, loan-sharking 
and illegal gambling and human trafficking. Provision of illicit goods includes drug trafficking, 
distribution and sail of stolen property and counterfeiting (goods, arms, documents). The last 
category involves extortion of business owners, money laundering and fraud (smuggling, 
investment broad). 
Over the time there was a shift of organised crime activities; however, it can be seen that modern 
forms are a newer version of older kinds of criminal conduct that changed due to new 
technology and opportunities. Many attacks are happening online. We have various forms of 
cybercrime such as online identity theft and various attacks against information systems – this 
are due to rapidly technological developments. 
 
22 P. Bakowski, Briefing on organised crime in the European Union, European Parliamentary Research Service 
2015 (PE 569.039). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 F. Varese “What is Organised Crime? Organised Crime (Critical Concepts in Criminology), Routledge, London 
2010, Vol. I, pp. 11-33. 
26 E4J University Module Series: Organised Crime (2018) https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-
crime/module-1/key-issues/activities-organization-composition.html (20 March 2019) 
27 J. Albanese, Risk Assessment in organized crime, Developing a Market and product-Based Model to determine 
threat levels, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Vol. 24, No. 3, 2008, pp. 263-273. 
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After a significant number of cases and studies and research papers on criminal organisations 
there were identified three types of organised crime groups: hierarchical model, local, cultural 
model and enterprise or business model. The first type identifies it as a group of criminals in 
which the leader is distinguished and in a superior position respect of other members. The illegal 
activities are organised by the leader and carried out by other members in a lower rank28. An 
example is the Italian mafia who consists of bosses, lieutenants and soldiers. 
The second type of criminal groups are connected by ethnic and cultural ties. This type usually 
is local in nature29. The third one it is based on economic consideration and they tend to form 
their illegal activities with regard to customers need. They tend to traffic drugs, arms or stolen 
property and other products with the objective to make a profit. According to Smith30 these type 
act as legitimate business do. They take into consideration the need and demand of suppliers, 
customers, regulators and competitors. The difference is that one deals with legal activities, 
other with illegal. The emphasis is on economic relationship rather than personal relationship. 
Today, we have a fourth new type of organised crime which occurs in the virtual world. The 
Web is the new place where illicit goods and services are sold. Hackers for example may extort 
victims. The cyber dimension permit criminals to be more disconnected from customers and 
victims. Potentially, it can be argued that members of organised crime may be starting to move 
away from the past type of relationship to a less formal one and disconnected. Europol reported 
in 2017 that 20% of criminal network known in Europe exists only for a short period of time 31. 
5. The comparison of terrorism and organized crime 
When we compare terrorism and organized crime, we have to examine a few features: the goal, 
structure, income, and the victims of crimes. We also have to talk about terrorism in the EU, 
and in the Middle East, as they show significant differences.  
Terrorism can be used as a tactic to scare a social group, ethnicity, or an entire country. It is 
often backed by an ideology or a religion. While the background of terrorist groups can be very 
different, almost all of them uses more or less the same tactics of intimidation. The goal and 
motivation of a criminal group are vastly different than terrorist groups, it is the main difference 
between these organizations. Its main motivation is to generate huge amounts of income, and 
to gain as much influence as possible.  
When we talk about the structure of a terrorist group, it is important to differentiate between its 
appearance in the EU and outside. Organizations in the middle east commit mostly the same 
crimes as criminal groups anywhere else in the world, and have almost the same structure. In 
the EU, terrorist groups form cells, which are loosely connected to the main organization. They 
 
28 Cf. J. Albanese, Organized Crime: From the Mob to Transnational organized crime” Routledge, London 2015 
29 H. Abadinsky, The Mafia in America: An oral history” Praeger, New York 1981 
30 Cf. D. C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, University Press of America, New York 1990 
31 European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2017, European Police Office, 2017 
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remain dormant, until the call comes from their group. Then they activate from their “sleep” 
and commit the terrorist acts. Criminal organizations very rarely use this tactics, as the group 
is more tight, and it is based on the trust of the members. 
The income of criminal groups is very colourful, ranging from drug trafficking, arms dealing, 
to money laundering or even legal businesses. Terrorist groups inside the EU are mainly 
involved in drug trafficking and money laundering, meanwhile in other parts of the world, they 
commit more or less the same crimes as criminal groups to generate profit. The goal of Criminal 
groups is to generate income, so these two features are almost the same. The main difference 
between organized crime and terrorism is, that terrorist groups use their income as a tool, so 
they have the manpower, weapons, vehicles etc. to commit their goal, which is to articulate 
their discontent via bloody and cruel acts.  
The motives and mechanisms of organized crime are vastly different. It is a parasite, a tumour, 
on the body of the economy and society, they use forms of violence and corruption to achieve 
their goals. 
The victims of violent crimes committed by these groups are different too. The victims of 
organized criminal groups are often part of another similar society. These groups mainly fight 
for power, influence, and income. It is rare that an outsider becomes a victim of these crimes, 
although it is possible 
To achieve their goals, terrorist groups mainly use brutal, violent crimes as they are the most 
effective to plant fear in a society. They choose their victims randomly, or based on the victims 
ethnicity, religion, or other features.  
We also have to state that not all terrorist acts are committed by a terrorist organization. Some 
terrorist groups like the Islamic State like to take responsibility for actions, which cannot be 
clearly linked to them. The most recent terrorist crime was committed in Christchurch, New 
Zealand. In this case it is clear that the perpetrator was not a member of a terrorist group. The 
same goes to the attack committed in 2011 in Norway, where 77 children were massacred.  
So in conclusion, we can see that the main difference between terrorism and organized crime, 
is the motivation behind their acts. While terrorist groups use their income as a tool, organized 
criminal groups generate income to gather more and more profit, which they can use to gain 
even more influence and power. Some of their methods are the same, but their goals are vastly 
different. 
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6. Common Legal Framework for Fighting Terrorism and Organized 
Crime 
Structuring a common legal framework for terrorism and organized crime could be of outmost 
importance and significance because of the recent researches and analyses on the linkages 
between the two phenomena. More and more similarities can be found, these organisations and 
networks are co-existing, cooperating and converging, they are increasingly working together 
which gives law enforcement the opportunity to better observation, monitoring and the chance 
to expose these circles and because of their connections it is also easier to identify further 
members and groups in their network. 
On the other hand, their interaction can be quite limited and not possible to trace due to the use 
of advanced communication and information technologies so it is really a big challenge to the 
authorities to keep up with this kind of technical development and find new possibilities to 
pursue their targets and gather information. 
We are clearly of the opinion to have this common framework because it could even provide 
unpredictable benefits. There are several similarities which can be used as the basis of the 
framework e.g., structural and organizational similarities, their operational tactics, financial 
resources – normally illegitimate drug trades – and technologies. Linkages are surely 
established in firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants.32 
Terrorism and transnational organized crime have a nexus formed between them, they are 
benefitting from the other, there is mutual operational, financial and logistical support which 
strengthens their infrastructure and widers their capabilities. It also creates more vulnerabilities 
that gives the possibility of better detection of both types of groups. Their cooperation can cause 
distrust as criminals do not have the same loyalty to the cause as terrorists have. This includes 
the possibility of the increased attention by law enforcement agencies and the chances of 
infiltration. Also, the involvement of criminals can undermine the credibility and support of the 
terrorist groups and it can also cause distraction from political goals and put an emphasis on the 
profit-making aspect. This can be used against the terrorist networks to discredit their 
ideological goals and purposes openly so that they are associated with common criminals. 33 
The newest and most dangerous forms of their collaboration are the hybrid organizations. These 
are sharing the characteristics and attributes of both terrorist organizations and organized crime 
groups. They have a complex structure, there is a clear political orientation and also a profit-
making agenda. This new phenomenon requires the increased attention of the authorities and 
new perspectives, analysis and monitoring. 
 
32 https://www.unodc.org/dohadeclaration/en/news/2018/05/unodc-invites-new-academic-thinking-on-linkages-
between-organized-crime-and-terrorism.html (20 March 2019) 
33 https://www.vocaleurope.eu/organized-crime-vs-terrorism-are-they-converging (20 March 2019) 
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This agenda desperately needs the common international attention, serious cooperation, the 
coordination and support of the member states’ initiations. After gathering enough data, it 
would also be useful to train competent experts, maybe create an agency devoted to these 
serious issues, and put the emphasis on the collection of information. 
The chief global legal tool in this area is the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its three protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition). 34 
Based on the previously mentioned facts I am on the opinion that besides the differences of 
these two organizations it is really needed to create this common framework because of the 
hidden possibilities of their similar aspects. Until now there are no successful initiations but 
with some time and enough resources it has a high chance to succeed. 
In conclusion we can say that although on the EU level the behaviours that are related to 
terrorism are regulated, it would be much better, if the states have a general definition for 
terrorism in the criminological aspect. The phenomena of terrorism changed since the 9/11 
attacks. There are changes in its tools, its methods (for example the using of weapons of mass 
destruction), the working mechanics of the terrorist cells, the use of new technologies, and the 
international aspects of the attacks. Talking about the organised crime phenomenon, the 
persistent attempts to harmonise the criminal law in different countries in order to come up with 
one common definition of organised crime have not been successful yet as there is still tension 
between the search for meaningful harmonisation and the respect for state sovereignty and 
national diversity as all States have their own view on how to deal with “serious” types of crime 
and therefore their own legislation. However, the EU’s position in this field have been 
substantially strengthened after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The issues, however, still 
persist and we have seen how there are different types of organised criminal groups which differ 
in structure and are involved in different activities. Whether it is necessary to focus on their 
structure or activities is still subject to academic debate. It appears that both have to be analysed 
deeply to understand how to prevent them. About the differences of the two phenomena we can 
see that the main difference between terrorism and organized crime, is the motivation behind 
their acts. While terrorist groups use their income as a tool, organized criminal groups generate 
income to gather more and more profit, which they can use to gain even more influence and 
power. Some of their methods are the same, but their goals are vastly different. Although the 
differences and difficult questions of the two phenomena it is important to have a common legal 
framework both for terrorism and organized crime. 
 
34 https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Training_Curriculum_Module2/17-
04123_eBook_FINAL.pdf (20 March 2019) 
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Substantive Criminal Law Harmonisation regarding 
serious crimes listed in Article 83 TFEU 
MIRABELLA KITTI NEZDEI – ISTVÁN SZIJÁRTÓ 
Law students, University of Pécs 
The article revolves around the cooperation between Member States regarding criminal justice. 
The basis of the article is the Stockholm Programme which was adopted in 2014 and it 
formulated the whole cooperation in justice and home affairs in the European Union. The 
article shows how important harmonisation of criminal laws of Member States and shows how 
it affects cooperation in criminal justice. 
Keywords: Stockholm Programme; harmonisation; guidelines; trafficking in human beings; 
computer crimes; justice and home affairs 
1. Introduction 
We have chosen this topic since the harmonisation of substantive criminal law of Member 
States is not researched much. When it comes to cooperation in criminal matters between 
Member States, it is often referred to that the approximation of criminal procedures and 
cooperation in criminal matters are of huge importance. However, the harmonisation of 
substantive criminal law is often overlooked as if it was of no importance. On the contrary, in 
our opinion it constitutes the core of the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It is based on 
the fact that criminal procedure is based on substantive criminal law.1 Thus it goes without 
question that the approximation of substantive criminal law must keep pace with the 
approximation of criminal procedures. Needless to say harmonisation also provides means to 
avoid forum-shopping regarding serious and organised crimes. 
Our article revolves around the Stockholm Programme. It’s relevant guidelines will be 
introduced in the second part of our study. The reason for this is that the Stockholm Programme 
is a strategic document for cooperation in justice and home affairs.2 It was introduced after the 
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon so it reflects the situation as it is now in the European Union. 
Another reason for choosing the Stockholm Programme was that it had ample time to make a 
positive change in relation to the harmonisation of substantive criminal law of Member States. 
Last but not least this was the first programme that supported this issue in a substantial manner. 
 
1 It is also worth mentioning that one of the main purpose of procedural law is to realise regulations of substantive 
law. 
2 Zs. Horváth & Á. Mohay & A. Pánovics & E. Szalayné Sándor, Európai Közjog 2., PTE ÁJK, Pécs 2016, p. 184. 
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First, we introduce the evolution of cooperation in justice and home affairs between Member 
States and the important guidelines incorporated in it regarding our topic. After this we examine 
the importance of approximation of substantive criminal law in the context of the Lisbon Treaty. 
In the end we draw conclusion regarding the role of the Stockholm Programme and make 
recommendations for future development in this topic. 
2. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
The second item of the third article of the Treaty on the European Union aims to establish an 
area without internal borders based on freedom, security and justice.3 In this area the free 
movement of persons, the supervision of outside borders, common policies on asylum and 
migration shall be framed, not to mention furthering the judicial cooperation in civil and 
criminal matters.4 Currently the regulations regarding justice and home affairs of the EU can 
be found in Title V of the TFEU that is called the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
It has taken a long time for the cooperation between member states in justice and home affairs 
to come to life. Before the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht it was formulated outside the 
framework of the EU. When the Treaty of Rome was ratified the idea had not even been an aim 
to achieve later. Instead the first instance of this cooperation was the TREVI-group which 
consisted of the ministers of justice and home affairs of the member states, thus this group was 
organised on an intergovernmental level. It involved cooperation in matters regarding 
migration, asylum, police and judicial cooperation.5 
The Schengen cooperation was the forerunner of the cooperation in justice and home affairs. 
Later the Schengen cooperation was integrated into primary EU law by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.6 It was the Treaty of Maastricht that incorporated justice and home affairs into 
primary EU law. The three pillars of the EU – which then went on to stay in force until the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon – was created by the Treaty of Maastricht. In this system 
justice and home affairs was the third pillar which meant intergovernmental level. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam changed this system by incorporating most element of justice and home affairs 
into the first pillar which only left the judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the third pillar. 
In 2009 the three pillars of the EU were revoked by the Treaty of Lisbon which reshaped the 
institutions of the EU in a radical way.7 
Along with repealing the three pillars of the EU the Treaty of Lisbon also introduced the 
ordinary legislative procedure in justice and home affairs. This procedure is based on the co-
decision of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. This means that those legal 
 
3 2012 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union Art. 3 It. (2). 
4 2012 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 67. 
5 A. Osztovits András (ed.): Az Európai Unió szerződéseinek magyarázata 1-2., Complex, Budapest 2008, p. 365. 
6 Osztovits, ibid, p. 366. 
7 Horváth & Mohay & Pánovics & Szalayné, ibid, p. 182. 
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norms specifically used for the third pillar were exchanged by the seconder legal sources of the 
EU such as directives, decisions and regulations. However, this does not mean that those special 
legal norms which were used to regulate justice and home affairs are automatically repealed.8 
In addition a break clause has been introduced in the legislation regarding justice and home 
affairs.9 Another important novelty is the Committee on Internal Security introduced by Art. 
71. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. It is a standing committee of the Council of the 
EU aiming to improve the cooperation regarding the internal security within the EU.10 
There were other programs like the Stockholm Programme as well in justice and home affairs. 
Before the Stockholm Programme there was the Tampere Programme and the Hague 
Programme. The current programme following the Stockholm Programme is called the Post-
Stockholm Strategy.11 
3. Guidelines of the Stockholm Programme regarding the approximation of 
the substantive criminal law 
The role of minimum rules is to strengthen mutual recognition and cooperation in judicial 
matters. The basis of mutual recognition and minimum rules is set in Art. 82-83. of TFEU. 
According to these articles the Council and the EP may introduce minimum rules regarding 
substantive criminal law in five cases: 
1. mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States 
2. the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; 
3. the rights of victims of crime; 
4. any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in 
advance by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
5. The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis.12 
We are going to examine the fifth point of the list. The Stockholm Programme has a chapter 
called a Europe that Protects. In this chapter the European Council instructs the European 
 
8 Horváth & Mohay & Pánovics & Szalayné, ibid, p. 183. 
9 J. Fazekas, Bel- és igazságügyi együttműködés az Európai Unióban - a hágai programtól a stockholmi programig. 
OKRI Szemle, vol 2, 2009, p. 4.  
http://www.okri.hu/images/stories/OKRISzemle2009/OKRISzemle_2011/006_fazekas.pdf (1 February 2018). 
10 2012 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Art. 71. 
11 These programmes are introduced by the European Council according to Art. 68. of the TFEU. 
See: Horváth & Mohay & Pánovics & Szalayné, ibid, p. 184 
12 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Arts. 82-83. 
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Commission to review the directives setting out the minimum rules for those serious crimes 
mentioned in TFEU and if the need arises commence new legislation.13 This next chapter, a 
Europe that Protects lists those serious crimes with a cross-border dimension that need to be 
reviewed.14 
4. Approximation of substantive criminal law in relation to serious and 
organised crimes 
In criminal law organised crime can be categorised as part of those formations (organised crime, 
criminal association and gang15) when there are two or more persons jointly concerned in the 
commission of an offence. In this case there is said to be participation.16 By formulating the 
definition of a criminal organisation criminal codes approve the existence of organised crime, 
not to mention that regarding sentencing committing crimes in criminal organisation is deemed 
more serious.17 
Members of a criminal organisation intend to generate profit from committing crimes.18 A 
criminal organisation poses greater threat to the society since these groups have many members, 
they are specially organised for committing crimes and theirs ties to the economy are plenty as 
opposed to principal participation.19 A group of perpetrators is deemed a criminal organisation 
if it consists of three or more persons, is organised for a longer period of time, achieves 
cooperation and aims to commit crimes deliberately that are punishable by five or more years 
of prison sentences.20 
We also need to examine organised crime from a practical viewpoint. As the internal boarders 
of the Member States of the EU were opened upon the Schengen Cooperation organised crime 
stated to become cross-boarder. Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
directs our attention to this fact. Organised crime is much more of a complex nature than we 
can demonstrate it with the definition of criminal organisation. It is a formation which is deeply 
connected to the legal economy, it operates according to the rules of supply and demand of the 
market not to mention that there is a fair deal of tolerance towards criminal organisations 
coming from the population for some reason. This makes them extraordinarily flexible for 
 
13 The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen, p. 44. 
14 These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women 
and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means 
of payment, computer crime and organised crime. See: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 83. It. 1. 
This item also empowers the Council and the European Parliament to adopt a decision identifying other areas of 
crime that meet the criteria of having cross-border dimensions. 
15 Á. Balogh Ágnes & M. Tóth (eds.): Magyar Büntetőjog Általános rész, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2015, p. 219. 
16 Criminal Law, University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing Edition, 2015, 227. p. 
17 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről 91. §. 
18 Balogh & Tóth, ibid, p. 222. 
19 Balogh & Tóth, ibid, p. 221. 
20 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről 459. § (1) bekezdés 1. pont. 
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changes which makes them even more dangerous for the whole population of Europe disregard 
of any European state.21 This is the basis for the cooperation between Member States against 
organised crime. In the Stockholm Programme this cooperation is strongly advocated by the 
European Council. It contains suggestions for unified boarder control, harmonization of 
jurisdictions, approximation in the field of substantive criminal law and last but not least the 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions. According to our point of view the approximation of 
substantive criminal law and the mutual recognition can be the basis of the cooperation between 
Member States against organised crime. 
In part 2. you could already see that the policy of justice and home affairs of the EU was created 
by the Treaty of Maastricht. However at this point mutual recognition was not incorporated in 
the third pillar.22 For this to happen it had to wait until the Treaty of Lisbon which incorporated 
justice and home affairs into primary EU law. As a consequence it was ridden of its 
intergovernmental traits. With the Treaty of Lisbon mutual recognition was introduced at a 
primary level in EU law. Before this Treaty it was possible only at a smaller level by seconder 
legal sources of the EC (for example the European Arrest Warrant is regulated in a framework 
decision). Thus the legal institution of mutual recognition on a primary level has been created 
by Item (3)-(4) of Art. 67. of TFEU. The legal institution of mutual recognition introduced a 
novelty in justice and home affairs. According to the regulations Member States mutually have 
to recognise the judicial and extrajudicial decisions of other Member States as binding.23 
However this means that these decisions are binding disregard of any differences between laws 
of Member States. This evolution of cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
makes the approximation of laws indispensable. It is needed because mutual recognition of 
decisions require strengthening mutual trust between Member States regarding their legal 
systems. It is achievable by the approximation of laws since it makes it possible to create 
minimum standards that provide a common approach towards certain regulations in question. 
As an example, we may examine human trafficking. If Hungary punishes human trafficking 
with a minimum of one-year sentence and a maximum of five-year sentence it is clearly against 
its criminal policy to recognise a judgement based on a criminal code which punishes human 
trafficking with a maximum of two or three years of prison sentence. It is also necessary 
regarding the formulation of criminal policies of Member States to create minimum standards 
of acts and punishments of serious and organised crimes that are cross-boarder in the EU with 
very similar traits. 
Due to its nature the main tool of the approximation of laws is the directive which doesn’t have 
direct effect. Instead of this it contains results to achieve without dictating the means for 
achieving them thus Member States have discretional power to decide on the means to achieve 
 
21 Serious and Organised Crime Assessment: Crime in the age of technology, Europol, Hague 2017. p. 13. 
22 V. Mitsilegas: EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009, p. 115. 
23 2012 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Art. 67. paras. 3-4. 
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the results.24 This discretional power is needed since the legal systems of Member States may 
wary in numerous aspects.25 As a consequence there are cases in which a decision or a 
regulation would not be able to fulfil its purpose since they may contain such legal institutions 
that some legal systems are not familiar with. This could very well lead to such results when – 
without the proper time to prepare for their entry into force – certain legal institutions could be 
practically useless. 
The basis of the approximation of the substantive criminal law is provided in Art. 83. of TFEU. 
We know of three kind of approximation of laws categorised by the extent of the approximation 
of regulations: full, optional and minimum approximation.26 Regarding the substantive criminal 
law of Member States approximation is done at a minimum extent. According to Art. 83. of 
TFEU approximation of substantive criminal law shall be done in case of the listed serious 
crimes that affect every European Citizen. The extent of minimum approximation in this case 
means that there are certain acts that may be deemed punishable in every Member State and 
directives may introduce sanctions for punishing these acts.27 Member States may provide more 
stringent regulation however they may not introduce sanctions that are less serious.28 
The approximation of substantive criminal law in justice and home affairs was first regulated 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). After the ratification of this Treaty the evolution it started. 
This can be viewed as the predecessor of today’s approximation of substantive criminal law 
since it affected the same crimes such as terrorism, sexual harassment of children, human 
trafficking, drug trafficking, crimes against information technology and corruption. However 
this approximation was achieved by framework decisions which reflects the fact that at that 
time the pillar-system was still intact.29 Today’s approximation is based on the Treaty of Lisbon 
which means that the approximation of substantive criminal law is done in the framework of 
ordinary legislative procedure which is an important change in the topic since in ordinary 
legislative procedure the EP and the Council only need a popular vote to pass a directive.30 
5. Approximation of substantive criminal law in practice 
In order to understand the process and the positive effects of the harmonisation of criminal law 
we need to examine working examples. For this we examine three areas of crime that are 
designated in the Stockholm Programme, namely trafficking in human beings, sexual 
exploitation of women and children and computer crimes. The main interest of this article is to 
show how the guidelines regarding these crimes achieves the harmonisation of substantive 
 
24 A. Osztovits András (ed.): EU-jog (Második, aktualizált és bővített kiadás). HVG-ORAC, Budapest 2015. p. 
179. 
25 Á. Mohay, Jogharmonizáció az Európai Unióban, Dialóg-Campus, Budapest 2018, p. 7. 
26 Mohay, ibid, pp. 10-11. 
27 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 83. 
28 Mohay, ibid, pp. 19-20. 
29 Mitsilegas, ibid, p. 33. 
30 E. Várnay & M. Papp, Az Európai Unió joga. KJK-KERSZÖV, Budapest 2003, p. 192. 
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criminal laws. We also examine how these guidelines has been implemented into Hungarian 
criminal law. 
5.1. Trafficking in human beings 
Criminal cooperation regarding trafficking in human beings is important for many reasons. It 
is needless to say that it is one of the most widespread cross-border crime in the EU along with 
trafficking in drugs.31 It is also deemed to be greatly harmful to society for it has serious 
causes.32 
The relevant directive 2011/36/EU determines the acts that are to be punished in every Member 
State. In other words, the guideline introduced minimum rules regarding trafficking in human 
beings. These acts include the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of 
persons and the exchange or transfer of these persons by means of threat or use of force or other 
forms, or by means of abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position of 
vulnerability.33 In addition the guideline defines what exploitation means. If the act is 
committed with the aim of exploitation it brings more serious punishment. According to this 
definition exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, including begging, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal 
of organs.34 Last but not least those acts are also punished that nevertheless are not committed 
in this manner but the victim is under the age of 18.35 
The guideline determines the minimum standard of punishment for the defined acts. This fits 
the form of minimum harmonisation, so the smallest possible sanction is determined for them.36  
As a consequence the harmonisation of substantive criminal law of the Member States results 
in a consolidated regulation regarding trafficking in human beings by determining the acts by 
which human trafficking can be committed and the minimum standard of punishment for these 
acts. Another important novelty of the guideline is that it introduces the aim of exploitation. If 
human trafficking is committed with this aim it is deemed more serious resulting in harsher 
sanctions. 
 
31 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Europol, Hague 2009, p. 23. 
32 Such as harming human dignity and freedom of movement of persons. See: M. Tóth & Z. Nagy (eds.), Magyar 
Büntetőjog Különös rész, Osiris, Budapest 2014, p. 116. 
33 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA. OJ 2011 L 101/1, Art. 2. para. 1.  
34 Ibid, Art. 2. para. 2.  
35 Ibid, Art. 2. para 5.  
36 It is also worth mentioning that Member States usually do not apply more stringent punishments than these 
minimum sanctions. 
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The Hungarian example shows the effect of approximation of criminal law. The new criminal 
code incorporated the aim of exploitation into the crime. So according to this exploitation shall 
mean the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability for the purpose of taking advantage 
of the victim forced into or kept in such situation.37 It can be stated that – though the first 
impression is that it does not fully comply with the definition of exploitation given in the 
guideline – it clearly accomplishes the implementation of the aim into our criminal code. The 
difference is due to the fact that it is a highly abstract form of definition aiming to fit for every 
possible way of committing smuggling of persons with the aim of exploitation. 
The effect of the guideline can be observed in case of the German criminal code as well however 
in a totally different manner since the German code does not restrict trafficking in human beings 
with only one crime but with many (for example with human trafficking for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation, human trafficking for the purpose of work exploitation, assisting in human 
trafficking, child trafficking and abduction of minors from the care of their parents etc).38 This 
shows that though in different form the German code also incorporates the aim of exploitation 
and the minimum standard of punishment for this crime. 
5.2. Sexual exploitation of women and children 
The sexual exploitation of women and children is not directly linked to organised crime. Instead 
it is connected to it by human trafficking since it is often its aim to use victims of trafficking 
for prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation.39 
For this reason the directive40 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography introduces stringent rules regarding the sexual abuse of children and 
child pornography.41 According to the guideline the Hungarian criminal code incorporated a 
form of child abuse as crime. Before the 2012. criminal code Hungarian criminal law did not 
punish acts of sexual abuse that is made of a recognized position of trust, authority or influence 
over such person.42 More protection for children can also be found regarding the crime of 
indecent exposure. According to the guideline Hungarian criminal code incorporated a case 
where the victim of this exposure is specifically a person under the age of fourteen. This case 
is punished with harsher sanction.43 
 
37 2012. C. törvény a büntetőjogról 192. § (8). 
38 German Penal Code 2013 232-236. §. 
39 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Europol, Hague 2009, p. 23. 
40 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA. OJ 2011 L 135/1.  
41 Much like in case of human trafficking the guideline determines the acts and the minimum standrad of 
punishment for them. See Articles 3-5 of the directive. 
42 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről 198. §. 
43 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről 205. §. 
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The German code has the same type of regulation which was introduced by the Hungarian 
criminal code due to the guideline in question.44 
5.3. Computer crimes 
Without any doubt harmonisation regarding computer crimes is needed since these crimes are 
not stopped by borders.45 Thus computer crimes slowly but steadily became one of the main 
tools of organised crime. The guideline on attacks against information systems justifies the 
harmonisation on the basis that society is extremely dependant on information systems. 
Computer crimes can also be connected to organised crime since information systems may be 
attacked by terrorist or these attacks may serve political purposes. It is needless to say that these 
attacks may also result in great economic harm. On the other hand, stealing and marketing of 
personal data is also a widespread aim of cyber-attacks.46 
These crimes are exceptions in the harmonisation of substantive criminal laws as for Hungary 
since the implementation of this guideline is not complete. This fact alone shows that computer 
crime is a novelty which cannot yet be effectively combated and the legislations cannot really 
keep the pace with it yet. Thus further efforts are needed to effectively combat attacks against 
information systems. 
6. Conclusion 
In summary one of the aims of the harmonisation of substantive criminal laws is to effectively 
combat organised crime across the EU. Thus, the guidelines introduced above are the realisation 
of the Stockholm Programme’s purposes. 
It is worth examining the results of the harmonisation. In general it can be said that 
unfortunately the numbers does not show that the harmonisation of criminal laws of the Member 
Stats proved effective. This is based on the fact the since the introduction of the Stockholm 
Programme the number of victims of human trafficking increased. However it must not be 
overlooked that this is the first attempt for a consolidated regulation aiming to achieve stronger 
cooperation regarding organised crime. Taking into consideration every aspects of cooperation 
against organised crime between Member States it can be stated that the Stockholm Programme 
provides a mature structure for this aim.47 As a result in the future it is worth researching the 
 
44 German Penal Code 2013. 182. § (2) item. 
45 K. Mezei, Az információs rendszerek elleni bűncselekmények uniós szintű szabályozása különös tekintettel az 
Európai Unió 2013/40/EU sz. irányelvre, Jogi Fórum, 2015. pp. 3-5 
http://www.jogiforum.hu/files/publikaciok/mezei_kitti__informacios_rendszerek_elleni_buncselekmenyek_eu_s
zabalyozasa[jogi_forum].pdf (18 Februray 2018). 
46 Cf. for example the preamble of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA. OJ 2013 L 218/4. 
47 It is the Stockholm Programme which introduced the Internal Security Strategy and the office of the EU Anti-
Trafficking Coordinator was created due to this framework as well. 
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results of this framework for cooperation established upon the strategic guidelines of the 
Stockholm Programme. 
As a final point it is worth mentioning that the reception of the Stockholm Programme was not 
as well as it was meant since the Programme introduced many novelties along with the Lisbon 
Treaty. As a result it upset the framework of cooperation in criminal matters which was 
formulated after the Treaty of Amsterdam. This being said its effects showed since the 
European Committee did not realise many of its objectives since they would not fit in the 
previous framework.48 However, in conclusion the Stockholm Programme had enormous effect 
on combatting organised crime in the EU. Taking into consideration this fact, the Post-
Stockholm Programme should continue this work, however with introducing more moderate 
changes in the system of cooperation in criminal justice between the Member States. 
 
48 S. Carrera & E. Guild, Does the Stockholm Programme matter? The Struggles over Ownership of AFSJ 
Multiannual Programming, Liberty and Security in Europe Papers, CEPS, December 2012, p. 15. 
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“Jihadists travelling from Europe to Syria and other hotspots in great numbers are a serious 
problem for European internal security. Urgent action needs to be taken.”1 These sentences 
have been written by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in a report to the Council two 
years before the 2015 Paris attacks. This clearly highlights the importance and seriousness of 
the question of having effective legal instruments which are able to prevent radicalization (and 
consequently terrorist attacks) and to tackle the issue of foreign fighters returning from Syria 
(or elsewhere) to the European Union. The purpose of this article is primarily to introduce the 
November 2015 Paris Attacks with special focus on the details of the case in relation to the 
relevant French and EU regulations. We firmly believe that a complex approach is necessary 
and indeed useful, therefore the facts of the case will be discussed in detail, including 
methodological aspects for criminal tactics usage. It will be shown that there is a strong 
relationship between the attacks and the foreign fighters issue, as at least some of the 
perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks were EU citizens returned from Syria.2 
Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, Paris attack, border control, foreign fighters 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism, as an international phenomenon, is not one of today's novelties. An ancient Chinese 
definition has already reflected the foundations of today's terrorism: “Kill one to intimidate ten 
thousand!”3 
 
1 Foreign fighters and returnees from a counter-terrorism perspective, in particular with regard to Syria. Report 
from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 9946/13. May 2013. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jul/eu-
council-terr-coordinator-syria-9946-13.pdf (5 January 2019). 
2 P. Bąkowski & L. Puccio: Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action, Briefing, European 
Parliamentary Research Service, March 2016 p. 3. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-
Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf (22 December 2018). 
3 J. Béres: Napjaink muszlim terrorizmusának gyökerei és visszaszorítási lehetőségei, PhD Értekezés, ZMNE 
Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola, Budapest 2008, p. 10.  
http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2008/beres_janos.pdf (31 June 2018). 
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We can find terrorism in antique Greek and Roman civilizations as well. However, it can be 
stated regardless that terrorism is typically a 20th century phenomenon, which became a major 
problem only after the Second World War.4 The renaissance of terrorism was clearly in 2001, 
when it underwent some major changes and started to emerge as a global risk factor.5 
Without a proper defintion effective cooperative work is unimaginable on the international 
level.  
Of course, many attempts had been made to define terrorism or terrorist acts, but this attempts 
for the common definitions were total resultless until nowadays. 
At the European regional level, the 2017/541/EU Directive has adopted a definition binding on 
the EU Member States, which has to be also quoted here. An offence6 should be qualified as a 
terrorist offence “when and insofar as committed with a specific terrorist aim, namely to 
seriously intimidate a population, to unduly compel a government or an international 
organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to seriously destabilise or 
destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
an international organisation. The threat to commit such intentional acts should also be 
considered to be a terrorist offence when it is established, on the basis of objective 
circumstances, that such threat was made with any such terrorist aim.”7 
In the light of the definitions, one can easily conclude that the November 2015 Paris attacks – 
the deadliest terrorist attack in Europe since the Madrid bombings in 2004 – were likely terrorist 
offences. It is also meaningful, that the Directive gives a clear definition, for it is binding on 
the EU Member States – and thus also France.  
2.  The 13th November 2015 Paris attacks8  
The attacks did not come as a surprise. In the past 30 years, French jihadists were involved in 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, which affected the French national security in terms of 
recruitment, support, propaganda, or terrorist acts. A research conducted in 2013 found that 11 
percent (one in nine) foreign fighters returned to Western Europe to perpetrate attacks.9 
According to Marc Trevidic, who was the leading French counterterrorism judge, 50 percent of 
the jihadis who fought abroad rejoined in terror networks after their return to France. Every 
 
4 I. L. Gál: A terrorizmus finanszírozása, PTE Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar Gazdasági Büntetőjogi Kutatóintézet, 
Pécs 2010, p. 6. 
5 F. Dávid: A terrorizmus és nemzetbiztonság az ezredforduló jogalkotásában, Szakmai Szemle, 2013/1, p. 44. 
6 The offences (serious crimes) which may be considered as terrorist acts are exhaustively listed in the Directive.  
7 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. 
8 The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. A Presentation of Findings. White paper. Courtesy of HSAC and the Paris 
Public Safety Delegation, June 2016.  
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4e0b79bf (28 September 
2018) 
9 T. Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between 
Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 1-15. 
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major terror plot prevented in France since 2000 involved returnees (e.g. the Strasbourg 
Cathedral Plot in 2000, the U.S. embassy bombing plot in 2001, a chemical attack plot in 2002, 
and plans to bomb the Eiffel Tower and the Notre-Dame Cathedral in 2010.) 
The highest number of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria and Iraq came from France. More 
than 2,000 French citizens and residents are taking part in Syrian and Iraqi jihadi networks, 600 
of them are believed to be fighting alongside terrorist organizations abroad and 250 are believed 
to have returned.10 
The shooting at Brussels’s Jewish Museum was the first successful attack committed by a 
returnee in European soil in 2014. It has been followed by other attacks, “culminating with the 
coordinated attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016.”11 
3. The details – facts of the case 
In this chapter we are going to discuss the events as has been described in the White Paper.  
On the evening of November 13, the nine attackers divided into three groups. One group went 
to the Bataclan, Salah Abdeslam drove three suicide bombers to the Stade de France, and 
another toward the bars and restaurants of the 10th and 11th arrondissements. 
The first of three explosions took place at 21.20 outside the Stade de France stadium where 
thousands of fans watched France versus Germany in a soccer match. A terrorist with a suicide 
belt was prevented from entering the stadium near Gate D. The man backed away from security 
guards and therefore he detonated the explosives, causing the death of the bomber and a 
bystander. At 21:30, a second man detonated his suicide vest outside Gate H. President 
Hollande, who was inside the stadium watching the game during these events, was rushed to 
safety. The crowd was not notified of the events and the match continued. At 21:53, a third 
terrorist wearing a suicide vest self-imploded at a fast-food store near the stadium.12 
At 21:25 in the 10th arrondissement, a district known for its plethora of bars, restaurants and 
cafés, gunmen in a black vehicle opened fire on Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge. Fifteen 
people died in the shooting, with fifteen severely injured. The terrorists continued on to Rue de 
 
10 J.-C.s Brisard: The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8 , No. 
11, p. 5. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-paris-attacks-and-the-evolving-islamic-state-threat-to-france/ (20 September 
2018) 
11 T. Renard & R. Coolsaet (eds.): Returnees: Who are they, why are they (not) coming back and show should we 
deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, Egmont Papers, February 2018, p. 4.  
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/02/egmont.papers.101_online_v1-3.pdf?type=pdf 
(15 January 2019) 
12 J.-C. Brisard & K. Jackson: The Islamic State’s External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus, 
CTCSentinel, Vol. 9, No. 11, November/December 2016, pp. 11-13. 
  https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1118.pdf (20 January 2019) 
177 
 
la Fontaine au Roi in the 11th arrondissement and opened fire on two more restaurants, Café  
Bonne  Biere  and  La Casa Nostra. Eight people were severely injured, while five were killed. 
Witnesses reported that the gunmen were travelling in a black car. At 21:36, gunmen opened 
fire on another bar in the 11th arrondissement, La Belle Equipe. Witnesses again said that the 
attackers were in a black vehicle.  Nineteen civilian people died during the attacks, with nine 
severely injured. At 21:40, a terrorist – later revealed to be Brahim Abdeslam – entered the 
restaurant Le Comptoir Voltair. The attacker detonated his suicide vest, killing himself and 
injuring fifteen others. 
The deadliest attack of the day happened at the Bataclan, a 1,500 seat concert hall, where the 
American rock group Eagles of Death Metal was playing to a crowd. At 21:40, three attackers 
with assault rifles emerged from a black vehicle, entered the Bataclan, killed the security guard 
and began firing on the crowd. Ninety people were killed and the rest of the audience was taken 
hostage, the siege lasted over two hours.  Police forces rushed the Bataclan at approximately 
00:20.  A police officer shot one of the terrorists and his suicide belt detonated.  The other 
attackers self-detonated also. Ninety-nine injured were taken to the hospital. 
Intelligence authorities think that one of the intents of the Stade de France attack was meant to 
draw security forces out of the city. Frequently after an emergency, law enforcement's reaction 
is to flood an area with resources, depleting the ability to react to another event.13 
4. The perpetrators14 
According to a document of findings, the below mentioned persons took part in the attacks.15 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He is believed to be the mastermind of the November Paris attacks. 
Abaaoud died in a police raid five days after the attacks, after a throughout search and 
investigation nationwide.16 
Salah Abdeslam, who was the only survivor of the Paris attackers. After four months he 
appeared in Brussels. His capture and interrogation was one of the reasons behind the Brussels 
attacks of March 2016. Abdeslam is in French custody today. 
Mohamed Abrini: a friend of Abdeslam. He was instrumental in the attack on the Brussels 
airport. According to the photos about the attackers, he was known as “the man in white”. 
Weeks after the attacks, he was captured and detained in Brussels. 
 
13 The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned, ibid. 
14 See also: Daniel Milton: The French Foreign Fighter Threat in Context, CTC Sentinel, 14 November 2015. 
https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-perspectives-the-french-foreign-fighter-threat-in-context/ (2 January 2019) 
15 The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned, ibid, p. 11. 
16 G. van Vlierden: Profile: Paris Attack Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, No. 12, p. 30. 
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Cherif and Said Kouachi: French brothers who attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices. They were 
killed three days later in a shoot-out with police. 
Armedy Coulibaly. He met Cherif Kouachi in prison. Coulibaly killed a policewoman in 
Montrouge and afterwards entered a Kosher market taking patrons hostage while killing four 
people. Finally he died in a police raid. 
After Abaaoud’s death, Salah Abdeslam was the only suspected Paris attacker still alive. On 
November 15, the authorities released his name and photo to the public. In 15h December, 
police raided an apartment in Brussels. They found explosives and Abdeslam’s fingerprint. 
After a four month-long manhunt, Abdeslam was captured in Molenbeek on March 18. He was 
shot in the leg but he survived it. The family suspected of hiding him was also arrested. In the 
wake of Abdeslam’s arrest, Belgian authorities worried about the prospect of another terrorist 
attack. Belgian Interior and Foreign Ministers warned the public on March 20, and again on 
March 21, that authorities suspected Abdeslam and his accomplices were planning an imminent 
attack. 
5. Modus operandi17 
The attacks in Paris in 2015 caught authorities off guard for a number of reasons. Previous 
attacks by terrorists trained in Syria had relied on a single mode of operation: a shooting, an 
explosion or an attempted hostage-taking. In Paris, the attackers did all of the abovementioned, 
with the aim to overwhelm the country’s emergency response capabilities. The attackers 
employed new tactics, exploited the weaknesses of Europe's border controls and showed a 
desire for maximum carnage, as opposed to directing attacks at symbolic targets. In many ways, 
the Paris attacks were similar to the Mumbai attacks in 2008. In India, ten attackers mounted a 
complex operation that lasted over sixty hours. The terrorists were each carrying heavy assault 
rifles and multiple rounds of ammunition, as well as improvised explosions. They split into four 
teams. One group targeted Mumbai's main train station, and then a hospital. A second targeted 
a Jewish residential complex, the third team stormed the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, while the fourth 
group attacked the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. All terrorits killed indiscriminately. Indian 
commandos ultimately brought down all of them, although they had killed 164 victims. The 
Mumbai attacks required, "precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation, 
both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability 
of the authorities to respond." As in Mumbai, the attackers in Paris had carefully planned, 
carried heavy firepower along with explosives, and split into three groups, simultaneously 
attacking different locations to prevent the authorities from developing an accurate action of 
the situation. The terrorists were better planned than in the Charlie Hebdo attacks and their aim 
was mass murder rather than targeted killings. At the Bataclan, they killed the security guard 
first and then took large numbers of hostages, creating a siege. It seems, that the terrorists 
studied Mumbai and replicated what worked. While the attackers in Paris were organized into 
 
17 The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned, ibid, p. 18. 
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blind cells, they had extensive logistical support. They spoke the language and had knowledge 
about the geographical layout of the area.  The group that attacked the restaurants in the 10th 
and 11th arrondissements targeting crowded places, provided a high number of potential 
victims, but also multiple options for ingress and egress. However, at least two of the attackers 
had trained in Syria.18 
Main purposes of the religious terrorist is the religious cleansing, so to create religiously pure 
state. The basic device of this aim is a suicide bombing. The definition of the suicide attack 
from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism: “as a politically motivated violent 
attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely 
causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The 
perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission”.19 This method has 
some advantages for the perpetrators, mostly that it is cheap, easy and – unfortunately – very 
effective. These three elements can enable to the lone wolfs to kill millions of people all over 
the world. 
 
6. Foreign fighters in French and EU law  
The French Code pénal (Criminal Code) defines terrorism as a number of listed acts – including 
intentional homicide, assault, kidnapping, hijacking, theft, extortion, property destruction, 
membership in an illegal armed group, digital crimes, forgery, and more – carried out with the 
goal of “seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror.” Preparing to commit 
an act of terrorism, and seeking, obtaining, and keeping material to be used for an act of 
terrorism, is also considered an act of terrorism in and of itself. Intelligence gathering and 
training for the purpose of carrying out an act of terrorism also falls under that definition, as 
does the habitual access to websites that encourage or justify terrorism.20 
Codified in Article 421 - 2 - 1 of the French Criminal Code, the AMT offence today penalises 
as a terrorist offence “the fact of participating in a group formed or in an agreement struck for 
the purposes of the preparation – characterised by one or several material facts – of one of the 
acts of terrorism mentioned”. These acts of terrorism include attacks on life and physical 
integrity; the hijacking of planes and other modes of transport; theft, extortions, destructions, 
degr adations; membership in or support of dissolved armed groups and movements; offences 
in relation to armaments, explosives, and nuclear materials; dealing in stolen goods related to 
these offences; as well as some aspects of money laundering and financing. These acts become 
‘terrorist’ provided that they occur with the additional qualification of “aiming to seriously 
trouble public order [ordre public] by intimidation or terror. The 1986 law created a specially 
composed Assize Court (La Cour d'Assises spécialement composée), entitled to adjudicate on 
terrorist-related offences. This specially composed court, contrary to the composition of the 
 
18 The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned, ibid, pp. 18-19.  
19 J. Béres: A nők és az öngyilkos-terrorizmus. Felderítő Szemle, Vol 6, No. 3, 2007, p. 16. 
20 K. Buchanan: FALQs: Terrorism in France, In Custodia Legis, Library of Congress, 2015. 
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/01/falqs-terrorism-in-france/ (28 August 2018). 
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regular Cours d’ Assises with respect to non-terrorist-related criminal matters, is without a jury. 
Instead, it is composed of the Court’s President as well as professional judges, of which there 
are four at first instance and six on appeal. The speciality of this regime is derogatory but its 
application by ordinary magistrates ensures it derives its origin from within French Law itself. 
The prosecution of terror-related crimes, which incur a penalty up to 10 years of imprisonment, 
takes place before the 16th Chamber of the Court of first instance in Paris, which is composed 
of a bench of three judges. The prosecution of terror-related crimes, which incur a penalty above 
10 years, are judged by the Paris Cour d’ Assises specially com posed of professional judges 
only. A terrorism investigation takes an average of two to three years.21 
The attacks in Paris have brought a significant amount of attention to the issue of border 
controls, in particular since it has been confirmed that at least one of the terrorists, holding a 
Syrian passport, entered the EU through Greece via a route used by refugees. It is also suggested 
that the Paris attackers, themselves EU citizens, had left the EU to fight in Syria and returned 
to carry out the attacks in Paris, and that one of them, Salah Abdeslam, could even have 
managed to flee to Syria after the attacks. This is the phenomenon of so-called “Foreign 
Fighters”: EU citizens who become radicalised and leave their home in the EU to join the war 
in Syria before returning to Europe. 
As Salah Abdeslam is French and not a third-country national, he could not, by definition, be 
the object of an alert related to the immigration policy. When he was checked by the French 
police during the night of 13 to 14 November, he was not known to the French authorities 
apparently because, despite being French, he was living in Belgium. He was also not the object 
of an alert for the purpose of arrest as the EAW was only issued by Belgium after the attacks, 
on Sunday. He had however been signalled in the SIS by the Belgian authorities as a person to 
be the object of a “discreet or specific check”. Following Article 36 of Council Decision 
2007/533, such an alert may be issued for the purposes of prosecuting criminal offences and for 
the prevention of threats to public security, “in particular where an overall assessment of a 
person, in particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives reason to suppose that that 
person will also commit serious criminal offences in the future.”22 
In the past few years since the attacks in Paris occurred, the European Union took many step in 
order to ensure that such an attack will not take place again. However, it has been since 2013 
that issues like foreign fighters and radicalization were on the agenda of the Council of the EU 
and the European Council.  
 
21 S. Weil: Terror in Courts, French counter-terrorism: Administrative and Penal Avenues, Report for the official 
visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, PSIA, Sciences-Po, Paris, May 2018, 
p. 8. https://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/Terror%20in%20Courts.pdf (22 June 2018). 
22 P. de Bruycker et D. Watt & H. Labayle & A. Weyembergh et C. Brière: The Paris Terrorist Attacks : Failure 
of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? January 2016 http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2016/01/08/cooperation-
judiciaire-penale/the-paris-terrorist-attacks-failure-of-the-eus-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice/ (25 June 
2018). 
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Even before the January 2015 Paris attacks, the members of the European Council announced 
a statement, in which they expressed their strong belief on the importance of safeguarding 
common values against terrorist attacks. The three main element of the announcement was the 
protection of the security of citizens, the prevention of radicalization, and the enhanced 
cooperation with international partners.23 
In March, 2017, the Council adopted a new directive on combating terrorism, which has been 
already mentioned and cited above. The directive aims to strengthen the EU’s legal framework 
in order to be more able to prevent further attacks. It also includes the phenomenon of foreign 
terrorist fighters, however, it gives a definition on terrorism acts for common use.24 
At the same time the Council also adopted a regulation, which amends the Schengen borders 
code. It reinforces checks at external borders, while it makes a systematic check against relevant 
databases on all persons crossing external borders obligatory for member states to carry out.25  
Protecting citizens and reducing vulnerability to attacks is one of the most important priority of 
the EU counter-terrorism strategy. This mostly focus on securing external borders, improving 
transport security, protecting strategic targets and reducing the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure. 
In this area, the EU adopted a directive regulating the use of passenger name record (PNR) data 
in April 2016.26 
“Passenger name record (PNR) data is personal information provided by passengers and 
collected and held by air carriers. It includes information such as the name of the passenger, 
travel dates, itineraries, seats, baggage, contact details and means of payment. The proposal 
for a directive presented by the Commission aims to regulate the transfer of such PNR data to 
member states' law enforcement authorities and their processing for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.”27 
The main aims of the PNR system is to complement the already existing tools to cope with 
cross-border crime and harmonise member states' legal provisions.28 
 
23 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/12/european-council-statement-fight-
against-terrorism/ (20 January 2019). 
24 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/rules-to-prevent-new-forms-of-terrorism/ 
(15 January 2019). 
25 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/regulation-reinforce-checks-external-
borders/ (18 January 2019). 
26 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/ (25 January 2019) 
27 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/ (25 January 
2019). 
28 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/ (25 January 
2019). 
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In April 2017, the Council adopted a directive on control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons, which includes more strict rules for the acquisition and possession of the most 
dangerous weapons. The directive also incorporates measures that aims to improve the 
traceability of firearms and to prevent the reactivation or conversion of them.29 
The EU also worked on to reach an improved information exchange, while also launched the 
European Counter-Terrorism Centre in January 2016, and also created a dedicated unit to tackle 
online terrorist propaganda.30 
7. Conclusion  
The Parisian terrorist acts were very well organized, albeit not unpredictable actions. Since 
2011 when the Syrian conflict began, thousands of EU nationals travelled to Iraq and Syria in 
order to join terrorist groups.31 According to a study, 30 percent of them had already returned 
to their home country.32 In the past few years, the European countries faced many terrorist 
attacks, which caused a threat to our common values and security. Each of them is somehow 
related to the above mentioned returnees.33 
The threat caused by Europeans being radicalised, travelling abroad, gaining combat experience 
and returning, thus becoming a ‘foreign fighter’ by definition, has been high on the political 
agenda for the last couple of years. This phenomenon affects a wide range of policies including 
e.g. the importance of a high volume information exchange, the criminal justice response 
system, and policies concerning the prevention of radicalization. 
It seems that the threat is likely to exist in the coming years, although no new attack by returnees 
has occurred since. Having the ability to perform an effective response requires a well-prepared 
approach both legally and politically. The primariy responsibility in dealing with this issue lies 
with the member states, nonetheless the EU made very important steps and play a supportive 
role in order to help member states.34 
 
29 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/25/control-acquisition-possession-weapons/ 
(21 January 2019). 
30 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/# (20 January 2019) 
31 Amandine Scherrer: The issue of foreign fighters: the EU framework, Part I., The return of foreign fighters to 
EU soil, Ex post valuation, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2018, 5.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf (10 
November 2018). 
32 B. van Ginkel & E. Enternmann (eds.): The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union, Profiles, 
Threats & Policies, ICCT Research Paper, April 2016. p. 3. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-
Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf (11 November 
2018). 
33 Renard & Coolaset, ibid, p. 3. 
34 Scherrer, ibid, p. 5. 
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While focusing on the future, it should be borne in mind that a more integrated and coordinated 
area of freedom and security is the only possible solution.35 
 
35 http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2016/01/08/cooperation-judiciaire-penale/the-paris-terrorist-attacks-failure-of-the-eus-
area-of-freedom-security-and-justice/ (25 June 2018). 

